

RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. VI

Autumn Number, 1937

No. 4

EDITORIAL BOARD

JOHN BAILLIE	SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT	JAMES R. JOY
WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN	CHARLES K. GILBERT	JOHN W. LANGDALE
LUCIUS H. BUGBEE	LYNN HAROLD HOUGH	HOWARD C. ROBBINS
FREDERICK K. STAMM	HENRY P. VAN DUSEN	

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Harvie Branscomb	Carl Sumner Knopf	Halford E. Luccock
Edgar Sheffield Brightman	Edward H. Kraus	Harris Franklin Rall
Clarence Tucker Craig	Umphrey Lee	Richard Roberts
Albert Edward Day	Edwin Lewis	Wilbour E. Saunders
Wilbert F. Howard	McIllyar H. Lichliter	Luther A. Weigle

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Winning of Peace.....	Francis B. Sayre 483
Religious Experience: Its Validity.....	Edgar P. Dickie 493
Appreciating Creation.....	Willis R. Whitney 502
What Is Man?.....	George Stewart 510
Religion Faces Naturalism.....	Roy Wood Sellars 526
Naturalism, Humanism, and Religion.....	Louis J. A. Mercier 538
Making Theology Available for Religion.....	Lynn Harold Hough 552
The Apocrypha.....	Charles Arthur Hawley 561
The Contribution of Paul Tillich.....	Reinhold Niebuhr 574
The Interpreter's House.....	George Arthur Frantz 582
Life Dramatic.....	G. R. Elliott 588
The New Order in Church Music.....	Robert G. McCutchan 601
Recent British and Continental Theological Literature.....	R. Birch Hoyle 615
Book Reviews.....	620
Bookish Brevities.....	637
Index—Vol. VI.....	639

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to John W. Langdale, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Business communications regarding subscriptions, etc., should be addressed to The Abingdon Press, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Entered as second-class matter January 16, 1932, at the post-office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. This number is the October, 1937, issue.

Subscription price, \$2.00 per year; postage free U. S. Possessions and Mexico; to Canada, 18 cents additional; other foreign postage, 30 cents; single copies, 75 cents.

For the convenience of readers in Great Britain, subscriptions will be received by The Epworth Press, 25-35 City Road, London, E.C.1, at the rate of nine shillings and sixpence per year.

Published by

THE ABINGDON PRESS
NEW YORK

CINCINNATI

CHICAGO

Who's Who?

EDGAR P. DICKIE, M.C., B.A. (Oxon.), B.D. (Edinburgh). Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, Saint Mary's College, University of Saint Andrews, Saint Andrews, Scotland.

G. R. ELLIOTT, Ph.D. (Jena), Litt.D. Professor of English in Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.

GEORGE ARTHUR FRANTZ, D.D., S.T.M. Minister of The First Presbyterian Church, Indianapolis, Ind.

CHARLES ARTHUR HAWLEY, S.T.M., Ph.D. Professor of Religion in the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH, D.D., Litt.D., LL.D. Dean of Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J.

R. BIRCH HOYLE, A.T.S. Theological Reviewer for the *British Weekly*, Free Church Chaplain for the Borough of Lambeth, London.

ROBERT G. MCCUTCHAN, Mus. Doc. Dean of the School of Music, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.

LOUIS J. A. MERCIER, Litt.D., L.H.D., K.L.H., Lauréat de l'Académie Française. Associate Professor of French and Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Ph.D. Professor of Applied Christianity, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE, LL.B., S.J.D., LL.D. Assistant Secretary of State.

ROY WOOD SELLARS, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

GEORGE STEWART, D.D. Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Stamford, Conn.

WILLIS R. WHITNEY, Ph.D., LL.D. Vice-President in Charge of Research, The General Electric Company, Schenectady, N. Y.

Copyright, 1937, by The Abingdon Press, Inc. All rights reserved—no part of this magazine may be produced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

Printed in the United States of America

The Winning of Peace

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

IF WE believe that Christ is still alive and taking a hand in the shaping of human destiny, we know that He must passionately want peace. War is the antithesis of all that He taught and of that for which He gave His life.

Christ was never content with mere sentimentalism. He was a realist, and He saw the world's problems as a realist would see them. Those who would adventure for Him and work for peace, because only through peace can His kingdom come, must be realists too. They must face the facts of life squarely, and with intelligence build the kind of foundations upon which and only upon which lasting peace can rest.

I

In our childhood fairy tales, no stories were more alluring than those of conquering the dragon which roamed the country-side devouring the land's fairest and its best. Today our youth stand ready to carry forward the torch of our civilization—if, and only if, they can escape the ravaging dragon of war whose hot and sulphurous breath we feel at times close upon us menacing all that we cherish.

In the fairy tales the dragon was always killed. But the tragedy of true life is that the dragon is not always killed. In the cold workaday world, often the dragons prove victorious. If we are to win our fight against the modern dragon of war, we must develop champions and leaders not only brave but wise—brave enough to stand out against the sinister pressures of powerful groups seeking their own selfish ends, and wise enough to understand how to meet the altogether changed conditions of modern existence.

Let us beware, in such a struggle, of developing a false sense of security in the mere enactment of legislation. Carefully framed neutrality laws have their place; but they cannot possibly save us from the consequences of a major war. Since the Industrial Revolution the whole trend of our development has been a growing interdependence of nation upon nation in commerce, in finance, in thought and belief. The workmen of one nation are dependent for their very subsistence upon markets on the other side of

the world; the sudden depreciation of one nation's currency may start in motion a succession of financial shocks and disturbances which will circle the globe; the turn of the political tide in one country between contending factions due to a purely internal domestic crisis may cause the downfall of governments or the outbreak of flames in another hemisphere. The actual world of commerce, of finance, of thought, in which we live today, knows no frontiers. Boundaries mark political administrative units; but under modern conditions they no longer represent real demarcations in human life.

It follows as the night the day that no nation through isolation can avoid the consequences of a major war. Ostriches can stick their heads in the sand, but in the world of realities this offers no means of escape. A nation may yield to the delightful fancy bred of outlived conditions that it can live sufficient unto itself; but the fancy is in direct conflict with the cold realities of modern life. The best way to generate war is for nations to close their eyes to modern realities, indulge in wishful thinking and try to live hermit existences.

Isolation is impractical because no political machinery can force time backward or reverse the ways of human life. No possible legislation can prevent the world-wide sequence of cause and effect, action and reaction, in the life of commerce, of finance, of ideas and beliefs; and these, after all, are the worlds in which we live.

II

Today there is one and only one way to escape the consequences of war. That is to prevent its outbreak.

How?

Not by force of arms. Not by competitive armament building which must eventually lead to bankruptcy.

Again, not by emotional pacifism. Peace will never be gained through mere emotion. Lasting peace is won not by mere wishful thinking but by toilfully building the kind of foundations upon which it must rest. The mere substitution of good will for racial hatreds or national prejudices is not enough. Racial hatred under modern conditions is seldom the root cause of war. No nation desires war merely for the sake of doing injury to others.

Nations embark upon war not because of desire, but because of what they conceive to be compelling necessities. Such conceptions may arise out

of falsely reasoned national interests and failure to adopt a co-operative attitude toward others or they may represent an exaggerated reaction to the non-co-operative policies of other nations. If we would escape war we must find a way of changing these non-co-operative attitudes and policies which lead to war-breeding situations. How can this be done? What are some of the policies which breed war?

One of the major root causes of war today is the blocking of foreign trade.

Some nations depend for their very existence upon various foodstuffs or raw materials which they themselves do not possess. England needs food from abroad; without it her people would starve. Italy needs foreign coal and oil and iron; cut off from these she could not carry on a modern existence. Germany needs both food and raw materials from abroad; without these she could not maintain an adequate standard of living. If ordinary processes of trade break down, nations under such necessities may resort to conquest in order to gain assured access to needed foods or raw material.

We know that conquest is in fact no solution, but only the way of despair. A major war forces down the standard of living in every participating nation through increased debt payments, through loss of foreign markets, through loss of the nation's manhood in the very prime of life. War is not a practicable means for attaining economic goals.

But this is beside the point. If peoples whose subsistence or whose standard of living is dependent upon imports from abroad are denied the power to get those imports because of the breakdown of trade, we are face to face with a war-breeding situation. Commercial policies which result in blocking access to foodstuffs or raw materials set the stage for war.

Other nations, more fortunate in the rich diversity of their natural resources, may not be so dramatically dependent upon specific imports; yet they may need general imports no less vitally in order to keep down living costs and maintain their standard of living. As a result of the developments of the past hundred years, national production has become highly specialized. Each country because of its natural resources, its climatic conditions or the aptitudes of its workers has been able to excel in the low-cost production of certain kinds of goods. Some have thus become predominantly agricultural, others predominantly industrial. International exchange of products has resulted in enormously reduced costs of goods and in heightened standards of living. Excessive barriers to international trade

designed to exclude foreign products have been erected by countries attempting to encourage domestic production—regardless of costs—of goods which they are economically unfitted to produce. The resulting obstruction to the normal flow of international trade has caused diminished national incomes, depressed standards of living, increased unemployment, social unrest, financial instability and menaced currencies. These are the very factors which generate war-breeding situations. When national standards of living are forced down to unbearable levels or when a country is reduced to such financial straits that it cannot balance its budget, national leaders may feel compelled to choose between pending revolution and foreign war adventures.

The need of export markets is no less vital than the need of imports. This is, indeed, only the other side of the shield. Even a country as varied in its natural resources as our own is vitally dependent upon export markets. We must normally sell abroad about three-fifths of our cotton crop, a fifth of our wheat, two-fifths of our leaf tobacco, a third of our lard, a third of our rice, almost half of our dried fruits, as well as enormous quantities of automobiles, agricultural and other machinery, typewriters, radios and the like. Every reduction of foreign markets constitutes a direct blow against our economic and social life.

National economies are geared to support millions of workers in occupations which have come to be vitally dependent upon foreign markets. Strip those industries of their foreign markets and you drive millions of people out of the only forms of employment by which many of them can live, and seriously affect the prosperity of millions of others through the curtailment of domestic markets.

Lowered standards of living, as a result of the loss of our export markets, would cause intense suffering and acute social disorders in the United States; in Europe, where most nations lack the rich diversity of resources which we enjoy, thoroughgoing economic isolation would entail in many countries actual starvation. Men will fight before they starve. They may also fight rather than see accustomed standards of living forced down to unbearable levels.

Heightened trade barriers generate war-breeding situations.

But it is not only the blocking of international trade which creates dangerous tensions. Commercial policies built on discriminations lead even more directly to the same result.

Nations in their commercial intercourse may follow either one of two alternative policies. They may follow either a policy of equality of treatment or one of discrimination. Under the former, concessions given to one nation are extended to all other nations which give similar treatment in return. It is the policy embodied in a comprehensive network of treaties whereby nations promise to give to each other the same treatment as that accorded to "the most-favored-nation."

Following the economic crash of 1929 and the introduction of new economic devices, such as quota restrictions, exchange controls, and government monopolies, nations entered into a more and more intense struggle each to increase its exports and to lessen its imports, in entire disregard of the fact that one nation's imports constitute another nation's exports. From these non-co-operative and isolationist policies grew intense and bitter trade rivalries; and the new economic devices seemed to furnish an easy means of escape from the binding provisions of existing most-favored-nation treaties, written with tariff duties only in mind.

In the desperate effort of each to increase its exports, nations entered into innumerable agreements for the granting to each other of exclusive trade preferences, again in entire disregard of the fact that every exclusive preference granted to one nation constitutes a discrimination against every other nation. A policy of trading in exclusive preferences can lead only to increasing commercial instability and economic chaos; for discrimination inescapably leads to retaliation, hostility, counter discriminations and mounting trade barriers. The policy of discrimination is the sure pathway to economic conflict and dangerous tensions; it sets the stage for war.

War in the past, it is true, has frequently been caused not by economic necessities but by "power politics." Unhappily the day of "power politics" has not completely passed. But international conditions are changing fast. Wars have increased in cost prodigiously since Napoleon's day. So interdependent in fact have nations become since the Industrial Revolution that a Napoleonic victory today would not only wreck the world commercially and financially but would bring down in ruin the victorious country upon the conqueror's head. There can be no economic victor in a modern world war. Even narrowly restricted wars of conquest lead to unforeseen and often startling repercussions in other countries which react like boomerangs; because of their economic consequences, they are proving of more and more questionable value to their instigators.

III

No thinking person advocates a program of complete economic self-sufficiency for the United States. We must trade.

The problem of foreign trade which we faced in 1933 was one growing out of the economic aftermath of the war. Averted for a decade by huge foreign loans, economic chaos burst upon us in 1929. Nations entered into feverish competition with each other to sell to foreigners a maximum and to buy from foreigners a minimum of goods. To protect against huge excesses of imports over exports and the consequent outflow of gold, nations sought to cut down their imports by launching intensive drives toward national "autarchy," or economic self-sufficiency. This movement was still further intensified by military considerations. New governmental measures were devised arbitrarily to restrict imports. Through the means of "quota" restrictions the importation of goods was cut to absolute, fixed amounts; and by assigning arbitrary quotas to different nations this new economic weapon came to be used to favor some and discriminate against rivals. Other weapons were forged for the same ends—exchange control restrictions, government trade monopolies, import licensing requirements. Through these new economic weapons nations found a way to sell their own markets to the highest bidders and to strike with deadly effect against the very vitals of their trade rivals. Preferences and discriminations became the order of the day. Nation became pitted against nation in the parry and thrust of bitter trade rivalry. The trade highways of the world became blocked with impossible barriers. Traffic became choked. International trade fell to a third of its 1929 value.

The United States could not escape the effects of this world-wide shrinkage of international trade. From 1929 to 1933 the value of American exports declined by 68 per cent, or from \$5,157,000,000 to only \$1,647,000,000. During that period the value of our exports of raw cotton—upon which the economic structure of the entire South is vitally dependent—fell by almost half. Shipments of meat products decreased in value by 67 per cent, and those of wheat and flour by 90 per cent. To the resulting losses in farm incomes due to lessened sales must be added the losses due to the sharp reduction in domestic prices caused by the glutting of home markets with unsalable surpluses diverted from foreign shipment. The economic prostration of the farmer had a direct and devastating effect upon the livelihood of merchants, bankers, those in the service trades, professional men,

and others in our small agricultural towns. Exports of manufactured goods, other than foodstuffs, declined by \$2,400,000,000, or more than 70 per cent. Suffering throughout the country became intense. It was evident that something had to be done.

It was in the light of this experience that Congress felt itself called upon to take steps to restore our foreign trade. Following a well-established line of precedents, the Trade Agreements Act, approved June 14, 1934, authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal agreements under standards set forth in the act and empowered him to modify existing customs duties within a 50 per cent limit in exchange for foreign concessions.

In granting this authority to the President, Congress was careful to insure against the arbitrary or bureaucratic action which characterized the customs regulation of certain foreign countries, where quotas may be reduced, import licenses revoked, available exchange cut off, or barter permits withdrawn almost overnight with no opportunity for advance notice or open hearings. Under the act no agreement can be concluded without prior announcement and full opportunity having been afforded interested private individuals to present their views. The hearings which form a regular part of the procedure are not essentially different from those held by other American administrative bodies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Tariff Commission, or the Interstate Commerce Commission. The determination of duty reductions and trade arrangements is not left to isolated professional bureaucrats. Instead, experts in the various Government departments having to do with foreign trade, including the Tariff Commission and the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture and the Treasury, are called upon for full study and examination of the various proposals.

We are constantly attempting to improve the methods by which informed and interested individuals may present their views. We fully recognize their interests and the Congressional mandate that those interests must be carefully protected. There is in fact no star-chamber atmosphere about the negotiations. Public announcement is first made that the negotiation of a trade agreement is contemplated, and interested persons are invited to present their views as to the products to be considered—both export and import commodities. Later, a formal announcement of negotiation is made, accompanied by a list of the commodities under consideration for reductions in our tariff, and American producers receive ample oppor-

tunity to present detailed evidence either in open hearings or otherwise. In addition to the formal open hearings countless informal conferences are held by the various departments with individuals or business groups, and, up to the last moment, the various Government departments concerned welcome information and critical comments which any business concerned may care to submit.

The process of reducing trade barriers by negotiation with individual countries is from its very nature a gradual one, and its effects are not to be measured by quick and superficial statistics. Nevertheless, such evidence as we have indicates an unmistakable and continuing gain in American foreign trade, in no small degree attributable to the trade agreements program.

Sixteen trade agreements have now been signed, all of which are in effect.¹ Our foreign trade with these sixteen countries constituted, according to 1936 figures, 40 per cent of our total foreign trade. Other trade agreements are in process of negotiation.

In 1936, our total trade—imports and exports—amounted to \$4,872,716,000, an increase of \$542,357,000, or 12.5 per cent, over that of 1935. Our exports in 1936 to the six countries with which trade agreements were in operation for all of 1936 increased by 15 per cent; our exports to the eight countries with which agreements were in effect for a part of 1936 increased by 12 per cent; while our exports to all other countries increased by 4 per cent. Our imports in 1936 from these six countries increased by 24.7 per cent; from the eight countries by 15.8 per cent; and from all other countries by 15.6 per cent.

During the first four months of this year the total value of our foreign trade—imports and exports—was 33.1 per cent greater than a year ago, increasing by \$509,019,000. To the fourteen countries with which trade agreements were in effect during the first four months of 1937, our exports increased by 35.7 per cent over those of the same period in 1936; whereas our exports to other countries increased by 23.3 per cent. Imports from the trade agreement countries during the first four months of 1937 increased by 32.1 per cent over those of a year ago. Imports from non-agreement countries increased by 43 per cent.

Our trade agreements program has been criticized on the ground that our imports from some of the countries with which agreements have been negotiated have increased by a larger percentage than our exports to these

¹ The last agreement, namely, that with El Salvador, became effective August 2, 1937.

same countries. Comparisons of this sort might have some validity if what we were concerned with were the state of our trade balance with each individual country. But such bilateral balancing is the very way to regiment and destroy trade. What we are seeking to do is to restore to international trade its essentially flexible and triangular character, because only when it operates on that basis can it really revive and expand for the benefit of ourselves and everyone else.

Moreover, to suggest that we have somehow or other got the worst of the bargain because in some cases imports have, over a short period, increased at a more rapid rate than exports is equivalent to arguing that imports, whatever their nature, are wholly bad and are detrimental to our national interest. Whenever prosperity is increasing, the country needs increased amounts of raw materials for our factories and our industries. Whenever disastrous droughts occur, imports of feedstuffs are necessary to save our farmers from famine prices and to save our cattle from having to be slaughtered. To argue that under these special conditions, trade agreements are failing if imports from each country exceed exports to that country reveals either a false philosophy or the intent to deceive the American people.

The increase of our agricultural imports in 1935 and 1936 has been seized upon in an attempt to convince farmers that the trade agreements program is wrecking them. Actually, however, most of the increases in our imports of agricultural products either have been in noncompetitive commodities like coffee, rubber, silk or the like, or in products of which there have been domestic shortages due to droughts. Because of the advance in prices, the values of imports in many instances show a disproportionate increase, the same imports often showing little or no increase in quantity. Half of our normal agricultural imports are not directly competitive and merely reflect an increased demand due in part to revived exports with the consequent need of additional raw materials and in part to marked domestic improvement of American business conditions. Of the remaining half, the outstanding cause for the increased agricultural imports of 1935 and 1936 was the unprecedented droughts during the years 1934 and 1936.

The trade agreements program is directed toward the achievement of permanent and far-reaching results. It seeks to encourage the lowering of trade barriers throughout the world. And although progress of this kind must be slow, we are unmistakably moving forward.

IV

If it be true that commercial policies which block access to needed food-stuffs and raw materials make for war-breeding situations, if it be true that policies of economic nationalism and excessive trade barriers destroy needed markets and thus make for war-breeding situations, if it be true that commercial policies based on preferences and discriminations rather than on equality of treatment make for war-breeding situations, surely the answer is clear. The way to build for peace is by ourselves adopting and urging others to adopt co-operative commercial policies which are liberal and constructive.

Our own trade agreements program is proving practicable and successful, not merely because it is resulting in increased material profits to all parties, but because it is proving an effective influence throughout the world toward the reduction of trade barriers and the elimination of trade discriminations.

What is needed now in our own country as well as in every other is the growing realization that, if the world is to be saved from war, governments must resolutely resist policies of commercial isolation pressed upon them by selfish pressure groups intent only upon their own gain and must instead adopt constructive and co-operative commercial policies such as will make for peace. That means policies directed toward the lowering of excessive and destructive trade barriers which block access to needed raw materials and to equally needed foreign markets; it means policies resolutely opposed to the granting of special privileges and preferences. It means a determined stand by each nation against economic nationalism.

Such programs require courage and high leadership. They may not be popular. They will arouse the antagonism of countless selfish groups. They will be denounced. But they constitute the pathway to peace.

Religious Experience: Its Validity

EDGAR P. DICKIE

“WE all feel certain,” says Lotze (*Logic* 2, ii, 212), “in the moment in which we think any truth, that we have not created it for the first time, but merely recognized it; it was valid before we thought about it and will continue so without regard to any existence of whatsoever kind, of things or of us.”

In spiritual matters, moreover, certitude belongs not to reason but to love. Our conviction goes only so deep as our love. We persuade others of it, not by argument, but by declaration of it and by life in accordance with it. (The proofs of the being of God have made many skeptics: the declaration of the love of God has made many saints.)

Yet skepticism is not always and necessarily sin. Reason was given to us to use. It is part of revelation. Christian faith must philosophize, since Christ is the Truth as well as the Way and the Life.

The incorrigible skeptic argues that the processes of thought and the experiences of religion may, for all we know, yield no valid knowledge of reality. But there are very definite limits to skepticism. The skeptic must found his arguments on reason. Universal skepticism is a malady which cannot be cured, but it is also a position in which reason finds it impossible for a moment to rest. Reason inevitably believes in itself. Its “faith” in itself is indestructible and inexhaustible; “and faith in itself means faith also in the ultimate rationality of the universe” (Pringle-Pattison: *Scottish Philosophy* 4, p. 72).

We think of reason as that by which man, the rational being, *is* man. We assume that we know the standard before we are asked to conform to it by “being reasonable.” Perhaps we may say in general that there are two kinds of reason. 1. In the narrower sense, the word refers to the use of syllogistic argument, working on observation, and acting in accordance with (a) the laws of thought, and (b) the postulate of a reliable system of cause and effect. 2. In its broader meaning, reason is that which validates conviction. (Cf. Adams Brown: *Pathways to Certainty*, English edition, p. 138.) It is not the conviction itself, but reflection on it; and it may be important to realize that reflection on an experience may *change* the experience. It is

at least possible that reason in the act of reasoning may never be able to see the experience as it actually is. It may be in the position of the man who switches on the electric light quickly in order to see what darkness looks like, or the young lady who opens her eyes rapidly in front of the mirror to see what she looks like when she is asleep.

I. Our first point is this: Reason in the narrow sense is not sufficient of itself for any demonstration. Working as it does by syllogistic argument, it must assume the cogency of the laws of thought. The conclusion of a syllogism follows from the premises by a kind of necessity, but it is not a necessity which can be proved by argument. The word "therefore" in the conclusion is an important (and mysterious) part of the syllogism. You cannot prove by argument that the argument is valid. You cannot by reason demonstrate that reason is competent to do its work. There enters into reasoning *an element akin to faith*.

Nor can we outflank a second difficulty. If we look outward to the object, instead of inward to the subject, we find that there is a measure of faith in all science. With faith in man's mind as capable of comprehending, there must go faith in the orderliness of nature. "There could be no science if we began with chaos on the part of the universe and incompetency on the part of man" (Curtis W. Reese in *Humanist Sermons*, p. 39).

II. The next point is that reason, even by such perfervid "rationalists" as Ingersoll, is taken to include *the moral sense*. Logical self-consistency is not enough. A totally different universe might be logically self-consistent. Why do we have *this* universe and not another? The only answer to this question appears to be that of the idealist tradition from Plato onward. Science and Philosophy want to present reality as an intelligible system. But the system is not yet intelligible if we do not know why it is this system and not another. It must be shown as a self-authenticating reality. And reality can be self-authenticating only if it is good. "A materialistic universe, taken by itself, may have to be accepted as brute fact, but it cannot be understood" (Hodgson: *The Grace of God*, p. 51).

III. The third argument therefore must indicate that reason includes an element akin to *personal trust*. Reason is not to be confined to that which can be weighed and measured, counted and analyzed, that is, to the object-matter of physics, chemistry, and the like. That which is amenable to these operations is not the real world. It must not be supposed that the impersonal is something easily intelligible. It is being increasingly realized

that it is in fact far harder to understand than the personal. It might even be safe to say that, though we do not understand the personal fully, we do not understand the impersonal at all.

There is a type of judgment which is a judgment of reason, yet not capable of syllogistic proof. The ideal of the metaphysician is to arrive at certainty regarding the truth. How is he to reach it? The answer depends on the kind of certainty which he desires. There are two contrasted types. 1. That which belongs to mathematical theorems; to knowledge of present-day facts; to the records of past history. This type of certainty rests on calculation, on observation, on the testing of reports. 2. The second type is that represented by knowledge concerning, for example, a mother's love, a friend's loyalty. In the first, concerned with matters of fact, our will must not enter. The personal equation is to be rigidly excluded. In knowledge of the second type, on the contrary, our will must enter into the matter before we arrive at certainty. If a man is a "trimmer," if he is one who "hangs his coat against the wind," he can never believe, with certainty, in the existence of a man on whom he can rely absolutely, whom nothing will move from the line he has once conscientiously taken. He believes that every man has his price. In this sphere, two things are required: (1) A man must have the thing within him before he can apprehend it elsewhere; (2) a man must trust before he can be certain. The first type of knowledge distrusts everything that cannot be seen and handled, measured and proved. The second rests on trust.

Let us see first that certainty is not to be found in the former type of knowledge. It, in turn, may be divided into two sorts: (a) Truths of reason; (b) truths of fact—what Leibnitz called *vérités de raison* and *vérités de fait*. The first type appears to give certainty because of its principle of non-contradiction, but this is at the expense of contact with the matters to which such laws of thought are applied. We have only a formal principle of certainty. As soon as we begin to fill it with content, uncertainty creeps in. For the other type—concerned with truths of fact—is not immediate knowledge. There is an ugly ditch between fact and truth. And even the law of non-contradiction does not go beyond the hypothetical. What it does say is that, if thinking is rational at all, it must proceed according to this law. It does not say that thinking *is* rational.

Now, therefore, we must return to the second of the two larger divisions—to judgments of trust and confidence. These are in a different category. Here we have a wholly different kind of certainty. Judgments of this type are, in fact, made again and again with great confidence. Men trust their friends far beyond what they can see and prove, and their confidence is reasonable. (So much so that it would be considered a dishonorable proceeding to ask for proofs of loyalty.) This is, indeed, the nearest approach we have to certainty in human affairs. And it comes, not by proof, nor by argument, but by the way of trust. It is a different type of certainty. Its highest form is that shown by the religious man who trusts God in spite, as we say, of appearances. "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him" (Job 13. 15). (Cf. Karl Heim: *Glaubensgewissheit*, pp. 1-30.)

It is important, above all, to notice that reason must not be confined to knowledge of the impersonal. There are those, says Canon Hodgson (*Essays in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 48-51, and *The Grace of God*, p. 153), who are still under the hypnotic influence of the nineteenth century, and count nothing real unless it can be "explained" in terms of physical necessity. We have passed beyond the time when it is possible to imagine that the impersonal is more intelligible than the personal. We are realizing that the impersonal must be explained by the personal and not *vice versa*.

An essay by René Fülöp-Miller (Hibbert Journal, January, 1936) is entitled "The Revolt against Reason." We are aware of this revolt in every sphere of human activity. In the realm of politics we have in Italy a Fascism which is opposed to all that is rational. It is not the calm reason of an educated people which is to be in control, but irrational forces, embodying the creative will of a nation and personalized in a Duce who has been, not elected, but mythically appointed. In Germany there is added to the idea of a Messianic Führer the concept of the sacred race, and the blood-myth. In science we have the Neo-Vitalism of Hans Driesch; and the astronomer who declares that the starry universe is not so much like a great machine as like a great thought. We have Planck suggesting that Nature, once supposed never to make a leap, moves all the time by leaps (rather like a kangaroo); and Poincaré, the astronomer, even hazarding the guess that if men had possessed eyes with the power of the microscope, the laws of nature would never have been discovered, since they are not able, he thinks, to endure too close and precise a scrutiny. In philosophy, we have Bergson turning away from rational cognition and falling back on the vital impulse,

the *élan vital*. In psychology, we have learned of unconscious, irrational impulses, racial memories, and symbols, influencing, perhaps determining, the conscious life.

Yet it is safe to prophesy that, after the revolt, reason must return to its rightful place. What that is we may best determine by looking at those things with which reason is usually contrasted. As we are concerned primarily with the relation of reason to faith, these contrasts may be reduced to two. Reason is opposed, 1. To authority; 2. to revelation.

1. Consider the suggestion that reason has no place in religion; that authority is all. Admittedly, the non-rational factors play a very important part in the acquisition of belief. Man is *suggestible*. He does not believe a thing chiefly because reason shows it to be credible, even undeniable. He believes it because of influences brought to bear on him. These may be found in the home, in his training and nurture as a child; in his adolescent or adult environment; in tradition. Suggestion might be defined as a process resulting in the acceptance and realization of an idea in the absence of adequate logical grounds. (Cf. Yellowlees: *Psychology's Defence of the Faith*, p. 19.) We conform. Occasionally we see those people who appear to be exceptions to this rule—the rebels, the “permanent opposition,” those who set themselves violently against the currents of the day. The contra-suggestible are, in art and religion, the *cranks*. But, however great may be the part played by suggestion in the *acquisition* of belief, it is evident that it does not account for the tenacity with which belief is maintained. In the long run, and in the normal mind, says Doctor Yellowlees, reason takes its rightful place. Belief is modified and molded through experience guided by reason. If faith rested on suggestion alone, it would speedily die. There is in life “plenty of disaster that seems to contradict it in the most intimidating way” (Professor D. M. Baillie: *Faith in God and its Christian Consummation*, p. 63). “Lord, I believe; help *Thou* mine unbelief.”

Closely linked with the influence of the herd is the part played by tradition. In order to arrive at the truth in matters of belief, it is said (cf. Karl Adam: *Spirit of Catholicism*, p. 38), we must get rid of self. “Autonomous” thinking lies in delusion. “The first ‘autonomous’ man . . . was Adam,” when he took the fruit of the forbidden tree. “And so man . . . fell sick and died. His self was his sickness and his self was his death.” We readily agree that, when the mind is humble, reverent, receptive, it is

then open to the deepest convictions. Man must rid himself of pride and of the unworthy elements both in morality and in intellect; but the self, surely, must stand secure and autonomous. To get rid of it; to seek for heteronomy, is to open the door to the very doubtful and dangerous conclusion that truth may in the end be that which is given, let us say, in the unconscious.

The same warning is required by that trust in the authority of the word of Scripture which, being exaggerated, leads to Bibliolatry. One writer has said that "we put out a person's own eye, and then try to persuade him that he ought to see with someone else's eye."

On the other side it may be asserted that autonomous thinking involves the danger of losing all certainty in belief; of falling back into pure subjectivity. That is an unreal and unnecessary fear. Final certitude, indeed, is not to be looked for, where none is in perfect communion with God. It is asymptotic. Yet it is real. In the highest forms of experience there may still be doubt, but on one point there is certitude, namely, that doubt is not due to any failure in the divine revelation, nor to any essential inapprehensibility of the Word of God.

2. Secondly, the question arises whether reason is altogether disclaimed in favor of revelation. For the contemporary "Theology of Crisis" God is the "completely Other," the absolute over against all relative. Because man is fallen from God, therefore the finite is incapable of the divine. God is not to be found in nature, in history, or in human "experience" of any kind, but only in revelation as it reaches us in the Word of God. And the distinctive feature of the Bible is not its ethics, nor its religion, nor its history, but the breaking through of the Divine into human life.

In Barth's doctrine of revelation we are frequently faced by the dangers which inevitably follow any depersonalizing of man. If the mind of man plays *no* part, then only a mechanized inspiration, magically enforced, is left to us. And Barth appears only to be pushing his difficulty one stage back. For the Bible is the record of those who did find God, where Barth says he is not to be found, in nature, in history, and in personal experience.

Such distrust of reason goes very deep. It drives us back to ask how it is possible for an intelligible word of God to come to creatures who are wholly different from God; how God can reveal Himself to man unless

there is some kinship between Himself and the recipient of His revelation. Reason, the Barthian forgets, is also revelation. Deny the authenticity of reason's judgment and you make it forever impossible for man to tell *when* he has the truth; *when* God is speaking to him. Irrationalism is bound to end in agnosticism.

God is Creator: man is creature. God redeems: man is redeemed. This we join in affirming. The Otherness of God is not really in danger of being denied. But in so far as God and man are rational and spiritual, they are of one kind.

.

Faith must make use of reason. But it is also true that reason must take faith into account. Reason validates conviction. But to understand how comprehensive reason is, we must consider all kinds of conviction; and religious convictions (those which are subsumed under the word "faith") form a large and important section.

Religion could come only to a nature that is essentially rational. Yet religion is not the activity of reason alone. We must agree that religious truth is apprehended and taken possession of by an activity of the mind; but we must avoid the mistake of supposing that reason, which is able to appropriate religious truth, is therefore competent to discover it.

In our own day the question is frequently being asked whether that which is styled "Humanism" is not enough. Its forces are arrayed against authority, against feeling, against revelation. In opposition to these is put a reasoned sense of the dignity of man. It is what we might call reason in the widest sense of the term, but reason which is unreasonably determined to deny *ad initio* the possibility of the supernatural.

It is evident that reason, in this philosophy of life, cannot be reduced to the level of discursive reason, proceeding by syllogistic argument; for then it either fails to be self-sufficient or is self-contradictory. It implies, for example, intuitive apprehension of the reasonableness of each step in the argument. Thus it must be widened to include (1) the element of intuition; (2) certain assumptions or postulates; (3) much wider evidence. The world of thought becomes its province. Insufficient in itself, it always points beyond itself. Faith is not reason, yet faith is reasonable. And, on the other hand, every form of rationalism, every dreamed-of "religion without revelation," is confronted with the insoluble problem of the unsatisfied demands of reason itself.

1. Reason is unable to achieve what nevertheless it recognizes as necessary. It always points forward to something higher, in which alone reason can become complete. Reason without revelation is not reasonable, because it is not self-consistent. Its own bafflements demand faith. It can make the demand—indeed it makes it inevitably—but it is unable to satisfy the demands which it cannot refrain from making. Without revelation, reason would not even make the demand for consistency and self-completion. Like faith, reason also is from without, from above, from the Wholly Other.

2. The same is seen to be true when we turn from the intellectual demands of reason to the emotional and ethical. Poets and artists may recognize that their work is not their own. (We think of the dying words of William Blake: "It is not mine! It is not mine!") They are the instruments. The reality which they are trying to interpret is a reality which is seeking to reveal itself through them.

More important are the ethical demands. The humanist will not be prepared to admit those perplexities of reason which are, for many of us, the most serious, namely, the inability of man to repair the ethical system when it is violated, to bring about the forgiveness of sins and the overruling of evil for good. For an *argumentum ad hominem*, therefore, we must go to his own conception of morals. Doctor Reese writes (*Humanist Sermons*, p. 46), "Man achieves his spiritual values because he feels the need of them." It is a dangerous statement for a humanist to make, if his criticism of religion is that it is a wish-fulfillment; and yet it is a statement which he is bound to make in one form or another if he hopes to preserve his belief in morality. Now, belief in God is *at least* as reliable as belief in moral values. You cannot remove the one without removing the reasonable grounds for accepting the other.

The book entitled *Things and Ideals* is one of the few writings in which a humanist of today has seriously faced the profound perplexities which Humanism leaves unresolved. At the end of that book Professor Max Otto has a poignant chapter on "The Hunger for Cosmic Support." He advocates the renunciation of every attempt to find a Friend behind phenomena; every quest for companionship with a Being beyond the fleeting aspect of nature. We acknowledge ourselves to be "adrift in infinite space on our little earth, the sole custodians of our ideals." We are psychically alone. Men, who are comrades in doom and agents of each other's

weal or woe, must not go down the years estranged from the one friend they have—each other.

Men have been afraid to face the truth, he says (p. 230). And the nature of their fear shows that religion is only wish-fulfillment. They desire a purposive universe, and psychic kinship with a transcendent Being. But their fear, when anyone threatens to remove these objects of longing, is not a fear of intellectual confusion. On the contrary, what gives the demand its vitality is the fear of *emotional* confusion.

Clearly, Professor Otto's initial mistake is to suppose that the two types of disquietude can be separated. Suppose any instance of the violent uprooting of a belief firmly held. Suppose that I were to look into my shaving-mirror one morning and find that it was no longer my own face that the mirror reflected. Professor Otto would say, "This is just a strange phenomenon which we must investigate calmly and dispassionately; there is no call to be upset or alarmed." I *should* be upset. I demand the *right* to be alarmed! Reason is not enough. It is true that religion must not be *irrational* or *sub-rational*. The task of reason is to make impossible all religions save the best. But religion must always be *supra-rational*, as it were, rational *plus*. The emotional confusion arising from the removal of the idea of God is a proof of the firmness with which the conviction of His being is held. Emotional and intellectual confusion may not always be rigidly separated. It did not need modern psychology to prove that emotional confusion, so far from indicating a trifling disturbance, may arise from the denial of truth in the inward parts. The disappearance of the thought of God may be due, not to any enlightenment of the understanding, but, as we well know, to apathy, forgetfulness, disobedience. Our peace and patience, grounded in the idea of God, are not created by any feeling of personal satisfaction, but by the *truth* which we both feel and know.

John Campbell Shairp, Professor of Humanity and later Principal of the University of St. Andrews, expressed the thoughts of many devout souls when he wrote the familiar words

"Let me no more my comfort draw
From my frail hold of Thee,
In this alone rejoice with awe—
Thy mighty grasp of me."

Christian assurance does not mean, "I am aware of my sure sense of blessedness." It *does* mean, "God's love in Christ is sufficient for me."

Appreciating Creation

WILLIS R. WHITNEY

I ACCEPTED the invitation to write this article because I wanted to be of help. I am not a religious expert, and I am quite familiar with the errors made by one who talks outside his normal territory. We nowadays expect music of musicians, we consult medical men for our physical well-being, we look to lifelong biologists for the truth about living processes. On the whole, we thus get along best, because we need this high specialization.

On that ground we should all be intensely interested in truth and its spread. For centuries the clergy led the world in knowledge, its extension and application. Our colleges were started to prepare ministers. Once the pastor of a flock was the only one who could read. Even before the discovery of printing he was the one who knew the history, who carefully preserved the facts and informed the flock by word of mouth. His word had great weight, his example was commonly emulated. Such was the condition when the countless wonderful cathedrals of Europe were built. With the passage of time education was advanced and the means of ready learning were rapidly increased. Today practically everyone can read and write and many can think independently. Endless numbers of devices for spread of truth are common. More books are printed than will ever be digested. Libraries are everywhere. We have reliable newspapers and magazines, and every country in the world takes part in discovering and spreading truth. Any important new fact is immediately broadcast over the world, so that all may know it. This opens the way for superior steps in further education.

I wish to speak of "appreciation of creation" because most of us show lack of appreciation in many ways. In its simplest form, subconscious appreciation of the common facts of living shines clearly and continually in the faces and actions of a few people, while others seem to lack entirely that particular sense. You all know the cheerful and the misanthropic types. It is, however, not that simpler difference between the joyous and the despairers I think of, but something much more difficult to make clear—an educated kind of discernment and discrimination, a voluntary process.

In this use of the word creation I mean the infinite kinds and arrange-

ments of all material things, and the so-called laws or regularities governing their relationships, together with all we mean by the word truth. Thus my creation includes mentality, for example. And my meaning of the word "appreciation" is not confined to that of the passive noun, but includes the active, vital process—that is, doing something about it, doing something which adds to the value of the truth. And appreciation of any property may be brought about through effort. I am trying to keep within the area of thought which might be expected of a physical research man and yet use physical truth for spiritual purposes.

I believe firmly that the forces seeking truth are alike among all people and in all lands. I believe that the research spirit in countless widely different fields is doing more to advance civilization than anything else can do today. And just at this time, when the world is becoming superficially informed on isolated though amazing marvels of modern truth through many new agencies, there is a pressing problem and a real responsibility for leaders to fill the educational gap between the isolated discoverer and the people for whom his work is done. We need leaders to co-ordinate new and old knowledge. It is not enough for men to hear that cosmic rays are being studied in balloon ascensions, that some new synthetic drug may time the heartbeat, that electrons work in radio tubes, that desirable new flowers or vegetables can be produced by selective pollination or by x-rays, that radioactive elements have been artificially produced, that man's history can be traced back a million years, that eyes of insects can be surgically transplanted, or that cancer may be cured. Such are only isolated specialists' facts. Their highest usefulness to man must be brought about through further general appreciation. More of the truths about creation must be understood and appreciated by the mass of people, and I look to religious leaders to bring it about. They should be the leading general appreciators of all the results of seeking and finding aimed by specialists toward understanding creation.

Certainly this cannot be done by those researchers who are individually preoccupied at the forefront of knowledge on its countless far-flung lines. The scientist of whatever line, deeply concerned with some hypothesis to be tested in order to acquire truth, usually has little time or aptitude for doing more than describe his results, in quite technical terms, to fellow experts in the same field.

Thus, for example, the geneticist perhaps works all his life to determine some tiny hereditary regularity in a plant. He realizes that his knowl-

edge may apply to other plants and animals and must fit into a great whole which others (more generalized leaders) will help create. Such researchers may be striving to bring about greater economic security, or the development, or even the birth, of individuals of higher quality; but general understanding and appreciation by the people themselves is apt to be long delayed because accepted authorities and interpreters are few.

There has always been discussion of what is truth. I do not care to continue it beyond saying that truth is a steadily and rapidly increasing entity. It is also quite generally unappreciated. But I am satisfied with the common usage of the word itself. Truth will be discovered as the same thing in all civilized lands, where there is also found the same type of aggressive youthful questioners. They are those who retain under cultivation the inquiring mind and the insatiable curiosity of the normal child.

Errors in methods of education may cause thoroughly schooled children to lose much of their pristine and vigorous curiosity. Certainly such loss is not due to any lack of new, unknown matters deserving recognition. In fact, every field of human "seeking and finding" expands continuously. New areas of interest are forever being presented.

As you read history, you will see that we continually change our minds about things in proportion as our truth increases. But we do not make false any of the previous truth. Man, in fact, seems always to clarify his earlier pictures by further refinements, without ever erasing anything real. If the universe was not created within one week, as certain of our ancestors believed, still the belief is dominant that it was actually created in time.

Darwin's truthful observations led to many new biological viewpoints. Those who were disturbed lest false assumptions damage the human outlook lived to see the interpretations of nature gradually grow increasingly compatible with all truth. It seems to me that group leaders like the clergy, organized for service, comprehending by mature efforts more and more of the disclosures of our infinite creation, might find here an agreeable way of serving fellow men. The world needs to appreciate better.

If our schools become too authoritative to be truthful, or if they produce better imitators than inquisitive doers or originators and thinkers of truth, then perhaps no one could be better equipped to help out than the clergy. Certainly such things should not be left to over-enthusiastic specialists in science nor, in fact, to specialists in any single line, excepting the broad way of education. Such service to education can be well per-

formed only as the leaders have an enlarged sense of active appreciation of creation, and it calls for group cognizance to counteract individual idiosyncrasy. Such appreciation calls for study and understanding of the *processes* of the sciences as displayed in the modern seeking era and of the *products* which we so thoughtlessly and superficially absorb.

Perhaps the most natural and helpful efforts could be made by conveying from the pulpits to the thinking public something like a real appreciation of creation. This state of mind must have been responsible, for example, for the worshipful attitude of multitudes in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. If all the people in our churches felt conscious of the powers of growing and natural truth and understood, even in part, the methods of seeking and finding which are in quite common use, they would want to further extend the ways; and this would of itself react in turn upon the systems of education of youth.

I had thought of trying to illustrate what I mean by analysis of some distinctly new fields of scientific research which have quietly expanded about us in the past few years. But they are myriad and would require a whole book rather than a short article. Nowadays there are hundreds of new ologies. Most of them are devoted to the unselfish search for truth. They all concern details of creation which had not risen above the narrow horizon of mankind a short time ago. Each ology branches in turn into new ologies which are soundly based upon new knowledge and better understanding.

Take biology, for example. It is merely the truth about living things, but soon it has to expand all the way from etiology, paleontology, embryology (or beginnings), and other separate fields, through all sorts of intermediate living ologies like philology, histology, cytology, neurology, and thence to the questioning of limits of psychology, of ontology (reality), et cetera. Those names, for most people, are fenced enclosures. It isn't possible to enter them intelligently without a guide. Moreover, the interested workers in one enclosure are usually entirely unfitted to guide folks through any of them, including their own little patch.

Perhaps I could have made my thought clearer if, instead of biology and some of its recent offsprings, I had started with religion or psychology or socialism, and followed the current expansions. But here I should be too obviously out of bounds myself. My main contention is that the world needs leaders of thought more than ever. The Church formerly provided them. Leaders must base their powers upon truth and understanding if advance is

to continue. This is in general not being done as I think it might be. One might say that the knowledge of and parts necessary for better lives, or better living, are being continually augmented, but that the assembly of all the useful parts calls for more general knowledge of truth on the part of producers of the useful product.

If general peace, for example, should be one of our aims, then, in addition to dutifully reading in the Scriptures of the successes in battle of Jewish heroes who killed their thousands, we might study more modern efforts aimed at new and different treatment of enemies. Perhaps an eye for an eye can still be proved "bad business." We don't know how far the clarification of modern truth and appreciation of the real creation, with all its still untested possibilities, might carry us. But we might learn by experiment.

For the past quarter century there have been hundreds of highly trained men devoting all their time to flies, and not even houseflies, and not even for pest extermination. No, they have bred, fed, and studied millions upon millions of fruit flies. What earthly good can this do? A wise priest (Mendel), by direct questioning of nature, established certain regularities about the hereditary traits of peas. This has been extended to flies. Call it pure inquisitiveness, if you will, but it has been highly contagious to some of our foremost biologists. It has led to many bread-and-butter discoveries, and made possible the improvements of plants and animals by intelligent breeding, which in turn yields all sorts of exchange-values by which men express their good will one to another.

But this work leads more or less directly to human heredity, and anyone can imagine a future state of mass-mind that will recognize that it is obviously better to stop breeding undesirables than to stick to the older methods of shooting down excess men, regardless of quality. But how is such a state of mass-mind to be acquired? Only by truthful, intelligent education by acceptable authorities.

Perhaps no ology is more remote than astrology. Astronomy is its offspring and today there are endless extended branches. Astrophysics is itself a grand science. Astrology and astrology are highly developed ologies. Men may ask: Of what human interest can they be? We really are still too generally ignorant to answer fully such questions. But I like to look back to the time when we occupied a self-centered world, in a concentric universe. The sun rose and set and was made for us. Our appreciation of

creation seemed to be 100 per cent, but now it seems like a very small fraction of unity. There was a time in our development when all we knew of multiplicity could be expressed in small numbers, say of thousands, and it was a great day when appreciation of tens of thousands slowly dawned. Saul slew his thousands but David his ten thousands. Now we talk of millions and billions. Our feeble powers have even brought us to the point where in star mapping (astrography) we have to deal with dimensions which seem still only words—light-years. Until we know more about them we wrongly call them infinite, but within a few recent years whole celestial systems, stellar universes, have been found which are hundreds of millions light-years away. Surely we cannot appreciate them, but we do need to realize that our power of appreciating numbers depends entirely on such values as stretch or exercise our previous conception.

I have been interested in reading of recent researches, on so-called brain waves. It is too early to know what they mean, but modern amplifying outfits, such as those which pick up truly infinitesimal radio waves from space and turn them back into original sounds, are used in such a way as to write continuous, curved lines on paper when the controlling wires are connected to the outside of the human head. They are not so very different from the very useful cardiograph records now a part of everyday hospital work. Such discoveries will never "go into reverse." They will proceed. They will lead to entirely unexpected results. The general public must become interested in such things because they are true. As that sort of knowledge is continually advanced perhaps we will all become better equipped to carry out superior ideals of life. Otherwise probably not. Certainly it is not wise to neglect new knowledge, and it is foolish to oppose it. Only those who can be depended upon for general good will and wisdom should be asked to assemble, analyze and summarize for general use the highly diffuse and widely separated parts of knowledge with which we must continue to serve one another.

Perhaps we can begin by saying that as far as possible "we accept the universe" about as we know it—concerning which Thomas Carlyle said, "We'd better." But we should have a reservation. Actually no one need accept the universe without altering it more or less. The universe never stands still. We need not be dissatisfied with things as they are, but we must not be satisfied to leave them unaltered. Man must be a growing thing. So it is that practically everything, including some formerly accepted state-

ments, are changed by and for the world continuously. We see this in relatively simple science. The law of gravitation does not stay simple. It is not reversed, but is changed. The conception of matter has entirely changed, while matter remains unaltered; that is, accepted statements about it have changed during the past years, and now we say that the conservation of matter, which was called a law a few years ago, is no longer complete, and also that the law of conservation of energy now seems incorrect; so we say that while mass and energy are certainly interchangeable, and neither in any other sense is consumed, there is still the conservation of their sum, or product. Such truth, in its narrowest application, still informs us of the nature of the changes of concept and appreciation of the universe which is before us.

Actively and fitly to "accept the universe," then, is our great opportunity, and what we do in appreciating it, in cultivating it and making it grow in the way which at the time seems right, is our history. As yet we don't fully realize our opportunity. Nothing I could write would give an adequate idea of my feelings. We are terribly slow in accepting the real universe. Our acceptance has perhaps been increasing in rate, for it may be said to increase as every new detail of knowledge is developed. (I refer both to material knowledge and to psychological or cerebral expansions which we must also recognize if we take a bird's eye view of man's growth.)

Perhaps this is a way to look at the possibilities of effort along the line of more extensive understanding. Some of the results of research in widely separated parts of biology make it seem as though we have been rebuilding ourselves continually, from the time when we were the simplest cells, by meeting novel experiences and trying to handle them. We don't grow ahead of our troubles and necessities, but only after experiencing them. If this is a general law, it should be understood thoroughly by all.

You may marvel at the enthusiasm and understanding with which some youngster plays with a toy aeroplane. We who are too late to meet aeroplanes with childlike attitude must recognize in their eager acceptance of the situation a valuable principle of Nature. This principle is part of a growing yet regular creation within the eternal workings of a still unfathomed universe. By applying more wisdom to accumulating observations, men may forever continue the processes of growth which must have been taking place long before anyone could say he even tried to appreciate them.

The way collective understanding may grow was well illustrated by

contributions to truth by Galileo and Newton in the field of astronomy. Contrary to previous conceptions, masses which normally fall together or attract each other could forever retain remote relative positions and motions if once started that way. Thus, Jupiter and its revolving moons forever remind us of Galileo's original conception of a perpetual motion among heavenly bodies. Newton's expressions of the laws of gravity exposed exactly counterbalancing power in centrifugal force to offset that of gravity. This altered the world's view of all sorts of force-relations. So it is also very interesting to see how such truths extend to and through those tiny systems of creation, the chemists' atoms. Once defined as indivisible, they are now clearly very complex, perhaps without being complicated. Within their interiors the same wonderful perpetual motions with the same interstellar forces play the controlling parts. While the end of such disclosures in any direction is not in sight, one could spend endless hours (as scientists have been doing) observing the regularities of atomic matter. To attribute the color of our common neon lamps to regular ultra-microscopic disturbances of infinitely small celestial constellations is a token of this expanding understanding. The removal of peculiar old stumbling blocks to the understanding of atomic simplicity by the discovery, and even production, of the so-called atomic isotopes is another intriguing sign of general advance from the original lead. People who now intelligently contemplate the continuous processes of change and growth which pervade the universe begin to realize that continuing processes rather than stationary states, or any temporary resulting products, constitute our great values.

This doesn't mean reversal of vision, but a better insight. It is almost alarming that such a small part of the already discovered qualities of Nature or the quantities of creation can ever be part of one person's mental inventory. But the degree to which we collectively might appreciate creation need not be so limited, though it is often exceedingly cramped by ancient habits of thought and by mental indolence.

There may be a good opportunity to assist us all in what I'd call more suitable worship by more widely instructing us in the ways of truth and understanding. This would still be true no matter how reverent or worshipful or appreciative anyone already is. I am not a critic of our present appreciation but am simply trying to point out its unlimited possibility in a truly infinite creation.

What Is Man?

GEORGE STEWART

MAN, of humble origin, with all his faults, yet stands at the peak of God's creation. He has done horrible things; he has also created beauty, interpreted history and his own life; he has suppressed disease and made the common lot better; he has learned to look up, to reach out to God, and at his best to obey Him.

Even a cursory view of the human scene reveals man's apparent dual nature, his animal and his spiritual side. Neither are to be despised. We are body and spirit. Neither is perfect without the other. Speaking in a strict sense man does not have a dual nature, he is a unit. Nevertheless, the conflicting loyalties which divide him, the inner tensions which dissipate his strength, are such that for all practical purposes we can speak of two warring natures which inhabit nearly every individual. When this state becomes abnormally acute, psychology applies the term split-personality to the victim. But there is a real sense in which every man is a split-personality to the extent that he feels within him the strain between the forces that build up and the forces that destroy.

Plato approached the thought of Jesus when he opposed the idea that morality was the product of convention, with the idea that morality was natural to man. The great Hellene describes man as inhabited by three animals. First, there are the passions represented by a monster with many heads, some of which are tame, others wild; second, there is the courage represented by a lion; and, third, there is the rational being, the human part. He urges that we make man dominant, that we feed the lion and employ him to take the monster, using the tame heads and disciplining the wild ones. Here for him is the way to happiness. "Goodness is, so to speak, the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, while evil is its disease, deformity, and weakness."¹

This tension within man is what we should expect of a self-conscious being once he has discovered right and wrong. That he has made little progress since the discovery is no reason for discouragement, for conscience

¹ Plato, Republic 444. See Livingstone, Sir R. L., *Greek Ideals and Modern Life*, Oxford, 1935, for a discussion of the ideals which were in vogue in the Greek world before Christ, especially Chapter VI, "Christianity and Hellenism."

and the knowledge of right and wrong are of recent date. The late Professor Breasted in a remarkable chapter, "The Great Transformation," in his book, *The Dawn of Conscience*, describes how the new function of intelligence enabled man to discover *character*. The word itself came first into use in the Pyramid Age and became a frequent subject of reflective speculation. "The rate of man's development is therefore appallingly slow. The high noon of that ethical day, which is now only dawning, is still far away, and there is great need of patience, the patience of him who has learned to wait, if need be, in expectant silence."²

We are different spiritually and intellectually from the beasts of the field. Chesterton said: "If I wish to dissuade a man from drinking his tenth whiskey and soda, I slap him on the back and say, 'Be a man!'" No one who wished to dissuade a crocodile from eating his tenth explorer would slap it on the back and say, "Be a crocodile!"

Will man expunge himself? That is an open question, the answer to which man holds in his own hands. God invites man to a high destiny, but man must choose to take it.

The opposing sets of loyalties within a man are engaged in a life-long conflict. A great saint may come to a state of complete spiritual peace, but not many arrive at such a place. Civilization, culture, and religion depend upon the higher levels of life achieving victory over the lower. The self-conscious, ethical man must employ and direct his brute strength and instincts to create personal and social values, at the risk of his existence as a man.

This civil war within the cave, the battle between beast and man, between flesh and spirit, whether that conflict be expressed in psychological terms or in the language of devotion, is a tension which must be resolved to achieve a fruitful, a happy, and a socially valuable life.

In the first place, it does no more good to deny our flesh completely than to obey all its demands. Complete denial brings neuroses, a withering up of love, of graciousness and of personality. To obey the body undisciplined by other loyalties, is to become a creature of every impulse of ego, hunger or of sex. The five senses are good in and of themselves. But to continue to enjoy the legitimate pleasures of the five senses there must be restraint, decorum, and discipline. Society, government, music, painting, poetry, and letters, all aesthetic feeling depend not only on the thrust of

² Breasted, James H., *The Dawn of Conscience*, New York, 1934, p. 398.

instinct and emotion, but also upon employment of restraint, and by using lower levels of life for supreme spiritual ends. Carrel has well pointed out that if Beatrice had become Dante's mistress we probably would not have had the *Divine Comedy*.

The tension between man's conflicting loyalties, between reason and instinct, is a tension which is inevitable, life-long, and which can be productive of the best achievements of culture and religion.

Moderation, proportion, good sense, good taste, honesty, fair play, love—these are not words which enslave the spirit of a man; they are roads to green pastures of enjoyment in a world which can furnish amazing satisfaction. The body is not vile of itself, nor are any of its natural functions. Vileness comes when a gross man or woman uses the body for gross uses in a gross spirit.

Without arrogance, and acknowledging his failures, man is bound to recognize privileges and powers above those granted any other creature. By inductive and deductive processes, beyond simple reaction to pleasure or pain, a man can comprehend abstract ideas and make generalizations. He can appreciate and weigh values. He has a sense of "ought" which is unique. His equipment of mind, emotions, and will is the most varied, subtle, and adaptable of any creature. As we scrutinize this fascinating, living universe, which can be no less an object of God's creative energy and love than the soul of man itself, we see in broad terms certain levels of creation. The higher levels utilize the lower, but also shed light upon and interpret the lower. William Temple suggests Matter, Life, Mind, and Spirit as the four levels of existence.³ Man has been granted the privilege of standing in the top level or grade of creation. He alone has the conscious, filial bond with God, which was perfected in Jesus. Man may, if he will, be a vehicle of the Spirit of God.

But man has his limitations. When he is sensible he recognizes them. Thomas à Kempis said, "Thou art man and not God, thou art flesh and not an angel." It is in vain for him to stand a rebel against life. Life is too much for him, alone. He can survey nature, he can separate continents at Suez and at Cristobal. He can span the Golden Gate, harness the Colorado at Boulder Dam, throw a network of railway and air lines across every land—but can he, alone, discipline his own desires? Many see man's futility in mastering emotions which lead to war between nations, within homes, in his

³ Temple, William, *Christ in His Church*, London, 1925, p. 4.

own soul, and become discouraged pessimists. But need a man be discouraged or cynical? Because he cannot lift a huge rock with his bare hands alone he need not despise his feeble strength. If he take a lever he can lift the rock. Man is not an orphan in the storm. He is companioned by a God who has made His love and His power not only known, but available in Jesus Christ.

Nor need he feel discouraged if it be true that God has other affairs than simply providing a good earth for man to till. Modern knowledge has somewhat changed our view of man as "Lord of Creation," nevertheless it has not displaced him from his unique position. John Muir once remarked in a letter on this subject: "Certainly not. No dogma taught by the present civilization forms so insuperable an obstacle to a right understanding of the relations which human culture sustains to wildness. Every animal, plant, and crystal controvert it in the plainest terms. Yet it is taught from century to century as something very new and precious, and in the resulting darkness the enormous conceit is allowed to go unchallenged!"⁴ Although our vanity may receive a shock, still there is much a man can do, and be. He still has a place, a large place, he is still, as far as we know, the only other personality in the universe capable of converse and co-operation with God. Morality, insight, guidance, ethical discrimination, the ability to see and appreciate what God is bringing about does not depend upon whether or not men are the sole objects of God's solicitation.

There is an inevitable tension or conflict between the one and the many. Two young men, long ago, stood before an altar. One was a tiller of the ground, the other a herdsman. Each brought an offering to the Lord. One offering was acceptable, the other was not. Whereupon he whose offering was rejected slew his brother. When the Lord said, "Where is Abel thy brother?" Cain replied, "I know not, am I my brother's keeper?" (Genesis 4. 10). Here is one of the great type questions which is laid at the door of every man of every generation. Centuries later Job pleaded, "If I have withheld the poor from their desire, or have caused the eyes of the widow to fail; or have eaten my morsel myself alone, and the fatherless hath not eaten thereof; . . . Then let mine arm fall from my shoulder blade, and mine arm be broken from the bone" (Job 31. 16, 17). Still later when Jesus walked the roads of Palestine He repeatedly pointed out both personal and social responsibility. He cared about the personal happiness and the

⁴Bade, William Frederic, *The Life and Letters of John Muir*, New York, 1924, Vol. I, p. 9.

social life of His friends, and He expected that they also should care. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15. 13). "Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow turn not thou away" (Matthew 5. 42). On his last night before the crucifixion He prayed, "For their sakes I sanctify myself" (John 17. 19).

Just as there is a tension between heaven and earth, between flesh and spirit, so there is a tension between the one and the many. Can a man feed and clothe and educate a family, can he run a business if he is always thinking of others, always giving away everything he possesses? Of course he cannot. There is probably a place for moderns, even as with Medieval Orders, to give all, to be pilgrims. But most men and women have roots in a locality and in family obligations that an ethical God would plainly require them to meet. Balance, searching honesty coupled with generosity will see a man through, perhaps not to one decision which will settle the matter for all time, but to a just and gracious proportion in life which will enable him to help himself and his family, and at the same time help others, always willing, if God directs, to lose his life in that service.

In spite of modern tyrannies and dictatorships, in spite of racial and religious persecution, there has been an increasing estimate of the worth of the individual ever since the Middle Ages. Although the complete fruition of this growing regard for man is in many cases frustrated by politicians, piratical industrial barons, parasitic hereditary fortunes and unethical trade-union policies, it is nevertheless a fact which churches, states, and rulers disregard at their peril. Even in the somewhat monotonous days of peace there are no lengths to which man will not go to save another's life. Recently a stoker upon a small east-bound liner suffered the loss of an arm in the engine room. A call was sent out for a surgeon. Whereas in war there was no stopping when a man fell overboard from a convoy, within an hour three transatlantic liners were drawn up to render surgical attention to an obscure stoker! One of the paradoxes of modern life is the dramatic efforts which are made to save a man lost in a mine or in a forest while we mutilate a multitude of children by needless road accidents.

The cult of the Unknown Soldier in almost every land that fought in the World War is but another indication, perhaps more than half sincere, that the common man should have recognition.

Through much of the hypocrisy in the legislative program of every

nation, regard for the individual is emerging. The Christian Church and Christian thought have led the way in this matter. But as yet we do not see life steadily and see it whole. Our respect for individuals is sporadic, accidental, often unwise, absurd, and sentimental. Too many deserving men, women, and children are overlooked, too many undeserving receive more than their share of wealth, leisure, bonuses, suffrage, and institutional care.

There is, however, a tyranny of the weaker brother which unless put in its proper proportions will wreck society. Most of the value placed upon the individual is frustrated by a partial approach to the total problem. Society is rapidly organizing itself with reference to its weaker elements rather than with reference to the sound in body and in mind. By this is not meant any idolization of the Nietzschean strong man, but the biological, social, and spiritual dangers involved in the care of the unfit to such a degree that they outbreed the fit. Christian brotherly love and biological consequences have yet to achieve some proper balance here. A few Christian scholars such as Dean Inge have given thought to this subject, but not many.

Regard for the individual has finally resulted in almost universal suffrage in the Western World. We are yet in the preliminary stages of that experiment which has gone on for only a century and a half. On the debit side it has led to the rising of the mass man with a vote in his hand. As Jose Ortega y Gasset pointed out in his *Revolt of the Masses*, this has a formidable aspect. Perhaps the average man will drag down all things superior to his own level. Nevertheless, in spite of abuses, the idea that man should determine who governs him is an inevitable corollary of the ethical teachings of Jesus. Men cannot be aroused to pray for and hope for freedom and brotherhood without attempting to realize these ideals.

But we so easily become victims of our own shibboleths. We speak of freedom and equality as fundamental social and political *desiderata*. Any realistic scrutiny of men reveals that they are unequal, and any honest appraisal of society indicates that it is impossible to have equality and freedom at the same time. If we have one we cannot have the other. Modern social thinking tends to ignore the individual. It speaks in terms of human beings. The concrete fact of a man is treated as an abstraction, universals such as man, mankind, society are treated as the realities of the situation. As a result of the confusion between the concepts of individual and of human being we are rapidly achieving the standardization of men. Our institutions also neglect individuals and thus tend to thwart the life

of adults. Our mode of living and of work halts the growth and frustrates the possibilities of millions of actual men and women and children. They are lost in the bigness and in the standardized modes of cities, offices and industries. A man loses his individuality and becomes an economic, a social or a political abstraction.

Our democratic shibboleths do not in reality take account of the bodies and minds of actual men, for men are not equal. How then can their rights be equal? It is unfair to make the normal man or child or the man or child of superior talent equal to the incompetent and the mentally deficient. If the dull are given equal rights to higher education, they penalize the intelligent. To force through equality may bring on the ruin of civilization.

The true course lies in respecting inequality rather than in asserting equality. There is a valuable contribution which the average or even dull person may make in the daily work of the race. Their education and their rights should be cut to their measure. Otherwise, with universal suffrage, power will inevitably be placed in the hands of the weak and democracy will destroy itself.

In America today we are neglecting the normal and surrounding the sick, the insane, and the criminal with a specious importance which strikes at the rights of individuals. All tend to be brought to the level of mediocrity. We confront another inequality between the sexes which we refuse to consider partly through a natural desire to play fair, partly through the commanding economic and social position attained by women and partly due to a mawkish sentimentalism posing as manly honor. Says Carrel, "We have applied to man concepts belonging to the mechanical world. We have neglected thought, moral suffering, sacrifice, beauty, and peace. We have treated the individual as a chemical substance, a machine, or a part of a machine. We have amputated his moral, esthetic, and religious functions. We have also ignored certain aspects of his physiological activities. We have not asked how tissues and consciousness would accommodate themselves to the changes in the mode of life imposed upon us. We have totally forgotten the important rôle of the adaptive functions, and the momentous consequences of their enforced rest. Our present weakness comes both from our unappreciation of individuality and from our ignorance of the constitution of the human being."⁵

That the weaker brother exercises a certain tyranny over his stronger

⁵ Carrel, Alexis, *Man, the Unknown*, New York, 1935, pp. 271-272.

mates is undoubted fact. How to reconcile humane feeling with social and biological demands is a question of grave concern to modern civilization.

Jesus never put the cart before the horse. He never launched a Utopia without reference to the bricks out of which the edifice was to be built. He was concerned with daily bread, bodily health, a sound mind and a happy home, not for man in the abstract but for those actual persons He met in actual life situations. There could be no just society without fair-minded individuals motivated by invincible love. He began in the most practical way with the individual, but He did not end there, otherwise Christianity would be a mere ambulance corps, without trying to stop the struggles which wound and kill. First came the personal, then the social.

In the Old Testament the people, or the nation, were the object of God's solicitude. Some of the later prophets such as Ezekiel did place responsibility upon the individual. "What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel. Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ezekiel 18. 2-4).

But Jesus brought a new filial relationship between God and man. Each man, woman, or child was precious in himself, as a child of God. "It is not the will of your Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish" (Matthew 18. 14). In Jesus' teaching the rights, powers, privileges, and gifts which formerly were the portion of Israel as a people now pertained to the individual soul.

He was quick to condemn social injustice, but as He went about teaching, healing, and preaching He was constantly integrating, serving, encouraging, and directing individuals. Peter, Simon, and Andrew, blind Bartimaeus, the woman at Jacob's Well, the lepers, the man borne of four, Zaccheus, the thief on the cross, these and many others were befriended, and in such manner that they were encouraged to leaven the society in which they lived. Men were to attempt to be perfect as God was perfect. The pure in heart should see God. Greatness was the natural consequence of service that is truly loving. The rule of God was to be a spiritual commonwealth or fellowship.

As J. Y. Simpson has said, "Jesus gave to the world a new conception of the value of the individual human life. . . . But this value of the

human life does not inhere simply in itself: it comes from the fact that man is called to co-operation with God in His purposes for the world."

How may we reconcile individual value with social necessities?

Victor Hugo had his Bishop say to Jean Valjean, "Remember, my son, life is to give and not to take." Jesus laid stress upon building up the character of the individual so that he might then be able to give himself worthily to a worthy cause, and lead a worthy life. Martin Luther was wont to say to his friends, "The Christian man is freest of all, yet bond-servant to all." That is the paradox of human life. We gain life by the gift of life, we win health by the gift of the health of those who experiment with disease and fight epidemics. Nothing for nothing and very little for a sixpence is the law of life. Man's mind, man's peace, man's bread, his home, his safety is bought with a price someone must pay. One of man's most precious possessions, liberty, is one of the possessions he least wants to keep. He is on an eternal quest for someone to whom he can give that treasure.

Individualism, unrestrained by fair play, by some reference to the rights of other lives, has often led to atrocious abuse of power. No school of thought save a few branches of anarchists have held that individualism be left undirected and uncontrolled. On the other hand, society conceived in terms of the modern fatherland in its intensest concentration of power, the totalitarian state, can be a despot of worst order.

Modern social thinking has done magnificent work in pointing out to the stubborn mind of man his social responsibilities. It has now the more arduous task of constructing societies and governments which will give justice both to the individual and to the mass.

Social necessities are such that only a few could possibly have their own way completely without wrecking civilization. Extreme individualism, untempered by a social outlook, borders on downright atheism. Society is based upon the restraint of the ego, harmonization of one's will to power with the rightful claims of others. The reconciliation between the thrust of the individual and the needs of a society which only can be built out of the renunciation and sacrifice of part of the individual's desires, can only come about through the paradox, "Whosoever will be chief among you let him be your servant" (Matthew 20. 27).

But how may we reconcile Jesus' concept of the worth of the individual man, even if he be criminal, insane or diseased, with the fact that if he be

cared for with every solicitude he will drag all society to his own physical, mental, and spiritual level? We know that the increasing burden of criminal and defective persons retards the development of the normal. Carrel suggests that petty criminals could be conditioned against crime by the whip. Major crimes could be punished by death with proper gases. This may seem harsh to some, but is there any penal technique devised so far that has accomplished its purpose? If it be claimed that society would brutalize itself, does it not brutalize itself by the court, prison and parole systems which today allow half a million known criminals to prey upon the normal population?

Taking the long view certainly eugenics, the elimination of slums in cities and on the farm, provision of the normal and necessary bodily, intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual satisfactions would do much to improve the race and to give the individual a better life.

We wait the day when the individual shall have complete justice, and when he in turn shall be required to render full justice to society. Both the individual and society now penalize each other because of false, dysgenic and sentimental standards. We await that combination of knowledge, wisdom, and practical ability which can instrument the demands of Christian faith and utilize the resources of science to construct a just society wherein all types and classes shall have justice and the satisfaction of their needs. We face the tragic fact that the individual is either given too much power, or he is tyrannized by society, in terms of nation, government, or popular opinion.

What is the duty of man? A man has a life on his hands. What shall he do with it? Can this bundle of primitive instincts and civilized restraints, these vestigial urges that come from jungle ancestors, these inhibitions which have been gained by living together in caves and tents and city apartments, be made into something beautiful and good?

Four conceptions of the chief end of man dominate modern education, literature, art and religion. The first is self-realization.

Whether or not self-realization is a good aim depends upon the self that is being realized. It is better that a few neurotics should suffer restraint than that the life of a neighborhood be polluted by their muddy thoughts and desires. Many who want to realize themselves succeed in becoming a public nuisance.

Should one express oneself fully at home and elsewhere? It depends,

of course, on what one has to express. Even practicing upon a piano can be very unfair. If all men did what they thought right, without further enlightenment, the world would be a worse place to live in. With each man's rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, with the urge toward self-expression, there are corresponding no-rights, disabilities, liabilities, and duties. Today we hear much talk of the *élan vital*, the drive of life, but there is as truly the *frein vital*, the restraint of life. Art is restrained emotion, not rampant self-expression. In all useful achievement there is the combination or balance between self-serving and self-restraint.

"What is man that thou art mindful of him?" He is a being who at his best is not so much seeking self-realization as he is dedicating himself to hard tasks. Self-realization is a legitimate ambition, but it must be harmonized with the right of others to realize themselves.

A second theory which has gained favor in the educational world is that the chief end of man is growth. It was once said of the younger Pitt, that "he was cast and never grew." Hammond remarked of him, "His clocks stopped at 1819." As we examine our own lives or observe those about us we do see growth, not always, but quite often. Goethe remarked of Lessing after a week's separation, "He has grown immeasurably since last I saw him."

The idea of growth is as worthy as it is attractive, but it can hardly be an end in itself. It is too fugitive, too indefinite, too evasive. When traveling, we wish to arrive somewhere, even though it be an intermediate station.

A third theory asserts that man's prime task is to answer the riddles of existence. Is the end of life to solve problems? Aristotle remarked upon observing the keen minds and nimble fingers of his neighbors that the chief end of man was activity. It is an arresting thought that God's work is still unfinished, that some of His problems are unsolved, some answers await our discoveries. There is hardly a category of problems which affect our lives in which human co-operation is not demanded. Problems of conduct, fears, religious and philosophical difficulties all require man's utmost ability to solve.

Much of the current legislation, and the political and religious tyranny of our times originate in fear. We face the biological fear of racial degeneration caused by disease, the mechanization of life and ethical lassitude, the psychological fear of mob rule, the political fear of democracy gone astray

in the hands of the demagogue, the economic fear of dehumanization by the machine, the historical fear of social old age lately aroused by Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West*, the fear of unmanageable bigness in all human institutions, and the spiritual fear lest present-day Christianity be watered down until it becomes the handmaid of psychology, culture, and a weak humanitarianism.

Poverty, disease, ignorance, and superstition are four great riddles civilization must solve. War, our outstanding social sin, is involved in each of these difficulties, for war creates poverty, breeds disease, is possible only through ignorance of man's real good, and is based upon the modern mythology, the modern pantheon of abstraction or idealization of some half a hundred fatherlands around the earth. This new mythology is the cruelest of all. Surely here are riddles to test the mettle of the strongest man.

But man cannot always be solving problems. Sometimes he has the right to live, carefree, if you will, although yesterday and tomorrow he may be broken-hearted over the world's woes and give himself to their solution.

A fourth conception of man is that his chief purpose is to be obedient unto God. This idea is repugnant to man, who sees religion as a series of prohibitions and restraints. But rightly understood, the kind of loyalty Jesus described and lived liberates at the same moment that it commands.

The more civilized and sensitive the person, the larger the self-imposed obligation. All social and spiritual advance is conditioned upon giving up individualistic anarchy and assuming obligation toward neighbors. Harmonization is based on restraint, which can easily blight, and freedom.

There is a persistent, often a relentless, quality about the love of God which pursues us until we find our true freedom in doing His will. As in friendship or in human love, there are conditions which must be fulfilled, austerities which must be respected.

Liberty through obedience is one of the strangest of spiritual paradoxes. Obedience is the watchword of spiritual power, and liberty has been the chief rallying cry in the western world since 1789, when the French Revolution rang the death knell of Bourbon rule in France. Since Voltaire and Rousseau writers and teachers have struggled for independence of thought and speech. Nevertheless, man at his highest always gives away his liberty. A young woman discards independence to care for her home, to take upon herself the terrific biological task of rearing children; a student drops his books to die like a rat in the yellow mud on the Somme; an English stewardess leaves

the safety of Southampton to risk death seven times on the torpedoed liners; a doctor leaves a lucrative practice to perish in wiping out yellow fever in an obscure Caribbean port. Livingstone felt that he was to be God's hands and feet in wiping out the African slave trade. An American frontiersman, Daniel Boone, said he was ordained by God to settle the wilderness. Each of these leaves behind security, each gives up material comfort, each hands over his liberty. Jesus attained His own independence and found His freedom in obedience to the will of God. "I lay down my life, . . ." He said. "No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself" (John 10. 17, 18). They knew the truth—"He that loses his life shall find it."

But what of the destiny of man? Dante expressed both the tension and the promise of help of which man is aware in his relation to God in his great line *E la sua voluntate e nostra pace*, "In His will is our peace."⁶ Although a man is aware that God limits human wishes by His will, at his religious best man knows that God in so doing is acting in accord with absolute values which lay the basis for reconciliation and trust; that in obedience to God lies not only man's peace but his only hope of achieving his fullest potentialities.

To reach his destiny a man must first of all achieve an idea of what he can be at his best. He must formulate some measure of his own norm. When he has done this he must disentangle himself from his social and natural environment to the extent that he can see both society and nature objectively. Only thus is he able to affect society beneficially or to direct nature so that it may serve himself and other men. This way man liberates himself from being a creature of instinct and environment. He must be haunted, reminded, at times goaded by the idea of what is normal for a mature personality. He can be sure that he will never approximate the norm until, like Jesus, he is willing to risk all to achieve it. He is left free to do God's will or to refuse it. He knows, at his best, that only as he surrenders to God's will will he achieve his true freedom and his true destiny.

Biologically man is mature. He is capable under certain combinations of diet, intermarriage, disease, living conditions, and unsocial modes of life of quick deterioration. He does his best physically, as well as morally, under hard conditions. Modern life is faced with grave consequences because of its conveniences and comforts. They soften us and lead to a whole series of new diseases. Birth control, as yet, is working to the detriment of superior

⁶ *Paradiso*, Canto III.

groups. Eugenics is fraught not only with purely scientific questions, but with major moral enigmas which must be solved at the peril of the race. The hypertensions of our hurried existence are taking their toll. Neuroses and a whole series of physical disorders derived from nervous states are widespread. Biologically man is mature, but endangered. He will maintain his position only with difficulty, by fearless realism and by organizing his life with reference to the normal, the sound and the healthy. This he can do without violating any brotherly obligation to the defective.

Intellectually men present rather a sad picture. Applied science has made enormous gains. Viewed objectively, our immense material progress in the last century has been a credit to the race. Measured by great original thinkers such as Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Galileo, or Jesus, we probably have no more such outstanding men per decade or century than did antiquity. While mechanization has increased sheer intellectual grasp has not increased. It may be that we shall never have intellectuals of greater caliber than in the past. This furnishes no reason for despair. We probably have enough brain power to make this earth a garden. Our major problem is not intellectual but emotional—to develop harmony and co-operation between man and wife, man and society, nation and nation, man and God.

Men are still infants in political, economic, and social organization. Only yesterday men began as lone animals to hunt and fish for self, wife and offspring. They found after long centuries the advantage of mutual aid. They formed clans, tribes, cities, states, leagues, confederations, then came modern statehood as we know it, scarcely four hundred years old.

Plato and other Greeks stated theoretical ideals of what society might be under the ethical control of enlightened citizens, but it was Jesus who took these ideas out of the realm of theory and so wove them into men's thought and action that they will be forever tormented until human society approximates His ideal. Jesus was a realist about men and society. He wanted in every deep sense to save both. He knew that the bread of earth and the bread of heaven were related. The faith He taught was no escape mechanism, no pietistic retreat from social enigmas into a purely personal religion. He realized clearly that to change society individuals must experience a new birth. However, He knew also that it was not enough to change individuals but that all human institutions must be motivated by the spirit of love and fair play. It is possible to convert men in slums, it is possible for a few even to live saintly lives there, but most of us, especially little chil-

dren, to have the fruits of the Spirit must have a decent environment. The slum itself must be redeemed. Man's destiny, socially, lies in the direction of discovering a method of applying the ethic of Jesus accepted by innumerable individuals to a society which, as such, has never accepted that ethic.

No one form may be best for all peoples at any one time. There are varieties of political experience as well as varieties of religious experience. Russia may do well under Communism, England under a constitutional monarch, Japan as an autarchy, the United States as a republic.

Economically we are rightly experimenting with new forms. Wisdom lies in balancing speed of experimentation, and adherence to what we have had. No hope lies in either a die-hard policy of holding to any pseudo-sacred standing order, or in rushing forward in headstrong dogmatism. Man is a strong youth, untrained to handle his new-found wealth. It is often easier "to bear those ills we have than fly to others we know not of." He is learning under the severe teaching of the school of hard knocks.

It is when man contemplates his spiritual destiny that he is conscious of his greatest lack. Moderation, freedom from adult infantilism, honesty, honor, adherence to the light he already has, would see man well along his way to contentment and plenty upon a fruitful earth. When his horizon is lifted until he sees this planet as a family, all members of which have hopes and fears and rights and duties similar to his own, when he recognizes that men are not equal, but are equal in their right to achieve their utmost possibilities, man may yet work out a way of life which will make the ideal states of dreamers but a pale shadow of his achievement.

Spiritually, a man is beset with many tensions, the tormenting ideal of what he might become, the humiliating consciousness of what he is, the stark fact of transgression, the battle between instincts and ideals, the necessary compromises and adjustments to the nature of society as it is in its as yet partially redeemed state. Jesus looked upon mankind neither with the eyes of a cynic nor with the unseeing eye of a fatuous devotion. He saw man with all the realism of which love at its best is capable, and His faith quickened not a few to attempt what they could become.

Cynical views of life find little nobility in man. Mark Twain said of man that "his history, in all climes, all ages and all circumstances, furnishes oceans and continents of proof that of all creatures that were made, he is the most detestable. Of the entire brood he is the only one—the solitary one—that possesses malice. That one thing puts him below the rats, the

grubs, the trichinae. He is the only creature that inflicts pain for sport, knowing it to be pain." George Sand once observed: "Humanity is a large number of knaves, a very large number of lunatics, and an immense number of fools." But man is not all crookedness nor lunacy.

The spiritual destiny of man is to achieve union with God and to work in happy co-operation with Him. Jesus spoke of the state of blessedness which man achieves here and now whenever man has courage to choose to be humble, sympathetic, hungry for goodness, merciful, pure in heart, peaceable, and faithful. In speaking of Thomas Aquinas' idea that the moral law exists solely for the sake of the destiny of human life—that man's duty is to that destiny, Hocking remarks in a noble passage:

"Sin, from this view, is a rejection of one's own blessedness; but it is sin because that rejection concerns another than ourselves, namely, the appointer of destiny, the real being. The interest of God in our realization of our destiny is not simply that of one who has devised that destiny; it is the interest of one who is to participate in it. For blessedness, according to Aquinas, is found in union with God: such union is at the same time a fulfilment of God's will and of our own. . . . Unless the universe has a central and unified life in which our destinies are involved, and which gives these destinies a higher importance than they can have for our own finite vision, the notion of obligation loses the degree of dignity which we, in fact, ascribe to it. When we speak of the rights of man and the duties of man, the respect we accord them is measured by our belief that they belong to man as a metaphysical entity, a ward of the universe. The work these 'rights' have done in history may testify to the truth of this statement.

"And our interest in our destiny is at the same time, as Aquinas says, an interest in a possible blessedness; though not simply in a far-off divine event. The destiny of the human will is to co-operate, in some degree of present awareness, with the central power of the world; and so far to perceive in present experience the quality of 'union with God.' In their complete meaning, our human actions are not only lawgiving in an ideal world—they are creative in an actual, but unfinished world."⁷

Man, always a creature of heredity and environment, is no less a creature of destiny. When man directs his mind, his emotions and his will to co-operate with God against his ancient enemies—poverty, war, disease, ignorance, and prejudice—he will achieve with God's help that blessedness which is his true destiny. To his twin nature come authentic flashes of spiritual insight. He finds himself disturbed, sometimes tormented, always pursued by the divine love until he come "unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."⁸

⁷ See Hocking, William Ernest, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, 1918, pp. 487-488.

⁸ Ephesians 4: 13.

Religion Faces Naturalism

ROY WOOD SELLARS

IN the course of a recent conversation I was asked the question, What, in your opinion, is the most fundamental problem confronting religion in our time?

Queries involving superlatives are always a little disconcerting. One may be fairly sure what some of the important issues in a given field are, while by no means certain which of them is the *most* important. And, after all, it may be that the questioner has desired only to discover what you have been thinking about in some field in which you are reputed to have some measure of expertness. Now it happened in this instance that I was not caught unprepared, because I have definite convictions on this particular subject. "From the standpoint of philosophy," I replied, "the most fundamental problem confronting religion today is this: *Can religion adjust itself to naturalism?*" And then I went on to explain my answer and to justify it. It has occurred to me that others might be interested in the basic questions thus raised.

First of all, it can hardly be supposed that religion is independent of the cultural tendencies and emphases of an age. Let us admit that it is conservative and moves forward slowly. It may well, then, have a lag when compared with other phases of culture. But when we consider law, politics, and economics with their institutional massiveness, we may not be so certain that the lag is so exceptionally great. And, after all, religion does deal with exceedingly fundamental issues, issues of life and death, of destiny and salvation. On these points we should not expect rapid shifts of position. Life and reality must depart from a religious perspective before it decays and gives place to another. In this respect religion and philosophy have much in common. They have rhythms which differ from those of empirical science. They deal with primary assumptions, first principles, rather than with facts and theories clustering about some delimited field.

Nevertheless, neither religion nor philosophy is something apart from man's knowledge and experience. It requires little insight into the past to bring this fact home. No century looks at things in quite the same manner as the one which preceded it. Emphases, perspectives, and values have insensibly altered. People begin to speak a different language. Words

do not mean quite the same; the accepted facts are different; expectations have changed. And there is much reason to believe that the tempo of change has been speeded up in our generation. I am, myself, old enough to notice basic shifts in the domain of philosophy. Not so long ago idealism had it much its own way in the English-speaking countries. Already that has changed. We hear more of realism, pragmatism and positivism than of idealism. Josiah Royce, for all his ability, left only three or four disciples. The current moved in other directions.

Anyone who has devoted some time and thought to the history of religious ideas will be willing to admit this organic union of religion and culture. The eighteenth century did not take kindly to the dogmatism and intolerance of the religious leaders of the seventeenth century, Protestant or Catholic. Bishop Butler saw eye to eye on this point with the French abbés. Both deprecated too much enthusiasm as savoring of fanaticism. The mysteries of Christianity were pushed into the background among cultured people in favor of a rational religion of God, freedom, and immortality.

It must be admitted that a religion based on revelation yields less easily to cultural influences than merely ritualistic and state religions. Like Islam, Christianity is a religion of a book as well as of a cultural tradition. It proclaims events with which science and philosophy have no contact. These events are connected with a supernatural set of postulates which are formulated as a creed and upheld by faith. Ultimately, that which sustains this set of ideas is the power of a tradition fostered by religious bodies and finding living translation in what is called the religious experience of the faithful. Those who do not have this faith and this related religious experience can find nothing in secular life to give these postulates validity and credence. The nearest that philosophy has ever come is in what is called rational theology, which is the attempt to prove such things as theism and immortality by reason. On the whole, rational theology, though still in existence, has fallen on evil times. Hume and Kant undermined the ontological argument and evolution weakened the apparent strength of the cosmological argument. But, of course, the debate is still under way. One can but report what seems to himself the present status of rational theology. It is interesting to note that many religious leaders have admitted the lack of cogency of the traditional arguments for theism and have fallen back upon what is called religious experience.

It may be well to quote the recent comments of John Dewey in his well-received book, *A Common Faith*, on these points. "The cause of the dissatisfaction is perhaps not so much the arguments that Kant used to show the insufficiency of these alleged proofs, as it is the growing feeling that they are too formal to offer any support to religion in action. Moreover, these religionists are moved by the rise of the experimental method in other fields. What is more natural and proper, accordingly, than that they should affirm they are just as good empiricists as anybody else—indeed, as good as the scientists themselves? . . . In reality, the only thing that can be said to be 'proved' is the existence of some complex of conditions that have operated to effect an adjustment in life, an orientation, that brings with it a sense of security and peace. . . . The determining factor in the interpretation of the experience is the particular doctrinal apparatus into which a person has been inducted." And surely we must point out that it would equally prove Islam and Buddhism for, surely, these thinkers would hardly deny religious experiences on the part of other types of religionists. One is led to recall Hume's argument with respect to the probative power of miracles that there are other than Christian and Jewish miracles on record and these point to other faiths. From the purely historical point of view, Christianity is but one religion among many others.

All these ideas and inferences are operating subtly and cumulatively in modern culture. What holds them in check is the force of organized religious movements with their prestige and influence. People are upheld and sustained by their confidence in the intelligence and reason of the religious intelligentsia. There is, for good and evil, a persistent indoctrination which maintains an atmosphere favorable to faith. This operates all over the world to the benefit of the most diverse beliefs. The Hindu scholar speaks and writes with the same authority and persuasiveness as the Anglican bishop or the Roman Cardinal. Each is linked with the bonds of admiration to his own clientele. Such is the picture from the sociological point of view. Who, that pauses to think, can deny it?

It is into this picture of what we may call religious traditions embodied in movements that the general culture of an age must be introduced. There is, undeniably, a steady pull and haul between perspectives and methods. In a certain sense we have applied the Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence to the realm of culture. Every tradition, be this political, economic, religious, artistic, or philosophical, must defend itself against

counter-currents. It has been said that philosophies and economic systems are never so much refuted as starved out. It is found that they no longer appeal in the old way. The old life and vigor has departed from them. They are like trees in a forest which have been overtopped by other trees and lose the sunlight. The result is that they seem dated. The educated no longer take them quite so seriously outside their privileged setting. All this may well take centuries to come to pass but indications are discernible long before to those who observe acutely.

Now it is scarcely deniable that modern culture is increasingly dominated by science and the scientific outlook on things. And here we must include the social sciences, for these are coming to their own in this period of social change. People are giving their lives for Democracy, Fascism and Communism, as they used to give them for religious faith. It is almost unanimously asserted that the next European war will be analogous to the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and will turn about social and political doctrines. The things of this world occupy men's attention. Every phase of life is being altered by knowledge and invention and by the assimilation of methods and attitudes which flow from science, directly or indirectly. It would hardly be possible that this tremendous cultural activity would not have its impact upon traditional religion.

Let us admit that there are levels in human society. Those regions which are little touched by a critical education and are likewise in the bypaths of social life are less affected. Life goes on in the old familiar patterns. Rightly or wrongly, the South has been spoken of as the Bible-belt. There fundamentalism was supposed to flourish. It has been found, however, that the great cities cherish within them regions almost equally unaffected by science and criticism. Here are brick wildernesses withdrawn from the impact of new ideas. Sociological surveys give odd cultural maps of our industrial towns.

But, while these qualifications must be made because the human soil is turned up at the top by the plows of science and the subsoil is left undisturbed when the ploughing is shallow, it yet remains true that the outstanding feature of our cultural life is science and industry. These constitute the atmosphere of the times and act as solvents for old ideas. The result is what is usually called modernism. Traditional religions are being re-edited the world over, the obviously mythological ingredients being removed as survivals from more ignorant times. As is well known, something analo-

gous to this happened in Greece when the poets and philosophers and moralists criticized the Homeric legends which came down to them clothed in beauty and yet outraging the newer morality. Today the Bible is handled in much the same fashion, that is, selectively and critically. It is generally questioned whether superhuman agencies, such as those past religions posit, did actually intervene in human affairs as reputed. What is usually called the warfare between science and religion deals with this re-editing of the Christian-Jewish tradition in the light of scientific knowledge and theory.

But, while science has in this manner changed the externals and details of traditional religion explicitly or implicitly, leading men to relinquish literal belief in the historicity of the Garden of Eden or the account of creation, it cannot be said to have so successfully challenged what we may call the traditional religious interpretation of the universe. In fact, scientists have been very divided in mind. Some of them have even taken on themselves the task of mediation and become edifying apologists. I refer to such distinguished physicists and astronomers as Eddington, Jeans, and Millikan. So much have they done this that they have awakened a sardonic strain in a good neo-Platonic theologian like Dean Inge as can be noted in his book, *God and the Astronomers*. It may be well to point out that technical philosophers have found nothing novel in their arguments and what seems to them much philosophical confusion. There are reasons to believe that this outbreak was a temporary one due, in part, to the tremendous changes going on in physics and astronomy and to the publicity which ensued. I think that it would be unwise for religious leaders to build upon this temporary development which seems already to be somewhat subsiding. It is true that our categorial concepts, such as space, time, causality, probability, substance, are undergoing re-analysis; but I doubt that the outcome will be so very revolutionary. There will be a deepening of our ideas and an adjustment of them to scientific methods and operations. I am inclined to think that the universe will be adjudged eternal and the scene of constantly shifting patterns in a moving equilibrium. Of course, in saying this, I am but expressing the hypothesis which harmonizes with the philosophy of physical realism. Surely something must be eternal, or else the miracle of miracles must be affirmed, the coming of existence out of non-existence. And this is the miracle of miracles because it cannot even be conceived, being essentially a collection of words.

These questions are old stories for philosophy. It is natural, then,

that the ultimate impact of the sciences upon theology and religion should be through the medium of philosophy. Now the philosopher well knows that this impact manifested itself in philosophy in the struggle between idealism and realism. When all is said, idealism has been the protagonist of both romanticism and of the traditional religious interpretation of the universe. Let me quote from Professors Wieman and Meland, who have written a sane and systematic study of *American Philosophies of Religion*. "The tradition of idealism," they write, "may be regarded as a turning back upon the scientific movement to recover values that had been lost to the age as a result of the scientific reaction against medievalism. This, I think, is significant. The shadow of the supernatural never quite vanishes from the philosophical systems that have developed under the influence of idealism." Again, "In idealism, Mind is the unique emissary from the transcendent realm which enables man to have visions and thoughts of God."

I do not think that I am far from the truth when I assert that idealism reflected the response of the critical religious mind to the over-hasty forms of mechanical materialism which threatened enlightened thought dominated by science. It was not until our own day that naturalism acquired a more adequate theory of knowledge and cosmology. At the least, it can be said that idealism has finally been confronted by more adequate realistic analyses of knowing and valuing and that, in the theory of emergence, a plausible explanation of human life has been advanced.

As I see it, then, the culture in which traditional religion finds itself today is increasingly alien to its assumptions and hopes. While science is disclosing in minutest detail the orderly structure and relations of things, philosophy is moving in the direction of realism and naturalism. Such an assertion admittedly requires qualification. After all, there are many philosophers who are still idealists and able ones at that. Nevertheless, in the democratic countries in which reason still has the right to speak, the trend is in the direction indicated. Of course, philosophical positions cannot be settled by majority vote. But analyses make a permanent difference just because they must be met.

The point I have been working up to should by now be clear to my reader. It is this: Is modernism enough? Must not religious thought confront a deeper questioning? Does not religion face naturalism?

It seems to me that this query is one of those inevitabilities rooted in the soil of modern culture. The individual may either face it or not face

it. That attitude depends upon his own temperament and training. But religious thought cannot avoid the issue. Such avoidance would be tantamount to withdrawal from the living stream of cultural life. In the long run it would mean loss of spiritual integrity. In the remainder of this paper I shall seek to explain the nature of this revolutionary issue which confronts religion.

In analyzing historical religions from what we may call the logical point of view, we are led to distinguish between primary, secondary, and tertiary postulates. It is in this fashion that the logician would order the elements in what the religious thinker calls his creed or faith. Thus, Christianity and Judaism share in the postulation of a God who is both creator and ruler, of personal immortality, and of the validity and objective value of prayer and worship. All these cosmic postulates are for them essential elements in their creed. These assumptions are, likewise, knit with the doctrine of revelation, with what Karl Barth calls the Logos, the Word. Let us call these the postulates of the first order. Beneath these we would place the postulates of the second order; it is with respect to these that concrete, historical religions have diverged. Thus Judaism affirms the premise that Israel is the chosen people and has a mission in the world of a unique sort, while Christianity proclaims as its differentiating faith the postulate of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ and Saviour. The historically achieved texture of each specific religion is largely determined by the expansion and application of these secondary postulates into tertiary ones expressed in ritual, creed, and sentiment and therewith connected ecclesiastical organization. Thus the divergence between the Roman Catholic Church and the various Protestant Churches is largely in terms of these tertiary elements. But it must not be forgotten that, while they are tertiary from the theological and philosophical standpoint, they are not so from the standpoint of sentiment. Quite the reverse, in fact, for people feel their differences more than they do their agreements just because these latter retreat into the background as not matters of dispute.

This analysis leads us to distinguish between two types of religious discussions: those *about* religion and those *within* religions. The first are of a philosophical character and turn about the validity of what we have called primary postulates. Is theism tenable? Can we believe in an after-life? If these postulates are relinquished is it a deathblow leveled at religion as such or only at traditional religion? As we have said, questions

such as these constitute the heart of philosophy of religion and all the resources of philosophy are brought to bear upon them. But discussions *within* religions are, on the whole, of another type. Take, for example, the battle between modernists and fundamentalists in this country. The modernists were desirous of adjusting their beliefs to the outlook characteristic of people trained in science and philosophy, to those of the modern temper. They were convinced that the conclusions of historical and scientific research should be accepted, that reason, working hand in hand with living experience, should have the right to challenge the merely traditional. Led by this conviction, they felt that they were taking the only intelligent path for religion in the highways of the modern world. For would not a religion at outs with the technique and ideas of a culture become more and more alien to it and so be doomed to lose its plausibility and appeal? At present, I am not concerned with the merits of the dispute, but only with its nature as a conflict within a religion and not about religion.

Another example of a controversy which is primarily within a religion rather than about religion is the present debate between the Barthians and semi-Barthians and the liberals. As I see it, the context is different from what it was in the older American dispute. In the so-called "crisis theology" or "dialectical theology," we have a reaction against the optimism of liberalism, an optimism which was associated with the rise of the middle class in alliance with capitalism and science and which goes back at least to the eighteenth century with its ideas of perfectionism and progress. The neo-supernaturalism of Barth and Tillich and Pauck is the expression of a doubt of the adequacy of this trend. It proclaims a return to the fundamentals of Christianity, though not to its mythological envelope. It reasserts the consciousness of sin and evil. God is the Other, the Transcendent One. We must await God's activity, for man is helpless to attain salvation apart from His initiative. Here we have a sort of neo-Calvinism arising in opposition to the notion of God's immanence in society and human reason. There is stress upon evil, upon the demonic. One senses the European atmosphere of political and social struggle. Naturally, in this brief reference which only ministers to the larger purpose of this paper, I cannot examine the significant points of difference between Tillich and Barth.

It is quite evident, then, that inside each concrete historical religion in an age like ours, there are critical, self-searching movements reflecting cultural changes. It is these that are discussed in theological journals, in

religious books, and in the more popular religious periodicals. The point I am making is that what I have called the primary axioms, or postulates, of traditional religion which constitute their framework are not called in question. The questions examined and discussed lie in the region of secondary and tertiary postulates.

But if we take the religious situation in the large, we can readily observe an increasing awareness on the part of the ablest religious leaders of the fact that even the primary postulates of the traditional religious view of the universe are undergoing questioning. In our terminology, there are discussions about religion as well as within religions. The only escape from this challenge would lie in what we may call religious autarchy, that is, something in this field analogous to national autarchy or self-sufficiency. But, to the critical mind, there is little hope in such an attitude and procedure of isolation from international culture and contact. In the long run the result would be stagnation and loss of vitality.

It is, of course, undeniable that, for a considerable period, the momentum of each specific religious movement is sufficient to enable it to make this challenge of traditional axioms seem muffled and, as the saying is, academic. That is, there is a working confidence resting on sentiments, beliefs, and activities ordered within a set of institutions. Concrete religions are group affairs absorbing and directing much of the energy of masses of individuals. The majority are creatures of habit; sufficient unto them are the thought patterns and folkways into which they have been inducted from childhood. They are not given to skepticism. There is nothing exceptional in all this. The same principles hold in law, economics, and politics. Who, for example, are more conservative as a body than our lawyers? An amusing illustration of this cultural lag is the guess hazarded by a friend of mine, after conversation with members of the legal faculty of a big university, that probably only two of the law faculty could be considered really liberal and aware of the philosophy back of their precedents. Does not this recall the jibe of the late Justice Holmes that, after all, the *Social Statics* of Herbert Spencer had not been enacted into the American Constitution. I make this comparison because I have of late been so agreeably surprised at the open-mindedness of religious leaders of nearly all faiths.

It is my argument, then, that in the long run, consideration of ultimates cannot be avoided. The spirit of the times insidiously penetrates the walls of institutions. As I see it, the query set by these trends of thought is in

the final analysis directed against postulates of the primary sort. Let us at once admit that there is nothing completely novel about all this. After all, the eighteenth century witnessed the rise of a rationalistic deism which sought to remove the miraculous and mysterious from Christianity. The impact of science and reason upon established religious tradition was most effective during the Enlightenment. As is fairly well known, many of the Founding Fathers of the American state were deists. Of course, religious partisans called them atheists. Tom Paine never received the gratitude to which he was entitled, because of the emotional effects of this classification.

And now we are in the twentieth century, well on in a period of astounding change. Can we help asking what will be the effect of all this cumulative change upon the outlook hitherto held by Western religions? Is it not certain to be revolutionary in character? It is my own opinion that religion is facing a crisis greater than any it has faced in the past. And one way to put it is to say that the very meaning of the term is under advisement. What, after all, is religion?

My suggestion is that Western scholars have been too much influenced by what we may call the Near East tradition. Had they paid equal attention to the Far East they might well have qualified their dramatic formulations. Is it not well known that Buddhism has much claim to being a religion without a god? And is not Confucianism largely an ethical cult? Of course, there was the constant incursion of the supernatural in historical movements and formulations; but yet there was a generically different emphasis and setting here. Following this clue among others, it has become fairly common among philosophers analyzing religion to find the heart of religion in man's need to interpret and direct his life in relation to the cultural picture. What we may call the varieties of religion have reflected the meeting of these two poles of man's life. It is for this reason that I am skeptical of the adequacy of the definition of religion given by the Oxford Dictionary: "Recognition on the part of man of some unseen higher power as having control of his destiny and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship." Is not this another one of those words which change and enlarge their meaning? Did not *democracy* mean, even to the makers of our Constitution, "rule by the many who are poor"? In other words, by the mob. Perhaps an even more relevant instance is the following: In a book edited by Joseph Fort Newton and entitled *My Idea of God*, eighteen

contemporary religious leaders sought to define their idea of God and found that there were eighteen differing ideas.

If, then, we take it as a possibility—if not a probability—that the traditional, supernatural framework within which much, if not all religion, has hitherto developed, is breaking down, the question which inevitably arises is this: Will something which deserves to be called religion still exist? I want the answer to be more than verbal. In its essence, it means, I take it, this: Will not men face still the task, individually and collectively, of interpreting their lives in relation to the universe as their culture translates it to them? Their religion will be their living and operating philosophy of life, their sense of values and ideals.

This shift will come slowly for the great majority, and then only as the powerful religious institutions which enclose them insensibly, perhaps, modify their emphases and doctrines. It is not easy for those brought up in the days of the strength of the older tradition to regard this possible religion of the future, called by some of its present apostles, humanism, as really having the savor of religion. To give up the epical and dramatic setting of supernaturalism will be in their eyes to pass from poetry into prose.

And this last strikes me as an excellent analogy. For how long did not Shakespearean blank verse with its heroic lines spoken by kings seem to many the only fit and proper embodiment of tragedy? Yet can it be denied that this royal atmosphere is no longer necessary for tragic effects? To reverse the relationship, does not sorrow in the tenement now appear kingly? Pomp and circumstance awaken reminiscent echoes but have in large measure lost the tang of reality. And this means that men have been gradually learning to see significance in the lives of everyday people as portrayed expressively in homely prose. We are becoming a race of M. Jourdain, learning to recognize our lives for what they are, a drama of joy and sorrow, of fate and enterprise. Since, then, literature has been slowly democratized and brought into touch with the life around us, who will be hardy enough to predict that something similar may not happen to religion? May it not, in like manner, take on less heroic and epic forms? After all, even if man discovers that, beyond all peradventure, he is but a child of this planet and this energizing sun, he must still interpret his life to himself, must still dream and feel, think and act, learn to love that which is of good repute, and to reject that which is evil.

What institutional changes will accompany this slow shift in human

perspective cannot be predicted. That they will in the long run be radical appears highly probable. And how can the churches which are already fighting desperately for worshipers in their pews on Sundays expect not to be confronted by cultural conditions requiring drastic adjustments on their part? Religion will probably be something less apart from everyday life, be more of a quality attaching to every significant phase of it.

But this continuity and transfer of the term, while possible, is not necessary. Words have strange fates and some fall upon evil times. It is quite possible that other terms will seem more appropriate, less loaded with ambiguous suggestions. But it is only in this sense that there can be what the French thinker, Guyau, called the "non-religion of the future." Beneath this nominalism there will still be basic ingredients of the human scene. It is the texture of human living which is the final datum.

It is, then, my suggestion that it is quite possible that religion must more and more face naturalism, accustoming itself to look upon its traditional enemy as less foe than friend. The good Hegelian would find in this interplay something savoring of dialectic, the meeting of opposites. The philosopher whose duty it is to confront possibilities from which the conventional person recoils seeks to lift himself above the partisanship of the moment. Playing my professional rôle, I have already pointed out that the heart of religion has always been human need. Man has inevitably sought to read the riddle of his life and to adjust himself to what he held to be the facts of his cosmic setting. As his picture of this altered, so did the texture and procedures of his religion. But what a range of future transformation this analysis lays open to thought! Man has faced fetishes, spirits, gods, the God, the One, the Absolute; and then, turning empirical and inductive, he has sought human power in knowledge of nature and of himself. As his picture of the facts has varied, so have the directions of his hopes and fears. The result has been a constant readjustment of his spiritual emphases and methods. May he not, in this New Age which we are entering with trepidation, be on the threshold of one of those cultural mutations which have marked the history of mankind? And so I leave for further reflection the query with which I began, Can religion adjust itself to naturalism? It is my belief that it can.

Naturalism, Humanism, and Religion

LOUIS J. A. MERCIER

THAT we are living in an age of confusion is admitted by all. That this confusion is at least as great in religion as in other domains no one would deny. The thesis of this article is that the fundamental reason for this confusion in all domains is philosophical, and that the first step toward understanding the nature of what is happening to us is, therefore, to work out a clear conception of just what has taken place in the domain of philosophy.

What has happened in the domain of philosophy is this: Toward the close of the eighteenth century there began the first radical shift in the fundamental thought of the Western world since the days of Plato and Aristotle, and this radical shift consisted in passing from their dualistic to a monistic conception of reality.

Now, as dualism and monism are contradictories, in fact the only two fundamental alternatives of thought opened to us, if you pass from the one to the other you cannot possibly retain the same civilization. As soon, then, as monism began to penetrate influential circles, the civilization of the West, grounded as it was in dualism, began to disintegrate. The hundred years which separate us from the ascendancy of monism were just about long enough to give it the necessary time to work out its consequences in our religious, aesthetic, intellectual, social, and political life. Hence we have seen the edifices of Western civilization crumbling one after the other, and our present confusion is but the result of the dust raised.

However, a further distinction should be made. Antiquity gave us dualism, but the modern age dates from Jesus Christ, and Christianity stressed a third element. Modern Western civilization was thus based on a trichism. Be it noted that the third element belonged with the first two so that without the first two it can have no meaning. Hence, not only the surviving structure of four hundred years of antiquity but Christian civilization began to cave in only about a hundred years ago. No wonder the dust is rising ever darker to the horizon.

To sketch in a few details: Before Plato and Aristotle, oscillations between a crude monism and dualism. With Plato, at least, the dualism of

otherworldliness and this-worldliness. With Aristotle, a profoundly worked-out system of dualism: percept-concept; particular-universal; senses and imagination-intellect; animal-rational; prime matter-substantial form; potency-act; possible being-actual being; contingent being-necessary being; changing-abiding; body-soul; creatures-God. With Saint Paul, with the Church Fathers, with Saint Augustine, beside the dualistic nature of the rational animal the element of supernatural grace was emphasized. Henceforth there could be distinguished animal nature, human nature, supernaturalized human nature. Theology was added to philosophy, Revelation to reason. By the thirteenth century, with Saint Thomas Aquinas, were worked out all the implications of this Christian trialism.

Now, what essentially has happened since? In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the decadence of Scholasticism or the weakening of the defense of the dualist tradition; the rise of Humanism or the call for a greater emphasis on human nature as opposed to supernaturalized human nature. In the sixteenth century, "the Reformation." But the so-called reformation had at least three aspects. A reform of many conditions within the Catholic Church of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was certainly imperative, and it was to take place within Catholicism itself. But "the Reformation" called for much more than the straightening out of possible abuses of discipline within Christendom. It called for an entirely different conception of Revelation and of its transmission. Revelation was now to be conceived as still continuous and directly made to each individual, as opposed to the idea that God spoke through selected individuals whose messages were to be treasured, and, finally, through the Church in which He dwelt, in a special way, through the Incarnation, the descent of the Holy Ghost, and the consequent sacraments.

What were to be the effects of this change of view on the problem of the knowledge of reality? For Revelation contributed to its solution. It confirmed the dualism of Aristotle, the actuality of two orders of reality and of the dual nature of man: spirit and matter. It further affirmed the existence of a third order, the supernatural, to which man, the rational animal, the link between the spirit-world and the material world, had been elevated from the beginning through supernatural grace, and about which his natural reason by its own efforts could obtain no knowledge.

The question was then: the concept of the authoritative magisterium of the Church as guardian of Revelation being abandoned, would the tradition

of a dualistic conception of the nature of man and of Christian trialism be preserved?

The chances were that it would not. Because what the substitution of the individual to the Church as a receptor and interpreter of revealed knowledge really implied was that henceforth churches could only be groups of individuals who chose to come together, and without authority whatsoever over one another. If God had not established an authoritative Church, he certainly had not established many. That there existed writings which had been and might still be considered witnesses of past revelations could not help. For, either these books admitted of only one interpretation on all points by every individual, or they did not. If they did not, which was most likely in view of the complexities of the matters involved and of the fact that the essentials were beyond the scope of natural reason, then the problem arose again. Either one or more individuals received an authoritative interpretation and all others should accept it, thus negating the very principle of private interpretation; or the interpretation of every individual was to be equally accepted, or at least his right to maintain it recognized. It is not surprising, therefore, that, at the very outset of the development of Protestantism the dilemma was revealed. Luther and Calvin illogically sought to establish creeds, and Protestantism soon pretended to be as authoritative as Catholicism. In fact, it came to boast that it had recovered the original revelation and proved most intolerant of all those who would not accept its own official interpretation of that revelation. On the other hand, it is evident that the principle of private interpretation led to the formation of numberless sects, and to the recognition in some of them of the right of rejection of their own tentative creeds by their members.

Let us note, however, that sixteenth-century Protestantism kept both the dualism and the trialism of the Western tradition. There is no doubt that it broke up Christendom, in so far as it had been united by the magisterium of the one Church, but it did not constitute a total shift in basic Western thought.

The first step in this total shift was the advent of Deism in England, on the Continent, and even in the American colonies. For what Deism represented, even when it still oscillated toward Theism as with Thomas Jefferson, was the total repudiation of Protestantism as well as of Catholicism. It would no doubt be possible to interpret the rise of Deism as a revolt against the Calvinistic doctrine of grace and the allied Jansenist doctrines.

But its implications are wholly clear: Away with all the Christian churches. Let us go back to natural religion, to such a natural theology as the philosopher may reach. Seventeen centuries of Christian civilization were thus repudiated at one stroke. To the endless bitter denunciations of Rome in Protestant literature were now added the no less bitter denunciations of Christianity and of all the Christian churches by the "Philosophers."

Still, the complete repudiation of the whole of Western thought had not yet come. Voltaire was at most back to Aristotle. The general philosophical outlook was still dualistic, and on this dualism Christianity could still be reasserted. Chateaubriand could hope to reconvert Voltairians to Catholicism.

But now comes the radical and total philosophical shift. This time not only the traditional religion of the modern world was to be disowned, but the whole Aristotelian tradition. The dualistic was to yield to the monistic outlook. The beginning of this shift may be traced to Descartes, although he remained a dualist. What Descartes did was to break asunder the integrated soul-body dualism of Aristotle: the soul the form of the body, and to separate them into independent entities. But once spirit and matter were thus dissociated what could be easier than to deny them in turn?

The development of materialistic monism, encouraged by Bacon's call to the study of nature, ran its course through the sensism of Hobbes and Locke and became fully formulated with some of the later French philosophers of the eighteenth century. Encouraged in the nineteenth by the English associationists, the positivism of Comte, the wholly materialistic interpretations of evolution after Darwin, and the development of a purely experimental study of psychology, it constituted an atmosphere hostile to every type of spirituality.

But the more precise idealistic monism, eventually thoroughly organized by a great genius, was to be much more potent in the dislocation of Western thought. The pantheism of Spinoza made mind and matter but different expressions of the one divine substance. Leibnitz and Berkeley sought to reduce matter to mind, and Hume to reduce both to phenomena. Hume awoke Kant to restate the problem, but though Kant reasserted dualism, his apriorism and even his moralism only opened the door wider to skepticism and subjectivism. After him, idealistic monism won the day. Subjective with Fichte, clearly pantheistic with Schelling, it reaches its final expression with Hegel, who makes the indifferent absolute of Schelling an

immanent activity, a becoming, a dynamic instead of a static absolute. Reality is the process, spirit, or idea realizing itself. There is no longer any abiding, any antecedently real, or the possibility of an eternal righteousness, but only the flux of change. God, man, and nature are merged in monism. It is this assertion of change as the very heart of reality which constitutes the radical shift from the dualistic philosophy which had triumphed out of the early search for truth and had molded the Western world.

How then did the passage from dualism to monism directly affect us? First, and radically, in the domain of religion. Materialistic monism makes any religion worthy of the name impossible, since it denies the spirit. But idealistic monism is even more insidious as a solvent of Christian thought. Making the spirit the only order of existence, it could lay a bold hand upon its data and call for their reinterpretation. It was thus that modernism, begotten of monistic idealism, swept through the Protestant churches, calling upon them to rewrite the life of Christ on its own terms.

In the social and economic domain, monistic idealism led us into atheistic Communism. For Hegel, the absolute realized itself through struggle within an emergent becoming of which history is the record. Karl Marx had but to stress class-antagonism, born of economic conditions, as the fundamental cause of this becoming, to make Communism appear as the one hope for the future.

In the political field, monistic idealism led to the totalitarian or absolute State. For, evidently, if the individual has no independent personal existence, but is merely a part of the becoming, he can have no personal rights. Since he is merged in the general flux of total change, he is in terms of his social group or state and has no appeal against its decisions, whether expressed by a majority of the legislative or by a dictatorial executive. To whom, moreover, would he appeal, since there is no abiding reality above men and nations? With monism, minorities or individuals can have no rights.

In the international field, monism had equally far-reaching consequences. Did not Hegel say that in universal history each nation in turn is for the moment dominant, and that its triumph in war is the proof of its right to dominance? What better appeal could there be to nationalism or racialism? But further, as struggle is the law for the emergence of the absolute, and as this emergence is the highest ideal, the nation which by

fair or foul means can triumph is to be considered the bearer of the then highest stage of development of the world spirit; and before its absolute right, as Hegel says, the spirit of other nations is absolutely without rights. Nor can this doctrine hold any promise of possible permanent agreements among nations, social groups, or even individuals. For under the philosophy of total change, treaties and agreements but mark the conditions which the weaker had to accept or the stronger thought it advisable to impose at the time, and thus become automatically scraps of paper as soon as conditions have changed.

As for materialistic monism, as it likewise denies an antecedent reality of righteousness, and its law of development must also be struggle leading to the survival of the fittest, it should be easily seen that it could lead as readily to consider the Christian centuries ages of illusions, economics as purely materialistic, the State as the absolute organizer of resources, and force the only deciding factor in international relations.

Idealistic and materialistic monism were already so influential in the second half of the nineteenth century that it should have been possible to predict what might be expected toward its close and in the first third of the twentieth: bewilderment in the Protestant churches and a challenge to them to accept monism even more unconditionally; a world-war; a powerful international offensive of atheistic Communism; the rise of totalitarian states; international commercial wars in the intervals of ever threatening and ever more ruthless cosmic armed struggles; and, within the state, the dislocation of the family and the tendency to interfere with every individual right to live, from the prenatal to that of helpless old age, whenever it suits the best interest of those in control of the situation. Indeed, it is actually true that the very men who ushered in the monistic modernistic period sensed the helplessness of those who would come after them. "What are people going to live on after us?" exclaimed Sainte-Beuve. Today we are beginning to know the answer. What might have been prophesied in the days of Sainte-Beuve, because of the consequences logically inherent in monism, has become our confused actuality.

Let us now come to our own American scene. It has been said that the pragmatism of William James and the experimentalism of John Dewey were particularly American products. And so they were, but they none the less link us with Hegelianism. For if, with practical American common

sense, James receded from Hegel, and though his pragmatism does not speak of an absolute realizing itself, it is nevertheless also a call to consider that which succeeds as the best yet attained. To say that truth consists ultimately in the utility of ideas is to beg the question, for the question remains: useful for what? and how shall we determine the quality of the what? To shoot a policeman will certainly help the racketeer to lead a fuller life than he would behind prison bars. For James, as well as for Hegel, might still created right since success did.

James' successor, Dr. John Dewey, brings us to our own day. But he, too, even more evidently, stems from Hegel, since, as Mead recalls, in 1884 he still wrote: "The individual has renounced his own particular life as an unreality, he has asserted that the sole reality is the universal will, and in that reality, all his actions take place." Some ten years later, however, the same author tells us, Dewey had placed "the will, the idea, and the consequences inside of the act, and the act itself only within the larger activity of the individual in society." True, he thus seems to give us a criterion of truth less individualistic than that of James: the social good. But what social good? the social good of the gang, the race, the nation, or humanity? Let us grant that Dewey always means humanity. It remains true that his pragmatic principle that a system of thought is no longer useful and hence no longer true if it does not better society begs the question as much as the more individualistic pragmatism of James. The totalitarian dictator and the atheistic anarchist are as much convinced that they are working for the social good as the democrat or liberal. Truth for the pragmatist is wholly relative to the flux of change in which he is immersed and which includes his own appetites, emotions, or fancies, and hence he is bound to remain purely subjective.

No better proof of this subjectivism and of the possible radical consequences to which it may lead is to be found than in Doctor Dewey's own case. For instance, he is convinced that "faith in the divine author and authority in which Western civilization" and "inherited ideas of the soul and its destiny" . . . "have been made impossible for the cultivated mind of the Western world." His understanding of working for the social good should be therefore to uproot all faith in God or hope of immortality from the minds of men. This indeed may be said to be the program which he and his disciples put forth in the so-called "religious humanist" manifesto issued in 1933, which contains the following: "Religious humanists regard the

universe as self-existing and not created. . . . Man is a part of nature and has emerged as the result of a continuous process. . . . The time has passed for theism, deism, and modernism. . . . The fulfillment of life is in the here and now."

This is surely monism with a vengeance. But the pursuit of the social good consonant with such principles evidently calls for the destruction of all existing churches, Protestant as well as Catholic; the development of school and university systems which could be in no sense liberal but would base all their teachings on atheism; and, finally, the repudiation of the American Declaration of Independence, with its assertion of the rights of the human person stemming from the Creator, of the Bill of Rights which enumerates some of them, and of the Constitution of the United States, with its separation of powers, and its supreme judiciary devised to denounce as unconstitutional any invasion of human rights by the legislator or executive. In short, the social good according to which Doctor Dewey would test the validity of his philosophy is to be found today in Russia and not in America. But as, on the other hand, the social good so conceived is merely a carrying out of his philosophical principles, we are evidently again in the vicious circle of the pure subjectivism which monism cannot escape, since for it all reality is in the flux of change and hence its values cannot transcend personal satisfaction. It cannot say: That's the way I ought to look at it. It can only say: That's the way I look at it. For there is no ought above the monistic stream.

Evidently monism could wreck American civilization as readily as it has the European. It is then high time that we clearly redefine our terms, and take our positions accordingly.

When we consider that in all their works, the self-styled "religious humanists" insist *ad nauseam* that they are in revolt against the supernatural, it should be clear that they have no right to call themselves "religious" if the word is to retain any meaning. Moreover, although they are not the first to so misuse the word, they have no right to call themselves "humanists" or their doctrine "humanism." After all, these words cannot be dissociated from the humanists of the Renaissance and these were not monists nor did they repudiate the supernatural. Humanism, moreover, is evidently the ism about the human, the human distinguished from the animal. If the humanists of the Renaissance championed classical studies,

it was because they considered them most consonant with human dignity flowing from a distinctly human nature.

What Doctor Dewey and his disciples should evidently be called are "humanitarian naturalists," "humanitarian" because they consider the amelioration of this life the highest ideal, "naturalists" because they believe only in the one order of nature.

In the light of the above discussion, however, what we should all carefully distinguish is evidently whether we are monists, dualists, or trialists. If we are monists, if we have merged in any way the traditional notions of God, man, and nature in one current of becoming, we should also be called humanitarian naturalists and have the intellectual honesty not to use the word religion in connection with our beliefs.

If we are dualists, if we believe in two orders of existence, and in man as the link between them and hence distinct from God and distinct in the midst of nature, we may be disciples of Aristotle, of Saint Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher, and even of Voltaire. We can have at least a natural religion. We may call ourselves dualistic humanists.

If we are trialists, if we believe that in addition to the order of the material and the spiritual which meet in man, there is a third order, the order of grace, known and knowable only through Revelation, then we are truly in the biblical tradition, and we may call ourselves religious humanists, Christian humanists, or more simply Christians, according to the stress we put upon the rôle of Christ in the economy of grace.

If the naturalists, now that their idealistic and materialistic monisms are merged, persist, as they are likely to do, in retaining the name of humanists, then they should be carefully distinguished as monistic humanists. As opposed to them, we should then have dualistic humanists and Christian humanists. But evidently the words monist, dualist, and trialist are sufficient to establish the fundamental distinctions in our conception of reality. With these distinctions established, we should be able, more easily at least, to work our way out of our confusion of thought.

It was rather natural that within the Protestant churches there should have been a receptivity for monism. In the philosophy of total change of Hegel, in his dynamic absolute, his emergent evolution of the All-One, Protestantism could at least find a plausible basis for its variations of doctrine and a full freedom of thought, since, according to this view, there was really no truth, but only truth in the making.

It was also natural that within a Protestantism which had denied the value of good works in favor of faith in a doctrine of grace so extreme as to imply predestination and thus deny man any part in his salvation, there should be in some quarters a reaction against stressing the supernatural and in favor of humanitarianism.

But it should now be clear that these two trends were but escapes out of the problems involved in dualism and trialism and that the whole modernist movement was but a begging of the question, since its dealing with the Gospels and their interpretations was but the carrying out of its preconceptions based on its acceptance of monism.

The so-called "religious humanist" manifesto and in general the numerous challenges to the Protestant churches to capitulate to naturalism at least bring the issue to a head. Modernism is now seen to have been but a half-way station on the descent to monistic naturalism.

Let us then decide whether we are monists, dualists, or trialists, and if we are monists let us admit that we are wholly out of the biblical tradition and act accordingly.

This would leave within the Protestant churches only genuine dualists and trialists. The trialists' special task is to work out the many problems of the relations of a genuine, because dualistic, humanism and of the supernaturalism of the Biblical tradition. It is a task for theologians, but for genuine theologians, who believe that, besides the possible findings of human reason, a Divine Revelation is available as a means of knowledge as to the ultimate nature, origin, and end of man. Just what a mere dualist should want to do in a church in the genuine Protestant tradition any more than in the Catholic is not very clear. The Deists were at least logical on that point. But this fact only makes clearer that a monist has no possible place in such groups since he should want to change them into groups of naturalists. These are not matters of excommunications but of intellectual respectability.

It remains true, however, that the dualistic humanist, though a mere philosopher, holds the key to the solution of the religious problem; for upon him as such devolves the defense of the only conception of man which can furnish the philosophical basis necessary for the possibility of the supernatural, or the order of grace added to the order of human nature distinct from all other natures in the universe through the factor of a spiritual element manifesting itself as intelligence and will.

Where then and how numerous are our Protestant trialists? Where

and how numerous in the Protestant churches, or in sympathy with them, are our dualistic humanists? On the answer depends how far the Protestant churches are holding their sector of Christendom against the attacks of naturalism. Where and how numerous are the dualistic humanists outside the churches? On the answer depends how far mere philosophers today are still asserting the most fundamental doctrine of Western thought and hence how many are working for the survival of Western civilization.

The answers to these questions would no doubt require numerous articles. It is to be hoped that we shall be able to read some in the pages of *RELIGION IN LIFE*.

In the meanwhile, need we remain under the impression that naturalism has won the day, and that our Christian civilization is definitely doomed? By no means.

It is true that our more prominent non-catholic philosophers still live in the foothills of Hegelianism, and that they are even now inviting us to build a new civilization even further down amid the dust bowls of an experience stretching to a godless horizon within which we can pick the grave through which we are to sink after a short life span "into extinction, the blackness of darkness forever."

Nevertheless, it is already clear that powerful reactions against naturalism have now long been at work. In fact, the most striking feature of our American naturalism is how far it lags behind several European movements, and how unaware it seems to be of this lag. Again several articles would be required to show this in some detail. At least it might be mentioned that in France, which, because of its geographic position, is ever at the crossroads of European thought, the reaction against naturalism dates so far back—at least half a century—that it has repeatedly affected the arts and brought about a vigorous religious renaissance to the point of the conversion or reconversion to Catholicism of some of the best minds of France bred in naturalism. Witness the works of Bourget, Brunetière, Bloy, Bazin, Baumann, Bordeaux, Jules-Bois, Baudrillart, Bertrand, Bremond, Claudel, Doumic, Giraud, Jammes, Péguy, de Mun, Mauriac, Massis, Max Jacob, Rod, Strowski, de Vogüé, Rivière, Psichari, Gilson, Maritain, besides the at least dualistic humanists Barrès, Lasserre, Benda, Maurras, Lemaître, and Faguet. Many others might be mentioned, the work of Seillière, for instance, which comprises more than fifty volumes and offers the most

minute study of the European, especially German and French, thought of the last one hundred and fifty years, and of the dissolving effects of monism. As for England, even the catalogue of a single publisher, Sheed and Ward, bears witness to a likewise vigorous and productive dualistic and trialistic movement in England, while in the United States the monumental work of Irving Babbitt and of Paul Elmer More would suffice as indications of the American critique of monism which must now be taken into consideration.

Before such an array of names and so numerous and many-sided works, the claim that "faith in the divine author and authority in which Western civilization confided . . . has been made impossible for the cultivated mind of the Western world," and the monist's call to the churches to surrender to naturalism if they do not want to lag behind, can only appear distressingly naïve.

It is very significant that Doctor Dewey tells us it was the Victorian age which "recognized that the new science demanded a certain purification of traditional beliefs—such, for example, as the elimination of the supernatural." For these words actually date the lag of the naturalists. Idealistic monism is pre-Victorian and pragmatic naturalism, mid-Victorian. But what those French names in particular represent is precisely the repudiation of mid-Victorian naturalism. Nor should we be surprised, for are we not daily more aware that the mid-Victorian mechanistic conception of the universe is now repudiated by science itself. Mid-Victorian mechanistic psychology is no less completely *passé*, and even post-Victorian experimental psychology has grown cautious; and if, perforce, it must content itself with studying the animal reactions in man, it is more and more prudent about asserting that they explain all human behavior. In fact, the mechanistic explanations of the laws of learning so enthusiastically exploited in the last thirty years have completely broken down, and we are beginning to hear again in educational circles about distinctly human higher mental processes. The mid-Victorian theories of evolution are also now going by the board, and we now realize that the only alternative to the idea of the seven twenty-four-hour-day creation of a static cosmos, wrongly imputed to the Bible, is not the monistic conception of a self-existing universe in process of continuous and total metamorphosis; but that another and much more rational alternative is the dualistic conception of many present-day evolutionists, already held by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas: a universe

created and sustained by, and evolving according to, an antecedently existing intelligence, will, and power.

In short, in every field, the monist is now revealed to be the one who is lagging behind. Most of the still prominent monists are significantly older men, whose teachers go back to the heyday of Hegelianism. According to their own doctrine, they might indeed be accused of representing an outmoded moment of becoming, or of having been conditioned too far back to be convincing in our day. Today, not only are we no longer easily impressed by the towering constructions of Hegelianism, but we readily realize that monistic idealism, far from being related to the inductive methods of science, was elaborated wholly deductively; and that its promulgators could be accused, as Bacon accused the decadent scholastics of his day, of having woven their doctrines like a cobweb out of their own substance. A philosophy of change without an antecedent prime mover must eventually overtax our credulity, for what is irrational is to believe that a universe essentially contingent since it is changing, could be self-existing; while, on the contrary, it is most rational to believe in an absolute, antecedent, self-existing God. Furthermore, unless we are to consider the only outlook which monism leaves to us: extinction after a life determined, inwardly, by our inheritance, and, outwardly, by our environment controlled by the State as superior to man's status during the Christian centuries, then monism stands condemned on its own pragmatic principle.

In fact, every sign indicates that we are on the threshold of a new age of thought, of an age that will have again at its heart the dualistic philosophical and trialistic religious outlook that built the Western world; and that the modernistic era, now ending in catastrophes, will have been but an interlude on our further way to progress, spiritual as well as material. Under the whip of dictatorship, and the threat to their common convictions, Protestants and Catholics are learning to stand together for the reassertion of the kingdom of God above the kingdoms of Caesar; and the Protestant world is working earnestly to recover as much unity as its principles permit. In Belgium, in France, in England, and even in America, the tradition of dualism is being recovered and brilliantly exploited. The Catholic world has never been sounder in personnel, or been able to boast of a more enlightened leadership in its scriptural studies, the encouragement of science, the recognition that every man of good will may have the grace necessary for salvation, and in its concern for social welfare.

Nor need we feel that the monistic interlude was a total loss. If monism was so influential, it was because representatives of dualism had been lax and too one-sided in the exploitation of their own doctrine. The study of matter belongs to dualism as well as the study of the spirit. Whatever even materialistic science may have discovered of objective truth dualism can incorporate. Likewise, the changing belongs to dualism as well as the abiding; and the challenge of the philosophy of total change may at least have brought home to us that dualistic humanism and Christian trialism in no way imply a static abiding which would make all progress impossible, but, so far at least as man is concerned, a philosophy of the abiding in the changing and in constant development, a truly dynamic ontologism.

"Thy kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven"? To the promise of that kingdom there is no end. May all dualists and trialists, in and out of the churches, unite in that prayer, that that promise may be fulfilled ever more abundantly, not only to the greater good of man but to the greater glory of God.

Making Theology Available for Religion

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

MAN'S life consists of the given, the discovered, the revealed, the achieved and the appropriated. If you know which of these a man emphasizes you know the quality of the man. If you know which of these an age emphasizes you understand the quality of the age. If you know which of these a church emphasizes you understand the quality of the church. The scientist is inclined to emphasize the given. "Here is the world," he says. "It is the object of our study." The rationalist (to use an old term which represents an actuality which persists through changes in usage) inclines to emphasize the discovered. "Here is the tale of what man has done by using his mental powers," he says. "The use of these powers is the great matter." The theologian (in the historic and perhaps the only adequate sense) is inclined to emphasize the revealed. "Here is what God has made known," he says. "Everything must be judged by that." The moralist is inclined to emphasize the achieved. "Man's life is the tale of the use of his moral will," he says. "This is the important matter." The Evangelical Christian is inclined to emphasize the appropriated. "Here is the offer of the divine grace," he says. "Behold what we may become by appropriating this gift of God."

The matter of course is complicated by what may be called the cross-fertilization of these different positions. It is not a matter of "either—or." Each has its own contribution to make. But the matter of emphasis is extremely important. And a completely one-sided emphasis may in the end become just about as false as anything can be.

These positions may be reduced to three: (1) That which emphasizes the world below man, which we may call naturalism; (2) that which represents human power, which we may call Humanism; and (3) that which represents the divine grace, which we may call evangelicalism.

That the period immediately before our own and to an even greater degree the period in which we live represent a rather dominant influence of naturalism few would deny. The surrender to lawless impulse, the chaotic social and economic situation, the inner bewilderment and the outer confusion so familiar to us represent a triumph of naturalism. That there have been powerful voices lifted in the name of the critical use of human

powers, the control of the forces we come to understand through the study of physics and the disciplining of the energies we confront in the study of biology and the experience of life, is equally true. Humanism has been honored by masterful voices even in an age obsessed by the sub-human. That Humanism, if it is not supplemented by a sense of that which is greater and more commanding than the human, is likely to become hard and rigid and self-conscious must also be admitted. If Humanism remains outside the temple of God it is all too likely to become a pseudo-religion. If man does not learn to worship God he is all too likely to worship himself. And even the distinctions seen on the human level may be lost in a descent to Avernus, as the human is merged with the sub-human in a biology where physical impulse becomes more important than moral purpose or a physics where mathematical uniformity becomes more important than critical intelligence. There are many ways of going wrong and we have tried them all.

That there has been a new and passionate assertion of the significance of the Godward side of experience both in Europe and America we all know. Many great thinkers have perceived clearly that only as we see everything in God do we see anything correctly. Humanism must become evangelical if it is to remain human. And physics must make room for purpose, and biology for clear and controlling intelligence if the sub-human is not to engulf the human. But purpose and intelligence are always precariously held if their basis in a being of perfect moral purpose and ultimate intelligence is not clearly seen. So on every level the reassertion of the Godward side of meaning is a matter of almost desperate importance.

At the risk of being regarded as an "advocatus diaboli" one must declare that even here we must be on our guard. It is possible so to use the word God that concrete meaning is lost in vague abstraction, and ethical purpose is lost in a vague unity which destroys the distinctions without which existence would have no meaning. If the repudiation of God leads to anarchy, the verbal loyalty resting upon a discarding of historic meanings in the word God may lead to an even more desperate moral and social confusion. To retain the word God when we have taken from the idea everything which has been able to command the mind and master the conscience and dominate the will and win the heart of mankind is to emasculate religion at the very moment when we are seeking to save it. This too we have done and the subtlest problems Christian leaders meet have to do with this sincere and unconscious betrayal of the Christian religion in the house of its friends.

It must be added too that in our very passion for God, in our desperate loyalty to His supremacy, we may so interpret the Divine Being and action as to secure the transcendent glory of the Deity at the expense of an understanding of His intimate and sympathetic relation to all human striving and to the relative achievement, at least the direction of the moving of the human spirit toward that good which exists in perfection only in God.

All of this rather too long and complex prolegomena prepares for the central assertion we wish to make, namely, that theology alone integrates and organizes all those essential insights which are a part of the understanding of life into a totality of comprehension which makes it possible for the full force of the Christian religion to be released in the life of man. It has become rather easier to see how true this is since we are approaching the end of an era when a good many earnest men tried to have a rich and productive religion divorced from theology. These men made much of the fine old-world liberal. They spent a good deal of time vicariously repenting of aspects of an older theology which they very much disliked. It is true that both in philosophy and in theology as indeed in literary criticism there come periods when the great insights which gave currency to particular dogmas so enter into the common deposit of thought as to be taken for granted, while the conventional applications of these dogmas by men who are not particularly vital lead to the assertion of what is sometimes absurd and at its worst evil. So the belief in unity may lead to the menace of pantheism, the belief in classic standards may lead to the artificialities of a formal age and an emphasis on a highly articulated theology may degenerate into a rigid and lifeless dogmatism. The nineteenth century liberals served a useful purpose in repudiating a good deal which had become formal, something which was petty and something which was cruel. But these liberals—at least some of them—were very naïve. They assumed that the central convictions which were the gift of ages of keen interest in theology could be kept by an age which repudiated theology because it did not like some theological positions. So we heard a great deal about undogmatic religion, about retaining the spirit of Jesus without asking metaphysical questions about His person, and accepting the attitude of good will without asking what made this attitude basal in the life of the universe. For rather a while the method did not reveal its inner bankruptcy. The men who had been vigorously trained in theological thinking succeeded in keeping what they liked and repudiating what they felt was unhealthy in the historic theology. As time went on

they were surprised and even startled as they watched the next generation growing up without a theology. The very positions which the older liberals held tenaciously began to be dropped by eager young men who had had no sound or critical training in theological thinking. The vast and masterful Godward side of the personality of Jesus began to fade from men's thought, the assured conviction of the personality of God drew dimmer and dimmer in the mists of pragmatic processes of thought which had no place for clear assertions about the perfect consciousness and purposive intelligence of the Divine Being. The word God more and more ceased to be thought of as a noun and was thought of as a noble adjective. The eternal principles of conduct which had been sharply asserted in a theological age also began to be shrouded in a mist of instrumental thinking. Multitudes of men began to live precariously in a world in which you could make no clear assertions either in regard to God or man or conduct. The background of thought and life for no end of people became a vast phantasmagoria.

At this very time eager and sincere people everywhere became increasingly conscious of the cruel lot of the underprivileged and the exploitations of powerful men and nations. Again and again during twenty centuries men have become passionately conscious that the character of God and the tragic pain of the divine act upon the Cross rebuked certain ways of men and of groups and of institutions and of states. This social passion then was a by-product of a living theology.

The social passion of the period just before our own, however, tended to become a substitute for living convictions about God and Christ and redemption rather than the inevitable expression of an appropriation of great truths about God and Christ and man. Men who had no theology tried to fill their lives with social enthusiasms which had no genuine basis in thought and so sentimental humanitarianism began to take the place of true and disciplined human interest. Preachers of this type in their enthusiasm for human rights forgot human responsibilities, and in their sentimental sympathy created utopias of imagination with no sound basis in character made stable by the grace of God. Increasingly they felt that they could do by laws what can only be done by surgery at the very center of the individual's life. Men came to feel that you could make an unselfish society out of vast groups of selfish individuals and that you could make a victorious world out of a collection of defeated men. So the very idealism of the period tended to betray itself because it never went to the root of

the social disease. But humanitarian sentimentalism has the other weakness that it is based upon uncritical emotion rather than upon sound thought. Sooner or later this rootless emotion tended to dry up. Feelings which have not secure bases in convictions about the nature of the universe cannot be permanent. When unselfish feelings with no firmly held philosophy of life to support them meet the desperate onrush of selfish feelings, the selfish feelings are likely to triumph. So the sons of the romantic Utopians were all too likely to follow hard and selfish ways to power.

When the stories of Jesus were only charming myths which could be used because they expressed lovely unselfish ideals, and when the word God was only the vague name for the rather incoherent idealism of men, the sharp word of moral mastery vanished from ethics, the steel strength departed from social ideals and the radiance and assurance vanished from religion. It was in a world where many currents were setting toward such results as these that the liberal evangelical movement began to speak with virile authority to men in Anglican communions all about the world, that the Barthian and kindred processes of thought swept into the minds of men in Lutheran and Reformed communions, and that the Neo-Thomist movement began to sound trumpet blasts in the Latin communion. These movements and a number of others represent a zestful and commanding endeavor to make theology really available for the purposes of religion. With something of surprise, bankrupt men in churches all about the world are lifting their eyes to inspect their unused resources in those central assertions of theology which hold so securely the secret of the vitality of religion.

It is clear at once that from this vitalized position in religion you see that in God you find the basis for a judgment of man. You do not go to man to find a basis for the judgment of God. To be sure, the story of man's chaotic and inadequate processes of thought, the tale of his futile and frustrated processes of living, may be the very best psychological approach to an appreciation of man's terrible dilemma. Case studies of frustration and brilliant expositions of futility are important. But all of them give us an indubitable understanding of human need. They do not of themselves present the divine response to that need. Such a play as "Mourning Becomes Electra" very well illustrates what is likely to happen to people who in the most genuine sense are godless. And such a study in semi-fiction as *The Last Puritan* quite clearly shows what happens to people who never find a secure intellectual or moral foundation for religion. Brilliant

studies of moral chaos and intellectual confusion have their own place in our equipment. But they offer no substitute for a vital theology. It is in God that the universe begins to blaze with light and glow with warmth. It is in God that we first see man in the blaze of possible glory. But the word God must have a certain meaning. And we must meet God in actual experience. The God in whom we find the meaning of existence must be conscious intelligence, perfect in goodness, and radiant with love. A God who cannot be conscious of every individual in the world is no God at all. A God who cannot consciously hear prayer and perfectly apprehend the moral and spiritual longing back of it is not even a false God. To use the word God for an abstract principle or an unconscious tendency or an ideal only conscious in human thought is to put spiritual vacuum at the heart of religion and to baptize it with the name most sacred in all the centuries of the experience of personal religion. A God who cannot consciously conceive and hold to a purpose for the individual, for the group, and for the race is a mere figure of speech, the empty echo of unrequited hopes. A God who is not the creator and maintainer of all that exists leaves the universe a body without a soul, leaves existence a succession of sensations with no rational meaning, and serves no purpose for the clarification of thought, the creation of noble purpose or the justification of temporal or immortal hopes. If you successfully deny the sovereignty of God you can never have anything important or significant to say about man. A deity lost in the processes of existence or produced by them or owing whatever being he possessed to the unfolding of life energies which he did not create and master would only be a name for a chaotic naturalism, the rhetorical compliment of a pantheistic monism paying facile tribute to a vanishing faith at the very moment when it set forth upon ways of thought in which all the distinctions which give meaning to morals and art and religion upon a civilized level would be lost. On the other hand, conscious fellowship with the God who is perfect goodness alive, perfect intelligence in conscious exercise of its powers, and ethical good will in decisive and authoritative action, puts such mighty energy into religion as makes it the most vital thing in all the world.

The Christian doctrine of man follows the Christian doctrine of God. It is inevitable with the understanding of God involved in that doctrine. It falls apart without it. If free ethical intelligence is the very quality of the life of God, you can see what free intelligence means in human beings.

You can see the significance of man as he lifts his head from the uniformities of physics and the rush of biological energies, to use the one and to control the other. You see what it means that man is made in the image of God. To object to this by declaring that man is a part of nature is to dehumanize man for the sake of a unified interpretation of life on a sub-human level. To conceive of nature without God and then to hold man within the limits of that impersonal nature is the last and most deadly attack upon the dignity of man. To use the ugly word dualism to express horror of a view of life which makes a distinction between the impersonal uniformities of physics and the exercise of control by a human being is to betray a singular lack of critical intelligence. To use the word dualism to express a basis for the repudiation of a view of life which sees a difference between the surrender to the rush of biological energies and their control by disciplined conscious will is to take the first step in the surrender of the civilized mind. Whatever unity the world possesses must make room for the distinction between the creator and the created, between controlling intelligence and controlled impulse and between good and evil. To confuse these distinctions is to betray the cause of man. And whether the betrayal comes from a misunderstanding of the philosophy which interprets the facts presented by physics and biology, or an invading impersonal mysticism from the ancient East, the result is a pantheistic monism which gathers into itself all those fallacies which would dishumanize man and rob him completely of the mental, moral, aesthetic, spiritual and social life only possible in fellowship with a personal God who transcends while He controls the world He has created, and with other men who transcend while they discipline and use those forces and energies whose nature it is to be controlled by intelligence. With a God of eternal purpose and creative conscious intelligence you can have a unity which conserves all true distinctions; without you can only find a unity which betrays and never a unity which emancipates.

From the doctrine of God as free and perfect intelligence and man as the possessor of an intelligence and a freedom which are the gift of God you come to the possibility of a clear apprehension of the nature of the moral tragedy of human life. The misuse of the gift of free intelligence is sin. The possession by a finite creature of qualities which by their very nature must be used in perpetual loyalty to the perfect and living intelligence who is God makes possible a choice between two alternatives. Man may choose a loving obedience which is the glory of the creature, or he may choose a

rebellion against the perfect good will of God, which is man's ultimate tragedy. This wrong choice itself may come in two ways, (1) either by making the sub-human the ultimate good, or (2) by asserting for the human an independence which belongs only to the divine. A man may sin by becoming a beast or by trying to be a God. This inner treachery to his own destiny is the moral tragedy of man.

There is another tragedy which comes when human good will is caught in the clutch of tragic circumstance. Here man is a victim and not a sinner, though the hostile circumstances in which the innocent are caught may be the cumulative result of other men's sinning. But the sharpest distinction must be made between man as a victim and man as a sinner. The two problems have different meaning and solutions. It is the problem of sin which is the central and bitter problem of human life. And only a divine surgery at the center of the individual life can deal with this problem.

It is the assertion of Christian theology that this supreme tragedy for man has been also a supreme tragedy for God; that God Himself has broken into the life of time from the life of eternity in all the wonder of the Incarnation and all the passionate agony of the Cross to deal with just this most bitter tragedy. Here again Christianity is met by a withering monism which would so fasten God in the imperfection of this tragic world that there is no perfectly free divine life to break with glorious splendor upon the tragic pain of humanity caught in the coils of selfishness and sin. Christian theology, on the other hand, brings God near enough to man to become a Saviour. It does not bring Him so near as to make Him a divine sinner. To dethrone God would not help man. To stain God with evil would not emancipate man. He must cling to the distinctions which give a basis for moral hope, and turn from that pseudo-unity which would fasten God with the very chains which He must strike from the lives of men.

It is the assertion of Christian theology that in Jesus God lived a human life, tempted yet sinless, baffled yet triumphant, one with us yet one with God, making God available to man and making man accessible for the stainless glory of the life of God. On the Cross all that God is in perfection of righteousness and love is expressed in a perfect deed of rescue: God in action for man at the very point where man can do nothing for himself. All of this glowing in the consciousness of the man who accepts it, cleansing his mind, giving peace to his consciousness, giving assurance to his hopes, singing in the raptures of human acceptance of this divine grace, is that Christian

experience of religion which transforms the individual and sets going forces for the transformation of every aspect of the life of man.

It is the assertion of Christian theology that the deed upon the Cross was followed by the deed in the tomb, life triumphed over death, from beyond the silence of the grave a voice spoke, from the grim dissolution of death a triumphant personality came, abolishing death and bringing life and immortality to light. God the transcendent through His spirit is intimately present in the very structural experiences of all human beings, and pre-eminently present in reinfusing the powerful ministry of reconciliation of the Son of God. The life of God is rich and many-sided beyond the understanding or analysis of man, an eternal perfection of unselfish love of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the unity of perfect agreement, and the assertion of one will thrice enforced, that man's dream of social good will is an echo in time of what God is perpetually in eternity.

When all this becomes a flaming reality in a man, he has indeed a new life. When it becomes a flaming reality in a group of men you have the Christian Church. When this glowing brotherhood of the redeemed confronts entrenched evil and hard selfishness you have the true social hope of humanity. And in its ultimate fulfillment in the heavenly kingdom you have the final beatitude of man in the presence of God.

It is good to know that living leaders all about the world are seeing these things with the rise of new and authentic passion as they appropriate their meaning. It is good to feel that Classic Christianity—firmly based in this eternal faith and glowingly aware of every contemporary problem and every subtle aspect of contemporary thought and struggle, of the pain of the underprivileged, the strange silence of the voiceless, the deep and corrosive agony of the consciousness of personal treachery to goodness and to God—is to go forth and to triumph through the Divine Grace in our own day like an army with banners. And good it would be if there might emerge everywhere triumphant consciousness of the power of Christianity making the whole glorious message of Christian theology available in a Neo-Classic movement which would sound like a trumpet in the Reformed Churches and in Protestantism as the Neo-Thomist movement is bringing new life to the Latin communion in many parts of the world. For this is the victory which overcometh the world, even our faith.

The Apocrypha

CHARLES ARTHUR HAWLEY

ON the 28th of June, in the year 323 B.C., word passed quickly through Babylon that Alexander had bade a final farewell to his officers. Foreseeing strife among the military dictators, for Alexander left no able successor, all Babylon mourned; and the lament was soon shared by the entire Hellenistic world. Although many judged that the achievement of Alexander had come to an end, the day of his death ushered in an era of ever extending influence, an era in which his many and great ideals were to become the work of countless generations. Alexander had set in motion certain ideas which were destined to touch future men and distant civilizations. With forward-looking thoughts, he saw the need of international understanding. This understanding he believed might be accomplished by an international appreciation of the Greek tongue, a language to this day unsurpassed in clarity of expression. Aristotle had given Alexander this idea when, as his tutor, he had taught him to love Homer and Greek culture. Aristotle had, furthermore, taught Alexander a greater lesson than this, for the older man had impressed upon his pupil's receptive mind the fact that men must have certain definite standards for literature and for conduct. The young Macedonian, after accepting these truths from his teacher, in course of time set out to enforce the Greek language and Greek values upon the then known world. Alexander's method was wrong, but his ideas of universal understanding were prophetic. Posterity also soon began to look with increasing favor upon the Aristotelian principles which Alexander had made his own.

Recent archaeological discoveries have revealed the fact that Greek civilization had penetrated the East long before Aristotle went north to teach Alexander. We now know that Greek and Oriental met at the ancient city of Ugarit, recently made familiar to every reader of current magazines, as the Syrian Tell Ras Shamra. It is likely, too, that the newly discovered facts about the Homeric age will, in due time, reveal more light on the developing Graeco-Oriental associations. The early Greek philosophers and historians, such as Herodotus, the father of all historians who use the methods of archaeology, had a pronounced curiosity about the Orient. Alex-

ander had studied the history of Babylon and the Fertile Crescent before he set foot in any part of it.

The result of this mingling of interest sooner or later was bound to end in a mighty clash between Orient and Occident, for Orientalism and Hellenism present two different views of life, not easily reconciled. Herodotus knew this, as did Plato and Aristotle. On the other hand, the Hebrew Prophets, from the day when Amos recognized that the Philistines came from Crete, saw the fact with even greater intensity of feeling. The later School of Isaiah believed all men would eventually come to a knowledge of the rule of the God of Zion. But the Greeks had no mind to this, and a later writer admitted freely the issue: "Thy sons, O Zion, against thy sons, O Greece."¹

In the short space of ten years, Alexander had paved the way for the conflict or the union of the two greatest forces of mankind. Had he lived, Alexander would most surely have made possible the way for a blending of the two cultures. He would have understood and given his support to the aspirations of the Isaian School. But that was not to be, and Alexander's generals, unlike their gallant leader, knew no teaching except that of the mailed fist.

I

Ten years before his death, Alexander completely broke the Persian influence over Palestine, and ushered in the so-called Greek Period, the dominance of Greece over Palestine and the adjacent world, until Pompey captured Jerusalem in 63 B. C. Naturally, the challenge of Greek thought pitted against Oriental ideas produced a large body of literature. The term Oriental, which includes more than Hebraism, might well be used in this connection. It is rather unfortunate that the phrase *Hebraism and Hellenism* has become so indelibly fixed in the popular mind. For this, Matthew Arnold is largely responsible, since his well-known essay carrying this title has been widely read in colleges and universities ever since 1869 when he published it in *Culture and Anarchy*. While great praise should be given Arnold for calling attention to these conditioning influences on present-day civilization, it should at the same time be pointed out that his definitions and limitations have ever since caused consternation in each camp. In the main, however, for our present study of the Apocrypha, that portion of

¹ Zechariah 9. 13.

literature resulting from this clash, Arnold's general thesis may stand. He contended, as all readers of his famous essay will recall, that Hebraism emphasized *doing* as against the Greek emphasis on *thinking* or *knowing*. In the second place, he insisted that Hebraism, in holding fast to strictness of conscience, or to fixed standards, fell short of the Hellenic spontaneity of conscience. In the third place, he contrasted the traditional-mindedness of the Hebrew with the native realism, the desire to see things as they are, of the Greek. In a general way, these conflicts are ever with us. All our educational institutions illustrate them, and proclaim the rapidly growing ascendancy of the Greek over the Hebraic. The scientific method, the constant admonition to "think things through regardless of the consequences," the revaluation of values with its attendant shifting of standards, all proclaim the Greek mind as against the Hebraic.

The clash, as has been noted, already appears in the Old Testament. The Prophets dealt with it, but the writers of what is known as the Wisdom Literature felt its impact with paralyzing force. For example, that well beloved book, Koheleth,² familiarly known by its Greek title, "Ecclesiastes," states the problem fearlessly and clearly. The theme of Koheleth is this: how can belief in a fixed standard, involving the idea of a supernatural origin for this standard, be reconciled with the Greek notion that all things are in a state of flux. The Torah of Moses, a supernaturally revealed body of teaching, became for Hebraism a standard for action and thought. True, exegetes might quarrel about interpreting it, but nevertheless it was there, fixed, as permanent as the world itself. On the other hand, the Greek Heraclitus, a contemporary of the most vigorous of the later Isaian school, declared with much conviction his famous doctrine, *πάντα ῥε*, *all things are flowing*, and to many an Oriental, Heraclitus's teaching had compelling force.³ The Greeks had no supernatural revelation behind their standards, and when Protagoras came to the assistance of Heraclitus's *all is in flux* with his teaching that *man is the measure of all things*, the clash was on between Zion and Hellas. Koheleth, in dealing with this problem of a divinely given standard for conduct and thought as it came into conflict with Greek speculation, was the first writer to introduce Greek Humanism directly and forcibly into the Old Testament. The problem in a different way had been

² I note that university students find a kindred spirit in Koheleth more often than in any other Old Testament writer.

³ I shall elaborate this in my forthcoming book on the Prophets.

foreseen by the poetic portion of Job. And, let it be remembered, Job cannot be limited to "Hebraism"; the book as a whole is a product of Orientalism. Again in Proverbs, which recent archaeological discovery has demonstrated as only partial "Hebraism," the problem appears.

II

This many-sided conflict, however, comes to the surface in its mature form in the books commonly called Apocrypha. This Greek word, a neuter plural, means, freely translated, *hidden writings*. And this Greek name came to be attached to these books by mistake. In the course of time a similar group of writings grew up in connection with the New Testament. But this study deals with the literature written between the death of Alexander and the birth of Christ, and commonly called the Old-Testament Apocrypha. As originally used, the term "apocrypha" did not mean that certain books were to be removed from use, but that they were to be used by all intelligent enough to read them. Many years later these books became the helpless victims of theological debate, and then institutional religion began to dispose of them in various ways. Our own time has seen the sad ending of this misunderstanding, when ignorant or unscrupulous publishers made a "racket" by advertising in a subtle manner the "lost books of the Bible."

These books were never "lost." Anybody could have read them at any time, provided he had known Greek and Aramaic as well as Hebrew. For many of these books, coming out of the interval after the death of Alexander, known as the Hellenistic period, were written in Greek. This fact the Palestinian and Babylonian Jews resented, and they resented it so fiercely that they excluded these books from their canon. This canon,⁴ or list of books generally accepted for teaching, upheld the idea of the fixed teaching, the Torah, or Law of Moses, against the hated Hellenistic Humanism. The Hellenistic scholars at Alexandria, however, having less theological bias, included in their translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, the complete list of writings as known in Alexandria. This translation, adopted by the Hellenistic Jews,⁵ became the Old Testament for the greater part of Apostolic Christianity. The Apostle Paul and the other New-Testa-

⁴ *Canon* originally meant reed, i.e., a measuring rod. The "five-foot book shelf" is a modern adaptation.

⁵ Cf. Acts 6. 11.

ment writers quote from the Alexandrian Septuagint, the Old Testament of the Hellenists.

This body of literature, the Apocrypha, belongs, historically and religiously speaking, between the Old and New Testaments in our Bibles. It is the voice speaking out of the centuries erroneously called "silent," for there never have been silent centuries at any time among any people. Every reader of the Bible knows that the last book of the Old Testament is Malachi, and that the first book of the New Testament is Saint Matthew's Gospel. If he has not studied the matter, he feels that much time must have elapsed and certain teachings developed since Malachi laid down his pen. Boys and girls in our church schools wonder about this strange silence.⁶ And well they may, because a large number of technical terms appear in the Gospels which do not occur at all in the Old Testament. Without knowing the origin, meaning, and significance of these terms, no one can intelligently read the New Testament. But these terms are all understandable if one has studied the Apocrypha. During the clash of Hellenism with Hebraism there also grew up certain religious sects which, like the Pharisees and Sadducees, for example, play an important part in the whole New Testament. During this same conflict definite beliefs began to take permanent form: the belief in the resurrection of the body or the immortality of the soul, this latter belief depending on how far Hellenistic ideas had been absorbed; the convictions regarding the Messiah and the Messianic age; the Fatherhood of God; the work of the Scribes as a definite official body to protect the Torah, which had now become a supernaturally revealed and unalterable code of law. The conflicts of Jesus and Paul with these groups and with these ideas are well known, but their origin and meaning cannot be known without studying the Apocryphal literature.

III

Some of the books dealing with the Hebraic-Hellenic conflict did get into the Jewish canon. Koheleth has been cited. Daniel, a book dealing with the Maccabean period, got into the canon because it was written partly in Hebrew and had an earlier setting, which placed its origin within the "prophetical period." This book is important for another reason: it is the only complete Apocalypse in the Old Testament. Apocalyptic literature flourished in the time of storm and stress. When men were baffled and at

⁶ I am glad to note that lessons on the intertestamental period are appearing in some church quarterlies.

their wits' end, then came apocalyptic thought to tell mankind it could be delivered only by supernatural means, as was Daniel. The greater part of apocalyptic literature was written under a pseudonym and came to be called by a Greek name, *pseudepigrapha*. Most of the Pseudepigrapha was written late and in Greek, and for this reason it was not included in the Alexandrian canon.⁷ Daniel, like Koheleth, deals with the problem faced by those who tried to reconcile the eternity of the Torah with the ever-increasing Greek humanism. The Song of Solomon, or Canticles, got into the canon, after much debate, by way of allegory. The love poems of Solomon, some of which might be compared to Greek lyrics, were allegorized to mean the love of the Deity for His church or for His children. While, in general, allegorical methods are deplorable, they have in such cases helped to preserve important literature.

The books which failed to find a place in the Jewish canon are as follows: First and Second Ezra, or Esdras, Tobit, Judith, The Rest of Esther, The Wisdom of Solomon, The Wisdom of Ben Sira⁸ (Ecclesiasticus), Baruch, with The Epistle of Jeremiah, The Song of the Three Holy Children, The History of Susanna, Bel and the Dragon, The Prayer of Manasseh, First and Second Maccabees. As has already been noted, the writers of the early Christian Church used the Alexandrian canon, and so had these books as well as the Pseudepigrapha. Many of the ideas in the Apocryphal and pseudepigraphical books appear in the pages of the New Testament. For example, the brief Epistle of Jude quotes from two pseudepigraphical writings, The Assumption of Moses and also from The Book of Enoch. As time went on, however, and the New Testament canon began to take form, discussion arose concerning the use of many of these books. Until the influence of Saint Jerome began to be felt, the term "apocrypha" was, in a general way, applied to what we call today Pseudepigrapha. Finally the Alexandrian canon was generally accepted by the Christian Church until the time of the Reformation. The Protestant Reformers then took the canon of the Palestinian Jews rather than that of the Alexandrian Hellenists. Of course in doing this, the Reformers had no idea of the ancient clash of Hebraism versus Hellenism, but made the choice principally on grounds of purity of doctrine. Luther, however, wrote in

⁷ I have dealt with this literature in my *Teaching of Apocrypha and Apocalypsis*.

⁸ The form "Sirach" arose from a mistake made by a Greek copyist who copied the Hebrew name incorrectly.

the preface to his translation of the Bible his opinion: "The books of the Apocrypha are not to be held as Holy Scripture, yet they are useful and good to read." This he wrote in 1534, and many times thereafter, in referring to certain books, he reaffirmed this opinion.⁹ The Church of England in general adopted Luther's position. The Westminster Confession considered the Apocrypha on the same basis as "other human writings." But since human writings are necessary to understand the background out of which the New Testament came, the Apocryphal books should in no wise be neglected. The Roman Church settled the matter for itself at the Council of Trent in 1546 by retaining the Alexandrian canon, but terming the Apocryphal books, deuterocanonical. This decision in regard to the Apocrypha makes the principal difference between the official version of the Bible as used by the Roman Church and the version adopted by the Reformed Church.

IV

The Protestant Church, as it emerged from the Reformation, based its authority on the Bible as the Word of God, rather than on the Church as an institution. For this reason, it gave more attention to Biblical study than did the Church of Rome. The Protestant Church, however, while not seeking pure doctrine in the Apocrypha, as it was now definitely called, never refused its use from an historical point of view. In dropping the Apocrypha for long periods of time the Protestant Church has, however, made a mistake which it is just now beginning to correct. And this is all the more important for Protestant Christians, since for them Jesus is the final authority. Jesus knew and used most of the Apocryphal writings. In order to understand Jesus, the goal of all Protestant religion, it is therefore necessary to understand these books.

In the traditional order, which is used above, the Apocryphal books begin with First Esdras, which should also come first chronologically. This book is to a great extent merely a Greek rendering of portions of the Ezra-Nehemiah narrative. One original section tells an interesting story of the three youths who vie with each other as to the strongest power in the world. One holds wine to be the strongest, another argues for the king, the third contends that woman has the most power, but truth is "strong above all things." This is a delightful little story with a decidedly Hellenistic touch.

⁹ Luther certainly considered Tobit to be holy history, and if fiction, to be beautiful, wholesome, and profitable. This judgment was quite different from his oft-quoted disparagement of the Epistle of James.

Second Esdras is a good example of a pseudepigraph of the apocalyptic type of writing found in that body of literature known as the Pseudepigrapha. The Apocalypse proper begins at chapter three, and consists of a series of seven visions. Among other things this Apocalypse teaches the Adamic origin of sin and the consequent guilt upon the human race. Second Esdras asks the old question which has its classical formulation in Job: why do the just suffer? The answer is not given, and cannot be, since man's finite mind cannot understand the Infinite. This book also shows an acquaintance with Greek thought. The problems presented are worthy of much study and meditation, and should, as they are intended, make man more humble. And humility, let it be remembered, is both an Hebraic and an Hellenic virtue.

This Apocalypse has another important value: it gives a contemporary picture of the making of Apocryphal writings. A section in the seventh vision tells how Ezra retires, drinks the cup of inspiration, and writes in the period of forty days the sum of ninety-four books. Twenty-four books are to be given to the publisher to be spread abroad, as the canonical Old Testament, for both the wise and the foolish to read. The remaining seventy books, however, are Apocrypha, to be read only by the wise and understanding. Jesus later may have had this in mind when he warned against presenting pearls to pigs. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." A similar command is given Daniel to "shut up the words and seal the book."¹⁰ The same motif in the Revelation of Saint John is familiar to all. Thus can we understand the apocalyptic type of mind. It reappears always in a time of storm and stress; it has an eternal hold on the disillusioned and the mentally baffled. A vast literature is yet waiting for these persons in the Pseudepigrapha. The makers of the canon considered this type of literature dangerous for the ignorant, and admitted but one complete Apocalypse into each canon: Daniel into the Old Testament, and The Apocalypse of John into the New. Ever since these two admissions, a certain number of people, mistaking apocalyptic for prophetic literature, have led curious but baffled persons into all sorts of ideas about the world's coming to an end, and into finding all manner of men and events in apocalyptic obscure phraseology.¹¹

¹⁰ Cf. Daniel 12. 4. and 9.

¹¹ Not long since I heard one expounder of the Revelation of John find the NRA in its pages; another found Mussolini in Daniel. What might these men not have found had other apocalypses been put into the canon? And one needs only to investigate to find what a large number were written during the clash of Hellenism versus Hebraism.

Apocalyptic literature was written to make men humble before God, not to make them magicians.

V

Another type of literature found in the Apocrypha as well as in the canonical literature is Wisdom literature. Koheleth is the best example in the Old Testament canon. The Wisdom of Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus), and The Wisdom of Solomon are the best examples in the Apocrypha, although portions of other books, notably *Tobit*, contain wisdom instruction. Wisdom literature concerns itself with the incessant conflict between Hebraism's fixed Mosaic Standard and the teaching of various Hellenic philosophies. This type of literature, both in and outside the canon, has a poor opinion of mankind. Koheleth puts man on a par with or even below the beasts of the field. Only regard man's behavior; he does things to himself and to others that the animals would not do. Sophocles, in his famous passage in the *Antigone*, has a higher opinion of man. But modern psychology and its allied branches seem to be coming around to the pessimism of the old Wisdom literature. Many novelists came to this position long ago. The function of wisdom is to help man discern that which is beneficial, and to avoid that which is harmful. But the process is difficult because man seems to exhibit a constant tendency toward evil. The degenerate Greeks who ruled over the world after Alexander's death were as bad as the Jews who refused to hear either Moses or the Prophets.

The Wisdom of Ben Sira in its Greek form was greatly beloved by both the Hellenistic Jews and the early Christians. Its constant use gave it the title of Ecclesiasticus, the Church Book, as it is called in the Apocrypha. The author seeks a *modus vivendi* between the Hellenist and the Hebraist exactly as did the Apostle Paul, two hundred years later. Ben Sira embodied in his wisdom much of the teaching of the Prophets. He has as highly developed social consciousness as Amos. In no ambiguous words he terms the man who deprives another of his livelihood a murderer. But nothing can be straightened in this confused world except by Wisdom. Ben Sira personifies Wisdom, which is an attribute of God and partakes of the divine nature. Already in Proverbs,¹² Wisdom had begun to share these qualities. Ben Sira has been touched with Greek Humanism to the extent that he believes man may partake of the quality of wisdom. A man whose conduct

¹² Proverbs 8. 22f.

is guided by wisdom would live according to what the modern Humanist might call the "higher will." Ben Sira devoted his life to dispensing wisdom, much as did Socrates or Plato. As an Oriental Plato, he had an Academy to which he invited the confused young men. Freely rendered, his invitation combined the best of the Stoics with that of the Prophets:

Come to me, you ignorant ones, and dwell in my house of instruction. Tell me: why you are deficient in the ways of wisdom, and why your souls are so thirsty? I opened my mouth and said: get instruction for yourselves without money.¹³

The disciples of Ben Sira in the course of time produced Gamaliel and the Apostle Paul.

The Wisdom of Solomon is a pseudepigraph written in Greek at Alexandria. This book develops further the teaching of Wisdom and forms the link connecting Wisdom as personal with the Prolog of Saint John's Gospel, which is the first to identify the Logos, Wisdom, with an historical personality. For this reason, the Book of Wisdom, as Jerome calls it in his translation, is of the utmost importance to an understanding of the New-Testament backgrounds. Here we see the beginning of the development of Christian theology out of the Hebraic-Hellenistic currents of thought and efforts to establish human standards of action. The author of Wisdom had Heraclitus, Plato, and the Stoics in his mind and on his desk as he wrote. Later, the Apostle Paul in his sermon at Athens took his text from a Greek Stoic poet. Saint John, writing from Ephesus, a Hellenistic city, gave the Greeks the best beloved of all the Gospels. It is to the eternal glory of Christianity, in its claim to be the only true religion, that it absorbed into itself all truth, whether Oriental or Greek. "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." In time the Christian movement, through the conversion of the Hellenistic Jewish Saul of Tarsus, brought about the synthesis in a way quite different from that which Alexander dreamed, but, nevertheless, it was Alexander who paved the way. The Wisdom of Solomon also anticipates another problem which confronted the Apostle Paul in teaching the Hellenistic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The Greeks had never heard of the doctrines of the resurrection of the body, a teaching of the Pharisees, until Paul's Athenian address, when they rejected it. Later, in his Epistle to Corinth, Paul sought to bring about a synthesis of these two quite different ideas. That The Wisdom of Solomon

¹³ Ecclesiasticus 51. 23f.

was not included in the canon is a great pity. It deserves the most careful study, not only for the light it throws on the development of New-Testament thought, but also as the most perfect example of Wisdom literature.

VI

The synthesis of Hellenic and Hebraic thought came not without great suffering and carnage. These struggles, as well as the beauties of a great literary epoch, are also preserved imperishably in the Apocrypha. The most important book dealing with the storm and stress side of the conflict is First Maccabees. Without a knowledge of this book no one can understand Daniel or Judith, the origin of parties appearing in the New Testament, nor the fierce hatred which the Jews and Greeks had for each other. First Maccabees gives vivid and unforgettable pictures of the successors of Alexander. If Alexander had lived, his own intelligent and benevolent attitude would have brought about an international mutual understanding. As it was, his untimely death left his territory to the mercy of unscrupulous, selfish, and narrow-minded exploiters of conquered peoples. In the course of time Antiochus Epiphanes came to rule over Palestine. With ruthless cruelty he set about, aided by the Hellenistic Jews in Palestine, to wipe out by force all that remained of Hebraism; but his zeal carried him too far, and he was eventually defeated by the Maccabean revolt. This uprising produced one of the great characters of all time, Judas Maccabaeus, a patriot in the truest and best sense of the word. Almost miraculous as it seems today, the Maccabees thoroughly defeated the superior Greek forces and saved the literature and religion of the Old Testament. First Maccabees carries the story down to 135 B. C.; Second Maccabees takes the narrative only down to the year 161 B. C., centering its interest on religion, introducing the miraculous and in general being less trustworthy than its better-known predecessor.

The Maccabean wars had a greater literary significance than, until recent times, has been recognized. It is true that Theodore of Mopsuestia in the fifth century believed some of the canonical Psalms came out of the Maccabean struggle, but scholars forgot, for the most part, about this suggestion, and not till the work of the famous Old-Testament scholar, Bernhard Duhm, has it been generally recognized that a large number of Psalms were composed during the Maccabean wars.¹⁴ Theodore of Mopsuestia, who

¹⁴ Cf. 1 Mac. 4. 24, which refers to the songs composed in commemorating the victories.

lived in the Hellenistic city of Antioch, was in consequence near to the sources, and his conclusions should have been heeded long before the time of Duhm.

Judith, the well-known historical novel, comes out of this period also. The heroine combines the qualities of Deborah and Jael all rolled into one. The scene, like that of Daniel, is laid in the Chaldean period, and the purpose of the two books is similar: God protects those who conform to His required standard of conduct. *Judith* shares with *Tobit* the honors due to a skillfully told narrative. The latter perhaps is the more valuable of the two, since it contains admirable bits of Wisdom literature. As any well-equipped gallery gives abundant proof, *Judith*, *Tobit*, *Susannah*, and *Judas Maccabaeus* set on fire the imagination of many medieval artists. Handel's *Judas Maccabaeus* shows how deeply steeped this great composer was in the Apocrypha.

The Apocryphal Additions to *Esther* show a religious writer's attempt to give the canonical *Esther* some reason for being in the canon. And well might he do this, since the canonical *Esther* magnifies in a thoroughly secular and cold-blooded manner just what the world is trying to get rid of—race hatred.

Baruch and *The Epistle of Jeremiah* probably had their origin in Babylonia, at least the interest is in that direction. These two brief tracts are later additions to the literature regarding *Jeremiah*. Of the same nature are the later additions to *Daniel*. *The Prayer of Manasseh* is also supposed to be an addition to supply the words of *Manasseh's* prayer when he was deported. It is in reality one of the many late Psalms which grew out of the Maccabean strife.

VII

Our understanding of the intellectual and historical background of religion has been impoverished because the "books called Apocrypha" have been omitted from most of the Bibles read in this country. There is no valid reason why these books should not be included in every Bible, and there is every reason why they should be included. The historical method has been accepted to the point that such material as is necessary to throw light on backgrounds is everywhere demanded. The original reasons for omitting the books are no longer valid in Christendom nor in Judaism. As for Christianity, it has long since recognized the fact that its one and only standard

of authority is Jesus. Since these books throw light on the background of Jesus, they are necessary to all Christians.

These books reveal clearly the origin of a deeply seated clash between two theories of life: Hebraism, or Orientalism, and Hellenism. This clash is still with us. The Maccabean wars by no means put an end to it; nor is an end to the conflict desirable. The Apostle Paul began a synthesis between the two views of life; the Johannine Gospel carried the synthesis farther, but by no means settled all the questions involved. The resurgence of various kinds of present-day Humanism has its roots in the Greek tradition. Theories of education go back to these two fountains; and one theory reigns for a time, and then another. Revealed religion with its inflexible standards, and natural religion with its effort to achieve standards, come from the same old quarrel. Aristotle and Plato, Moses and the Prophets, we need them all: and to get the right perspective we should read and ponder the travail of the soul of man as it has sought clarity rather than confusion, peace rather than turmoil. Alexander sought by force to bring understanding and unity. He failed. Jesus came, and looked upon the work of Alexander. His reporters credited Him with two comments on the whole matter: "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword," and "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

The Contribution of Paul Tillich

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

IT may be in a peculiar sense providential that the political vicissitudes of Germany should have forced Paul Tillich to migrate to America, where he is now teaching at Union Theological Seminary. It is possible that he may be able to mediate what is best in continental theology to American theological thought, a task which no pure Barthian can perform. The dominant forces in American religious thought are Calvinistic and sectarian. In spite of Karl Barth's Calvinistic background his theological system is unthinkable without the Lutheran presuppositions of continental theology. It is in Lutheran theology that the Pauline-Augustinian emphasis upon justification, rather than sanctification, is most fully developed, or in other words, in which Pelagian and semi-Pelagian moralism is most rigorously resisted.

Barth carries this Augustinian emphasis to a point where he is forced to deny what both Saint Paul and Augustine affirm, namely, that man is formed in the image of God and thus innately capable of knowing something about God. In Augustine the human memory is the particular symbol of the *imago Dei*, since it is there that man reveals his capacity to transcend the moment of time and to participate in the infinite. In Saint Paul's first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans he ascribes to the Gentiles a natural capacity to know the Creator through the creation. Barth rejects the Augustinian thesis unequivocally and treats the Pauline doctrine with gingerly ambiguity, being prevented by his conception of Biblical authority from an unequivocal rejection. He is forced to reject the conception of a "natural theology" in every instance by his conviction that every effort to understand God on the part of man leads to a deification of man, particularly to the sin of making human reason the unconditioned principle of life and clue to the meaning of existence.

American theology is completely mystified by this uncompromising exclusion of every human effort in Christian life. In its Calvinism it has a simpler idea than Barth of the possibility of redeemed man doing God's will upon earth. In its sectarianism it has inherited ideas of sanctification in which the Biblical conception of a justification for sinful man, who continues

to be a sinner even though redeemed, finds little place. The power of eighteenth-century rationalism has furthermore entered into American theology with greater force than anywhere in Europe and tended to reduce Calvinistic and sectarian moralism to a simple humanism. Furthermore, the whole tendency of Anglo-Saxon religious history is humanistic in the broadest sense of the term. It therefore finds Barthian anti-humanism too unpromising to be of service to it, even at a moment in history when its own liberal illusions are being dissipated and what is true in the rational approach to theology is threatened with annihilation by a new authoritarianism.

It is just at this point that Tillich's significance for American theology arises. How perfectly he is cast into the rôle of mediator between continental and American thought is apparent from the fact that the Barthians regard him as a humanist, while the American naturalistic theists insist that he is a Barthian. In Barth's revised dogmatics, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, he devotes attention to Tillich again and again, claiming that his conception of revelation reduces God's word to a human dialogue. On the other hand, the extreme left of American liberalism, which describes its theism by insisting that John Dewey is a theist, against that gentleman's embarrassed disclaimers, regards Tillich as the source of a new and corrupting "supernaturalism" in the pure and simple American naturalistic theology.

Tillich's position, and the promise of a fateful rôle as theological ambassador, is succinctly stated in his article, "What Is Wrong With Dialectical Theology?"¹ which incidentally Adolf Keller has described as the most brilliant criticism of Barth's thought from any theologian. In this article Tillich describes Barth's thought as paradoxical rather than dialectical. He says that Barth's statements about God "do not yield a process of thought in which 'yes' and 'no' are mutually involved, but they permit only a constant repetition in other words of the one paradox—the relation between God and man is expressed in the sentence, 'God is in heaven and thou art on earth.' Between God and man there is a hollow space which man is unable to penetrate. If it were possible for him to do this he would have power over his relation with God and thus would have power over God himself."

Against this paradox Tillich sets what he believes to be a more valid dialectic. What is wrong with dialectical theology is that it is not sufficiently dialectical. The relation of revelation to natural theology is that the word of revelation would have no relevance to human experience if

¹ In *Journal of Religion*, April, 1935.

questions about God would not arise out of human experience. It denies with the supernaturalists "that what is purely a divine possibility may be interpreted as a human possibility." But an adequate dialectic "maintains that the *question* about the divine possibility is a human possibility. And further it maintains that no question could be asked about the divine possibility unless an answer even though preliminary and scarcely intelligible were not already available." "Were an event only a foreign substance in history it could neither be absorbed in history nor be operative in it. It is as erroneous to call history God-abandoned as to regard it simply as God's revelation."

In consequence of this basic dialectical conception Tillich interprets the relation of theology to culture and of the Church to society in more dialectical terms than Barth. The whole depth of a culture is revealed in its pointing toward God in a way which concerns it "neither solely with God as a remote reality nor solely with human self-glorification but with erring and questioning knowledge about God." That is, every human culture is tempted to glorify its truth as the final truth, but it is also impelled to point to a good and a truth which is beyond its conceptions. If it seeks to name this truth and this good it simply succumbs to the temptation of self-glorification, as one part of human culture always does. But if Christian theology merely regards this pointing beyond itself of all human culture as sin, it has no point of contact with any human question about the divine. Put in another way, if a man were really able to succeed in making himself God and in glorifying his culture as final and absolute, no divine voice could ever reach him. His isolation would be complete. It is because there is an uneasiness in every human heart about the relativity of every human good (a covert revelation of something beyond itself) that the divine word can be heard and related to human experience.

This relation of culture to revelation is most succinctly stated in Tillich's conception of the relation of philosophy of religion to theology and revelation. Philosophy of religion has a negative function in its relation to theology. It points to a realm of the "unconditioned" by its very analysis of the conditioned character of all human culture. What Tillich has to say on this point is related to the old cosmological argument, which he finds stated with particular clarity and freedom from error in Anselm. The later medievalists bedevil the argument because they seek to give a rational definition of the divine and unconditioned, thus committing the error of defining what transcends the human and temporal world, in terms of the necessities

of human logic. Against this kind of rationalistic transcendentalism Tillich insists that philosophy can never go further than a negative definition of God. His own favorite philosophical definition is the "unconditioned." But against the naturalists Tillich believes that it is possible by rational analysis to point to a ground of existence which is not existence but toward which existence points, since no historical fact is self-explanatory nor fully explained by antecedent facts.

Theology speaks positively about God upon the basis of revelation, Christian theology upon the basis of the revelation in Christ. God is the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." This revelation is in history, but not all history is revelation. Revelation is that point in history in which the ground of history becomes a point in history. This very idea represents an impossibility and can therefore be expressed only in mythical terms. Christ is the eternal coming into history. He thereby becomes "the center of history," the principle of its interpretation. Such a revelation must be accepted in faith precisely because it is impossible to furnish necessary rational proofs why just this revelation is the revelation of the divine. If such proofs could be adduced the real ground of history would be the logic of such proofs.

Perhaps the matter could be illustrated by an analogy for which I do not claim Tillich's authority. Human personality has a depth somewhat analogous to the depth of the world in God. Human personality is on the one hand inserted in all the contingencies and necessities of nature and on the other hand it reaches a degree of transcendent freedom which makes it impossible for an observer of human behavior fully to understand a personality if that personality does not express its freedom in a "word" in which it ceases to be the object and becomes the subject and proves its freedom. To try to understand the world merely by observing its behavior is therefore a theology akin to an anthropology which insists that human beings have no more depth of being than animals have. But human beings, having freedom, must give the clue to their observers how their behavior is to be understood. Without such a clue the conclusions reached will be faulty in detail and erroneous in general concept. This general error is fully revealed in behavioristic psychology which reduces human self-consciousness to animal proportions in order that it may speak scientifically about it.

The word which a person speaks to another person out of his freedom is akin to the revelation, the "Word of God" which God speaks to man.

The analysis of behavior which leads the observer to suspect a transcendent ground of freedom which alone can give the key to the behavior represents the negative character of philosophy of religion. The subsequent linking of the self-revelations of a person to his significant behavior into one pattern, as we have it in the art of biography, for instance, would be analogous to the task of relating religious revelation to all the problems of human life and the history of the world. Such an analogy would of course be completely unacceptable to Barthians. They would insist that man's sinfulness and finiteness in relation to God make every analogy drawn from human experience inadmissible.

If we remain for a moment within terms of this analogy it may offer us the occasion for one criticism of Tillich. For him the center of faith and history is Christ and not Jesus. He insists that it is not possible to go behind the faith of the Early Church that Jesus was Christ and the faith that this Christ was as He is described in the Gospels. He is not interested in any rediscovery of the "historical Jesus," since the basis of the Christian religion is the faith that the Christ is the revelation of the eternal meaning in time. That, to speak analogically, seems to me like accepting the biographers' estimate of a person's peculiar significance too uncritically. There was, after all, an historical Jesus who had a gospel which fitted remarkably well into a life which ended on the Cross. Humanly speaking, this life could not have been accepted in faith as the revelation of God had its intention not been in such remarkable conformity with its destiny. I wonder whether Tillich does not allow his natural theology to become too thin at this point. The faith of the Church in Jesus as Christ is like the effort of an artist to express the depth of a personality in a portrait. The portrait is not the man but the symbol of the quintessential character of the man. We can accept it only if we have corroborative evidence that the portrait is true.

To return to Tillich's thought, a word must be said about his interest in philosophy of history. Among the unfortunately too few books of his in English, the only one published since his arrival here is *The Interpretation of History*. (The only other volume translated is *The Religious Situation*.) In this book he gives some indication of the tremendous range of his thought, not only in the field of theology but in sociology and politics. In his interpretation of history Tillich's conceptions of the "demonic" and of "Kairos" are particularly significant and interesting. The demonic is the mixture of form-creating and form-destroying energy in history. "Form of being and

inexhaustibility of being belong together. Their unity in the depth of essential nature is the divine, their separation in existence, the relatively independent eruption of the 'abyss' in things is the demonic. An absolutely independent eruption of the abyss, a mere devouring of every form would be the satanic, which for that very reason cannot take form or come into existence. In the demonic, on the other hand, the divine, the unity of basis and abyss, of form and destruction of form, is still contained, therefore the demonic can come into existence only in the tension of both elements."

In other words, human history is never purely evil, because pure evil would be pure destruction. But neither is human creativity ever purely good. The very character of human freedom which makes it possible to transcend a previous historical form and to search for a new construction also inclines all human activity to claim a more absolute value for itself than its conditioned character justifies. A demon is something less than God which pretends to be God. The demonic in history is sinful but must not be identified with sin. "The simple lack of form, the weakness of a social structure is naturally not demonic. Demonry is the reign of a superindividual sacred form which supports life and which at the same time contains the force of destruction in such a way that the destructive power is essentially connected with the creative power."

Obviously Tillich's analysis of the demonic elements in human history places him squarely on the side of the Pauline-Augustinian emphasis in Christian theology as against the Pelagian and moralistic schools of thought, in which the hope is held out that men may achieve freedom from sin by moral striving. The consequence of such moralism is pharisaic self-righteousness and utopianism. "Utopianism overlooks the fact of the demonic as an element of all historical creation. . . . (It) devaluates every moment of history in favor of the ideal which lies in infinity rather than eternity. It does not know the creative depth of every moment, its direct contact with the eternal and the character of decision by which the moment is placed between divinity and demonry."

It will be apparent from this brief analysis that Tillich's doctrine of the demonic is in reality a very astute interpretation of human culture and history, from the point of view of a Christian theology which takes the myth of the fall seriously as descriptive of a permanent human situation. His doctrine of the Kairos, however, sharply distinguishes him from the radical Protestantism which regards human history as unequivocally sinful and

which therefore ascribes only a negative meaning to it, analogous to the meaningless history of Neoplatonic thought. Kairos is "not empty time, not pure expiration or mere duration but rather qualitatively fulfilled time, the moment of creation and fate. We call this fulfilled moment, the moment of time approaching us as decision and fate, *Kairos*." This is a word first coined by the Greeks "but it attained the deeper meaning of the fullness of time, of decisive time only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness."

Tillich's Kairos doctrine is consequently an effort to elaborate the Biblical-Hebraic view of history in contrast to the Greek view of the logos. The logos is the eternal pattern to which history does not conform, though it is the pattern of existence. Kairos stands for a dialectical relationship between time and eternity in contrast to a dualistic view of a realm of eternal forms and a realm of finite emanations. Expressed in another way, Kairos expresses a doctrine of the Christian conception of the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God is neither a Utopia in history nor yet the heaven of timeless and tensionless bliss. But the kingdom of God is the eternal significance which must be expressed amidst the contingencies and contradictions of history. In terms of this conception Tillich develops a Christian ethic which follows neither the Catholic nor the radical Protestant line. "Catholicism knows only two possibilities of historical fate: to belong to the Church or not to belong to it. Radical Protestantism knows only the one historical fate: to stand under divine judgment." The other possibility is to make decisions "toward the unconditioned," though it is recognized that in a "cleft world" every "human decision with respect to God is equivocal." This ambiguity is the actual mark of concrete existence. In answer to Radical Protestantism one can only say that while there can be no unequivocal decision for God in a world of cleavage, neither can there be an unequivocal decision against God and consequently that existence is never Satanic."

Here again we see with what justice Tillich insists that he has a more consistent dialectical view than the dialectical theology, and, one might add, than dialectical materialism. The former can speak only a "no" to the ambiguities of history, while the latter allows its dialectical view of history to degenerate into utopianism. It believes that the contradictions of history will be permanently resolved when the class system of society is overcome. This is the consequence of identifying human sin with a social organization

instead of regarding the injustices of a social system as a particular historical expression of human sinfulness.

In spite of the rejection of Marxian utopianism, Tillich is a socialist who regards the decision which must be made between a dying capitalism and a new social order as one of those fateful decisions, characteristic of Kairos. This can be a decision for the unconditioned, even though it is recognized that it is an ambiguous decision, in the sense that the new society is not the unconditioned good which socialists imagine.

Time and space do not suffice to do justice to the wide range of Tillich's thought in dealing with the relation of religion to culture, of the Church to the community, of Catholicism to Protestantism. His comparisons of Catholicism and Protestantism are particularly illuminating. Catholicism is able to build civilizations through its affirmative relationship to culture and civilization by way of the historic Church. But it loses the prophetic principle of criticism. Protestantism, on the other hand, tends to abstract the prophetic principle of criticism from the total prophetic view of history so that it is unable to construct, except in terms of a rather irrelevant liberal moralism. Tillich's generalizations about Protestantism are a little too colored by the continental situation and really presuppose Lutheranism rather than Calvinism or sectarianism as the classical form of Protestantism. At this point his generalizations will undoubtedly be qualified by his growing contact with Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

Tillich's thought may have to be mediated for some time because, even when he speaks English, his rarified abstractions of German philosophy and theology are not always understood. Sometimes his terms, understood in Germany, where they have a particular-history, completely mystify his English and American readers. But whatever the difficulties of interpretation, his thought is bound to have increasing significance in American theological thought. For he is not only one of the most brilliant theologians in the Western world, but one whose thought is strikingly relevant to every major problem of culture and civilization. His terms may be abstract, but his thought is not. It deals in terms of rigorous realism with the very stuff of life.

The Interpreter's House

GEORGE ARTHUR FRANTZ

I

WE have the facts. Now, sir, please show us their meaning. We are weary of fact-finding. We need interpretation. We are pilgrims on the road. So much has come to our sight. Now we want insight.

Yesterday, the Pilgrim was unpopular. He was an anachronism. He belonged to queer days of yore. He had become a literary museum piece. The Pilgrim was a curious creature with his medieval trappings of sandal-shoon and shell and staff, and with that monstrous burden, called a sense of sin, on his back.

He thought the world was only a bridge; that he was to pass over it from one eternity to another—from God who is our origin to God who is our home. He thought life had a meaning; that our days are for discipline, and a preparing for something great here, and for something greater to come.

When he passed through this fine world, and saw its houses, lands, trades, honors, preferments, titles, kingdoms, pleasures and delights of all sorts, he passed, as it seemed, through a lusty fair. And he had no mind to the merchandise, nor did he lay out so much as a farthing upon it.

In short, the Pilgrim was unsocial. He had not learned that the chiefest of all deadly sins is riotous saving, and that all our troubles are due to underconsumption of things. Poor stick! He held that life had a meaning, a significance too great to be realized in this one small world.

But the Pilgrim passed out of the picture. And the disquiet his presence brought to the keepers of the stalls in Vanity Fair passed with him. His old song that gave so many the jitters:

"Angels of Jesus, angels of light
Singing to welcome the pilgrims of the night!"

Well, the song went with the Pilgrim.

The jolly tourist took his place. The excursionist had the wheel, and stepped on the gas. The "tripper" cast out the Pilgrim. The tourist was

the best customer Vanity Fair had. The camp grounds resounded with his song.

"The world is so full of a number of things;
I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings."

And we are just that—"as happy as kings." I am not intimate with many kings. "All I know is what I read in the papers." "Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown." We had the crown of many things. We had everything but real freedom. Oh, certainly, we still have the Statue of Liberty. But, as a Frenchman said in New York Harbor, "Yes, we too erect monuments to our lamented dead."

We had everything but the one thing needful. We knew everything but the meaning of life.

II

Is it never in your thoughts, when you awake in the black night, that the Pilgrim must take to the road again? This man, for whom life had a strenuous significance, who knew whence he came, and whither he was going; who was stark aware of what helps and what hinders the journey. Must he go back on the road?

The Red Queen said to Alice: "It takes a deal of running to stay in the same place." The trippers are growing weary of forever making round trips. We want to make the real journey. We want to know the direction, at the very least.

The Pilgrim is abroad once more in the land. He is sans staff, sans sandals, sans shell, sans everything that once set him apart from others. His burden of sin he tries to conceal, and carries it like a hidden cancer. But abroad he is, and he is seeking a city that hath foundations. "The immortal mind craves objects that endure." (Wordsworth.)

The Pilgrim is in the market for durable goods. "We buy the truth."

The Pilgrim spirit spoke in two young university men who sought places in the last attack on Mount Everest. "Why do you want to join? Do you know you risk death?" "Yes, we would like to die in an interesting way." One such young man, Dr. Howard Somervell, joined that Everest expedition, and is living now in India as Christ's medical disciple.

The Pilgrim spirit is again on the road. He spoke in a girl in a woman's college: "Tell me what's wrong? I have about come to the end of doing the things I was told not to do, and they were not very interesting."

The Pilgrim is once more ready for the road. Some of the men in that university, which is acknowledged by all its undergraduates and alumni to be America's best, petitioned the faculty for more comprehensive courses in philosophy—courses which would gather up the scattered facts and interpret them. They wanted to turn a mess into meaning. They want to make some "ontological flights" over the crazyquilt of learning's landscape, and see life whole, and discover some significance. They are tired of the question hunt, and are ready for an answer hunt.

We are drawing toward the end of the reign of "King Question Mark."

"This age that blots out life with question marks,
This nineteenth century with its knife and glass
That make thought physical, and thrust far off
The heavens, so neighborly with men of old,
To voids sparse-sown with alienated stars."

We have outdone the billboards. We have plastered the universe with interrogation points. We have opened the cupboards and looked under the beds. Into the cellars we have rushed, and we have explored the garrets.

The question mark is the sign-manual of all science. Science has brought us much new knowledge. And science is a great cleanser of thought. It has dry-cleaned a lot of our intellectual wardrobe. Gasoline is a great cleanser, but it is not a satisfactory substitute for the Water of Life.

Science is fundamentally description. Philosophy is interpretation. And religion is interpretation supreme. We must bring our facts to Jesus Christ, and say: "Explain unto us."

The more complete the scientific description of a simple phenomenon is, the less relevant it may be. Balzac pictures a scientist unmoved by his wife's tears. "Tears, what are tears? I have analyzed them. Some phosphate of lime, chloride of soda, a little mucus, and some H_2O . They are secreted normally by the lachrymal gland in small amount, and diffused between the eyelids to moisten the parts and facilitate their motion. Ordinarily, the secretion passes through the lachrymal duct into the nose, but when profuse it overflows the lids. Ah! a tear on her soft cheek. Yes, that is it."

No! !

"A tear is an intellectual thing.

A sigh is the sword of an angel king." (Blake.)

"Some melodious tear." (Milton.)

The devil complains, in the *Inferno*, that Buonconte da Montifeltro was saved from his clutch by "one miserable little tear." That tear was a sacrament of repentance unto life. "Some phosphate of lime, chloride of soda, a little mucus and some H_2O ." And the more complete the scientific analysis of "a woman's weapon," the less relevant that explanation.

III

Verily, we stand in need of the Interpreter. "Explain unto us." "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." There is a spirit in man that can read meanings. Phi Beta Kappa keys are not a *sine qua non* of interpretation. There are good cooks who cannot read cookbooks; good farmers who do not know agronomy; wise mothers who never read books on child psychology. An old colored mammy said to her young charge, "Lor, chile, if yo' don't have an eddication, yo' jis has to use yo' brains."

We have been under the spell of a method of secular education which assumes that the truth of any matter is to be found in its origin.

In religion even, we have been told that if we discover and set out in order the persistence of primitive traits in religious revivals, then we have explained Pentecost and "The demonstration and power of the Holy Spirit."

If, by the methods of historical criticism, we can reconstruct the social and political situations of the Prophets, then we have, *ipso facto*, no need of a doctrine of inspiration. It is all a little like explaining Abraham Lincoln by his primitive frontier, his cradle, his feeding bottle and his teething-ring.

We have had sociologists who prove that the pigsty makes the pig. Now, I once saw a pigsty built from the ground up. I saw the pigs put into it. And the testimony of both the optical and the olfactory nerves is, "The pig makes the pigsty." Is there anything in the charge that preachers and professors are men who sit in studies and behold books as men walking?

IV

Christian Education is life in the Interpreter's House. It is going to Christ for the meaning of the facts. It is either that high business, or it is just religious boondoggling. People are tired of being merely students. They want to be disciples, who have the right to say, "Explain unto us."

"Education is the transmission of life to the living by the living." The teacher must live on the other side of the Cross. "Except ye be born again, you cannot see the kingdom of God." "Spiritual things are spiritually dis-

cerned." "The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit, because they are foolishness unto him." We must evangelize before we can educate completely.

The Pilgrims are on the road again. They are knocking at our doors. "Then, said the Interpreter, 'come in—I will show thee that which will be profitable to thee.' So he commanded his man to light the candle." ("The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord.") Until the Pilgrim's intellectual and spiritual lamp is alight, you can't show him much. And he must have something to carry his interpretation away in. "Marvel not that I say unto you, you must be born again."

What does the Pilgrim see here? He sees first the picture of an ideal teacher. "And this was the fashion of it. It had eyes lifted to heaven, the best of books in his hand, the law of truth was written upon his lips, the world was behind his back; it stood as if it pleaded with men, and a crown of gold did hang over its head." Has our English speech a finer description of a true teacher? This man has inner plenitudes.

Education is not merely the collecting of interesting facts. It is the commerce of immature personalities with the rich and mature. It is not just the finding of information, but the discovery of our Master.

Then, on they go into a large parlor full of dust. It is the pig that makes the pigsty. You can't make a new world till you make men new.

Then on to a little room, and its two children, Passion and Patience. Passion says, "Life is self-expression." Patience says, "Life is growing a self worth expressing." Passion says, "Religion is sitting on yourself, hard." Patience says, "Repression is the very shadow of release, of growth, of achievement. But it is only the shadow, not the substance." Repression is asceticism, and it is negative only when our attention is fixed upon the means, and not upon the purpose and end. *αἰσχεω* means "exercise." The asceticism of the monks was a penance. The asceticism of Saint Francis and his friends was an equipment.

Repression is a bridge built to lead out from the lonely, barren little island of myself into the continent of life. The bridge is narrow and hot—sunsmitten and windswept—no fruit trees, no gardens there. The ascetic insists upon living on the bridge. The Pilgrim, on his way to life, rich and full, passes over the bridge of self-denial, and comes into a wealthy continent where seed is sown, and the harvest is grown, and gathered and shared with brothers.

Passion and Patience can teach us. "Salvation is deliverance from parts to wholes" (Boethius)—a deliverance from lust to family love; from self to service; from knowledge to wisdom.

There was also the place "where a fire burned against a wall, and one standing by always casting much water upon it to quench it; yet did the fire burn higher and hotter." That fire is the flame of faith and godly living. It has been burning now some years in the world. It cannot be quenched, because Christ is feeding it secretly with the oil of Grace. It is profitable for the Pilgrim to learn this.

Again, lasting success is as "a stately palace." Its doorway is guarded by many men in armor, set to hinder all who will enter. There is a battle before us. There is a good fight to be fought. "It is by no breath, wave of hand, turn of eye that salvation joins issue with death." But fight, "For sudden the worst turns best to the brave." "And to him that overcometh, I will give a crown which is life."

The Interpreter's House is concerned with character. Our character is what we do with the facts and their meaning. The character of the few is the soil out of which good for the many grows.

There is a story in the *Life of A. J. Gordon*. In those good old days in Boston there was a time of discouragement over prevailing conditions. A group of men drew together—men of so great eminence as Emerson and Lowell. Gordon was there also. As the conference proceeded, they seemed to touch bottom. Gordon thereupon told them a story—the story of a tree in his manse garden. That tree brought forth fruit in abundance, no matter what the crop was elsewhere. But the time came when builders invaded the garden. The tree had to be cut down, and its roots dug up. Gordon, in love and curiosity, watched the process of loosening those roots. Root after root was exposed. But there was always a root that ran deeper still, seeming to be anchored to something on the other side of the earth. They pursued that root into an ancient burial vault, and found it at last coiled around the backbone of Isaac Williams, one of the Pilgrim Fathers.

Backbone, moral, spiritual backbone is a rich fertilizer.

We are engaged in the business of growing backbone.

Life Dramatic

G. R. ELLIOTT

I

ONE cloudless day at the height of summer, two large deep-sea fish swam higher than they had ever swum before. I shall not attempt to explain their behavior in terms of the facts of submarine life as viewed by Dr. William Beebe and other deep-going scientists; my aim being theological rather than ichthyological. The time was noon; the water without a ripple; and the downpour of sunshine amazingly strong. It penetrated the ocean to the depth of many feet—or tails: it gleamed on the scales of my two fish. They waved their fins and goggled with unusual animation. The elder, whose Christian name was Moses, asserted solemnly: "This dim illumination comes down from our creator, the Great Round Sun Fish, ninety million whale-lengths away. He dwells in a vast invisible liquid above the surface of our little ocean. But He can come down"—

"You poor superstitious fish," the other gurgled sibilantly; then he performed a long-headed, elliptical smile. Julian, as he was called, proceeded: "My friend, you love to loll in the sluggish currents of outworn traditions. Why not face the plain fax?" (The full articulation of "facts" is very hard for fish.) "The truth is, there is nothing at all above the so-called surface of the sea. Indeed there is no such surface, except in the dreams of superficial fishes. Why credit the airy fancies of the self-inflated little creatures known as flying fish? As for this warm, green luminescence about us, certainly it must seem to you to come down from above so long as you insist on rolling your eyes upward in that very pious, unpiscine fashion. But, really, it comes from below. See straight and you will see that it rises from the depths beneath us. It is a phosphorescent shimmer thrown up by that dark vast, fathomless Reality from which we fish are evolved."

"But how do you know it is fathomless?" Moses inquired. "And what is it that does the evolving? And how can light come out of darkness? I too wish to face the fax; but I wish to face them all."

Julian gave him a white-edged glance of scorn. "You don't know fax from bubbles," he began—then suddenly darted away after his dinner,

which happened to be passing. Moses watched the swirlings fade, brooding gillfully. Then he glided upward, very, very slowly, through increasing radiance, until his sensations warned him to desist. He knew that his constitution differed decidedly from that of flying fishes. He had no desire to explode. Also it was dinnertime. He looked down around.

II

When we try to face all the facts, we see that human life is a drama, whatever else it is or may be. It has been given innumerable other names: a dream, a stream, a game, a trial, a mechanism, a growth, a final result, a preparation. . . . And no doubt every name is true in its way; it represents what some people have sometimes found in life. One finding is "a stream." But of course there are streams and streams. If I should declare that the Suez Canal is an excellent image of human life, the reader, I trust, would disagree. His thoughts would fly to a river, some river that he loves, one with a richly various course. And his mind would dwell less on its smooth canal-like reaches than on those where the current copes with twisting banks and rocks and falls. That is, if the reader is one who has had considerable experience of life; not if he has always lived, untroubled, on the income of his income. The point being that life is dramatic, that a river is more dramatic than a canal, and that some reaches of a river are much more dramatic than others. Normally we find every image of life to be more or less appealing as it is more or less dramatic.

For me and, I think, for many others—though not for such as the poet Shelley—a stream is more interesting when it has a fisherman on it or in it; on it in a boat, or in it with boots up to his groins. Not that I myself am fond of fishing (except for images), but it is a kind of game, and games are on the whole more dramatic than streams. Persons who are sufficiently alive prefer "the game of life" to "the stream of life." But of course there are games and games. Fishing is one of the least dramatic. Still less so is solitaire. An elderly, placid spinster who spends much of her time at it, may regard life as mainly a game of solitaire. But football, surely, is a far more adequate emblem; and then there are the greater games of love and commerce and politics and war.

"Life is a battle." Think of all the drama in that old saying; then place alongside it, "Life is a mechanism." Certain thinkers in ancient times and, again, during the past two centuries, managed to conceive the universe,

including human life, as a self-running machine; thus pretty well blotting the "battle" out of the picture, to the eye of common sense, at least. For common sense knows that life cannot be really battailous if it is in the main a self-running machine. But common sense also knows that life has in it a large mechanical element. At times we exclaim, or feel like exclaiming, "Life is just one d—— thing after another!" It appears to us in such moods not only a self-running but a useless machine. Those moods, after we emerge from them, are recognized as abnormal. Yet they point to a reality, to the immense amount of machinery that there is in our universe. But of course, so far as human experience goes—and in this essay I wish to go no further—machinery can never run itself, in the long run. The machine for perpetual motion will probably need to be attended to every billion years or so. In any case it will need to be attended to at the first: it will need to be invented. And it will be known in *Who's Who*, perpetually, as the invention of Somebody. A machine is a personal contrivance. The so-called "mechanical genius" of a great inventor is very personal indeed, as all real genius is. A machine is contrived by that part of Somebody which is not a machine.

To contrive is human. Battle, especially, is full of devices. In the main, however, war is not contrivance but inspiration. As fighting is very costly men contrive not to fight until they are inspired, for good or ill, to do so. Then their inspiration seizes upon and subordinates, transforms and quickens, all their powers of contrivance. Strictly speaking all contrivance goes back to inspiration. When we say a design is "utterly uninspired" we mean that its inspiration is very slight or second-hand. Nor can inspiration be real without contrivance. So-called inspiration that cannot at all contrive to assume intelligible form would better be called "spiration." Inspiration is really the ultimate spirit of contrivance. The two are continually opposed, because life is a battle. But they are not intrinsically hostile, because life is less a battle than it is a drama. The struggle of inspiration with contrivance is dramatic. Not "*merely* dramatic," as we say of a cloud-battle in a storm; that is, comparatively unreal. It is all the more real because it is highly and thoroughly dramatic. It is vital and fruitful. Contrivance, like Jacob in his struggle with his angel, wins by losing. Contrivance must put forth all its strength, testing the quality of its friendly opponent; but in the upshot contrivance gains when inspiration wins. Wherever life is, there is contrivance. Normally we regard the universe as an inspired con-

trivance. But life is most dramatic when a superb, complex contrivance—for example, the personality of Saint Paul—is mastered, transformed and fulfilled by a sublime inspiration.

III

The drama is the most contriving, the most artful, of all the arts. Hence it is often the tawdriest. But hence, too, it can be remarkably comprehensive: it can draw a multitude of other arts into its service. And because it is so rich in contrivance it can be the milieu of opulent inspiration. Shakespeare inherited a large array of dramatic devices and conventions which he was able to inspire with fresh vitality. His work, so our school-books say, is surpassingly true to life. More exactly, it is true to a certain sphere and phase of life; namely, the civic life of man, in its modern, thoroughly mundane form.

Certainly this phase of life is very dramatic in its way. That it is also dramatic in the fullest and most real sense of the term, has been a growing belief since the sixteenth century. But nowadays many are aware that our modern preoccupation with the drama of mundane civic life—immensely quickened during the past hundred years by the phenomenal advance of practical science and industry—is abnormal, “untrue to nature.” It has led to disillusion, to the feeling that the world is just a stage and “all the men and women *merely* players.” Such result was prophesied in many verses of our modern Bible, the Works of Shakespeare; especially in the later plays, written while the King James Bible was in course of preparation—a profound coincidence, the simultaneity of those two authorized but different versions of life. The Shakespearean drama is a great city with stately mansions, busy streets, and laughing rustic suburbs. But it has no sacred hills around and no temple at its center. The citizens, so “true to nature” as we say, are remarkably cut off from universal Nature. No doubt that was the necessary condition of the author’s extraordinary success. His city is a “close-up” of a fascinating mien of life. He could know, and show, his people with such intense nearness only by assembling them in an isolated foreground, away from the epic gods and mountains that had hitherto dominated literature and drama, Christian and pre-Christian. But a heavy price had to be paid for that splendid isolation. The more completely we have been entranced by the great city, Shakespeare’s and ours, the more we feel in the end the force of his great cry when his work (together with the

English Bible) was just about finished: "This insubstantial pageant . . . our little life."

Such was certainly not the judgment of Shakespeare the man upon life as a whole. The late G. K. Chesterton remarked that every Catholic knows that Shakespeare was a Catholic. In a broad sense this, I am sure, is true. Shakespeare, albeit very much a man of the world, had a catholic Christian standpoint. He viewed the universe as a creation wherein personality and love are supreme creative powers. Early passages in his plays, such as Portia's speech on mercy and King Henry the Fourth's crusading proem—celebrating "those holy fields over whose acres walked those blessed feet"—prepare for the greater utterance in *Measure for Measure*, when he was approaching the height of his tragic period:

"Alas! alas!

Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once;
And He that might the vantage best have took,
Found out the remedy. How would you be
If He, which is the top of judgment, should
But judge you as you are? O! think on that,
And mercy then will breathe within your lips,
Like man new made."

Such a passage is recognized as close to the heart of its author; not mainly because of its rare force and conviction, which could be attributed to the speaker, the would-be nun, Isabella; but because it represents the attitude of Shakespeare in his total writings. Love, he always knows, is "the top of judgment." He treats his characters with high Christian charity and with a deep sense of the divine-human mystery of redemption. But just because of his catholic Christian outlook Shakespeare knows that life under the aspect of a merely mundane drama is indeed "the baseless fabric of a vision." His special capability as an artist was for civic plot and dialogue. But his catholicity of spirit as a man made him feel keenly the comparative unreality of the quick words and structures of modern civic life.

He did not profoundly believe in the civic drama but in Life itself. Hence the not infrequent lightness of his artistic conscience, his nonchalant violations of dramatic probability. And hence the modest cheerfulness which characterized him as a man among men, according to the records, and which is certainly the dominant tone of his work as a whole. No doubt he had moods of deep-going pessimism. But he would be shocked, I am sure, by the fundamental disbelief in Life which many modern Hamlets have read

into his plays. It is hard to say whether he would be more shocked or amused by the scriptural solemnity of many of his modern adorers—by the spectacle of his works placed on a level with the Bible, or above that level, as a fundamental interpretation of human life; by hearing himself termed “the sole universal genius.” In fact, he is universally urbane, not universally universal. He is lacking in a faculty which he himself, I believe, would rank above his own abilities and which is certainly universal in the truest sense—the mythological imagination.¹

That faculty is man’s sovereign means of interpreting the universe and of realizing practically his own place therein. Therefore it is the supreme faculty in the realm of art. Which of course does not necessarily mean that the leading mythological poets were greater artists than Shakespeare. The comparative merits of Shakespeare and Dante, for instance, may better be settled when our perspective is better, say one or two thousand years hence. But suppose, in accordance with the present prevailing opinion, that Shakespeare is peerless, so far. This would mean that human art has reached its highest level, so far, in the sphere of the mundane civic drama. A still higher level may be attained some day in a greater sphere, one that will not exclude the mythologic imagination.

This gift of the gods to man is so great that it requires for its full development the whole of human history; which, according to new science as well as old instinct, lies mainly ahead of us. The mythologic imagination, just because it is supreme in the realm of art, is slow in becoming supremely artistic. Ancient innumerable efforts preceded the perfection of Greek epic and drama. From the standpoint of Greek art at its best, the rest of the vast realm of pagan mythopoesy is a crude chaos. But from the standpoint of Christianity at its best, Greek mythopoesy itself is a very primitive shapeliness. And Christianity, still comparatively new in the world, may in the future produce works of art greater than those inspired by its medieval phase, that is, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. Supreme Christian drama (not to speak of Christian epic) remains to be created. The inchoate religious drama of the later Middle Ages, unlike that of the early Greeks, was estopped in its development by the rise of secularism. Shakespeare came, instead of a Christian Sophocles. Yet Shakespeare’s

¹ The assimilation of “myth” to “legend” is characteristic of the modern age. For most people today “mythical” means “untrue.” But properly a myth is the story of an action in which the divine and the human mingle. The lowest myth must have some truth (unlike a legend), and the highest must be supremely true.

dramatis personae owe their unique "reality" to the value which the Christian Faith revealed, uniquely, in human persons. Our modern secular drama is largely the result of Christianity; and it may be reabsorbed into the Christian outlook. Indeed, unless this is to occur, it is hard to see any great future for the drama, since it has now exhausted its chief secular motives.

Some great dramatic poet of the future, combining the arts of Sophocles and Shakespeare, may create for the stage persons who are "real," as we say—that is, psychologically complex and vivid—but whose story will have for its background the sublime Christian mythology. They will be overseen and visited by gods and demigods. Mythic "machinery," as we now call it scornfully because it is dead to us, or we are dead to it, will become alive and organic again. So will the inward struggles of the persons of the drama. Shakespeare and all good dramatists, including some who have written plays concerned with the World War, know that man's inner conflicts are more truly dramatic than his outward battlings. Indeed, the human moral struggle is the very heart and center of the drama. But during the eighteenth century it came to seem unreal, a merely civic phenomenon, unrelated to the heart and center of the universe. Therefore the drama lost heart: its pulse was extremely faint a hundred years ago. But recently it has been taking or trying to take heart again, groping for its true center. And in the Christian mythopoetic drama of the future, the human moral struggle will appear again as a divine conflict—derived from and belonging to the heart of God Himself.

The warfare of the gods depicted by human art throughout long ages in a myriad of forms, is not in the main legendary. It is truly mythical; that is, mythically truthful. It adumbrates man's experience of a central fact of the universe, the living universe, at once physical and spiritual, in which we move and have our being. The gods when most adored by man are not remote from the human struggle. Because it is essentially theirs, they come down and take part in it. And they fight all the more effectually because they cannot lose their Peace. Deity is at once immanent and transcendent, as theology puts it. Mythology, antecedently, shows that the human gods are "sons" of the "Maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible." The Creator, the Zeus or the Brahma, surpasses but indwells the creation. He indwells it surpassingly in the persons of his divine-human sons. Apollo and Vishnu, just because they are so richly

human, are seen to be great impersonations of that which made and is ever making man. The Maker, in human and personal forms, toils and suffers with and for His creatures. Only when this is seen to be the necessity of His nature, is He vitally adored as the supreme creator. And the divine mystery of immanent transcendence, though above our reason, is within our dramatic experience. We admire a great dramatist for creating living characters distinct from his own; yet he can only do so, we say, by "putting himself into his work." We recognize him as a transcendent artist because he is vitally immanent. And thus we think of deity when our thinking is normal; that is, mytho-dramatic.

Only the mythological imagination, not the Shakespearean, can be supremely dramatic. Certainly Shakespeare is more genial, in the civic sense, than the seers who wrote the Bible. He is more artistic; but also he is more artful. The Bible is more natural than his works, more true to life as a whole, more really dramatic. The drama of human life is real only because the universe is essentially a drama; as all great mythopoeists have known. But those who wrote the Bible knew far better than any others how dramatic, in the highest sense, the very God is—how concerned with the human moral struggle, how immanent in history, how revelatory of himself in particular scenes and actions. . . . The unique revelation of the heart of deity in Jesus Christ is not the less sublime when it is seen to be entirely normal and natural from the standpoint of man's mythological intellect.

IV

But of course it does not appear normal and natural from the standpoint of the academic mind.² It appears either miraculous, in the sense of divinely lawbreaking, or else legendary. At first it was a wild legend, a "stumblingblock" and a "foolishness" in the words of Saint Paul, to the ancient intellectuals. But when they accepted it they viewed it as miraculous.

² The late Professor Charles A. Bennett makes a charming confession in his book "A Philosophical Study of Mysticism" (Yale University Press, 1923), page 87: "I have to confess to a certain prejudice. . . . I do not like the idea of a God who unbends to me personally. There is something stuffy and provincial in the thought that my salvation is important in the scheme of things. This, after all, is a Republican Deity, ready to shake hands with the humblest citizen and to call him by name. He lacks a necessary dimension of Godhead, some of the Olympian remoteness and mystery of the Aristotelian Deity who did not condescend to notice the world and its affairs, but who drew the world after him not by what he did but by what he was. Of him one can say with Spinoza, 'Who so loves God must not expect God to love him in return.' Yet". . . . Here the author proceeds to criticize effectually the point of view just given. The beauty and importance of his book derive from the fact that it comprises and yet transcends the academic attitude.

The theory arose that the nature of Jesus was different metaphysically from that of other men. But not the most elaborate Christological reasonings could reconcile that theory with the deep conviction of the writers of the New Testament that, though "without sin," He "was in all points tempted like as we are." He could not be the Saviour of human beings if He were at any point nonhuman. Therefore that notion, officially condemned by the Church, was bound to collapse in time; making room again for the other academic extreme, the theory that the central fact of Christianity belongs to the realm of legend. The increasing vogue of this theory during the past two hundred years was due to the advancing sway of secular academic thought.

Man has been called all sorts of an animal, a toolmaking, a laughing, a political, a religious animal. Not until today, however, has he thoroughly earned the title of Academic Biped. Our age will probably be termed by future historians "The Academic Age." Now, as never before, man is regarding the universe through academic spectacles. His eyes are commonly armed with big, round, celluloid-rimmed glasses; even Mr. Gandhi, I believe, wears them. And this abnormal phenomenon seems to us quite natural. Surely it will be abolished in the future by a humaner optical science which will discover how to develop our natural eyes instead of fitting them with bulging windows. But meanwhile many of us have to wear spectacles; and all of us have to look through them, more or less. Men, women, and children search the latest books and articles for the latest theories upon all aspects of life. The dramatic realities of business, politics, art, and religion are seen out of focus because they are viewed through the medium of academic concepts. Our ruling caste is the "professor" in the widest sense of this term. It comprises the man in the street, who used to be so practical in contrast with the collegian, but who so often nowadays out-professors the professor. And notice that the word "expert," which used to mean a man who makes things work, denotes now a person who makes unworkable theories.

The worst delusions are in two fields, economics and religion, since these affect "our daily bread." The notion that man can be saved mainly by attending to economic laws (which do not humanly exist) is a very bad error. But a worse one is the belief that man cannot be saved unless he severs religion from its anthropomorphic basis. An American scientist fancied that he was doing this, doubtless, when he declared at a recent meeting

that "reverent science refuses to attribute any human qualities to God." But clearly the speaker was creating God in his own image. He was interpreting the divine mind in terms of the mentality of a natural scientist, who arrives at a certain valuable but limited kind of truth by excluding from nature all specifically human qualities. He was therefore exemplifying the truth of Voltaire's great epigram, even while trying to avoid it. It is a law of Nature, of Complete Nature, that God must make man in His own image and that man must return the compliment. But the compliment is a very poor one indeed when we fashion our image of Him by means of a limited part of our own limited intellect. In our current academic atmosphere deity, at best, is the Supreme Professorial Mind. Of course It excludes all possibility of the event that occasioned the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. For that sort of event does not occur—it is a thing that simply is "not done"—in the best divine academic circles.

To be sure, the word "Incarnation" is itself more or less academic. So were the early Christian thinkers who formulated the great dogma. Dogmas and councils, even the most inspired, are by nature academic. But the more we stress that fact, the more must we be awed by the way in which the academicism of the Catholic Councils of the Church was overtopped by true intuition. All the ancient alluring metaphysical theories about the nature of Christ yielded to the perception of His complete humanity. The formula of the Council of Chalcedon, "perfect God, perfect Man," is the bold assertion of a mystery beyond the reach of academic thinking. But of course that formula is subservient to the sublime prologue of the Gospel of Saint John. Here, too, there is what may be termed an academic concept, that of the Word. But it is the greatest of concepts and it is here entirely transfigured by the glory of supreme inspiration. The Word, the Logos, becomes mythological in the highest sense. Therefore this prologue is recognized as the most successful attempt so far to put into words the main meaning of the drama of the universe. The author sees "eternity in an hour." He knows the uniqueness of the advent of the Christ because he knows how fully it accords with the way of universal Life. "This was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

Alongside that passage, the recent pronouncement which I quoted earlier, "reverent science refuses to attribute any human qualities to God," appears very academic indeed. And such in general is the fate of modern "natural theology," as it is called. In fact, it is not very natural: it is not

true to Complete Nature. It envisages only that aspect of nature which has been so wonderfully exploited during our era. Hence today the word "supernatural" commonly means "unnatural." It ought to denote that which is superlatively natural; just as "super-gasoline" means, I trust, the highest and purest form of that great modern motive power. The truth is that "natural theology" is far less natural than Christian theology. It is thoroughly academic. And a blatant paradox of our Academic Era, from the time of Edward Gibbon to the time of H. G. Wells, is the ridicule that has been showered upon the ancient councils of the Church for being so academic. Those ancient councils (unlike the counsels of Mr. Wells) were extraordinarily practical. They had firm hold of a supreme historic fact and of the most practical function of the human mind, the mythological imagination.

To be sure the findings of that great faculty need to be continually revised by academic reason. The child's mythology is crude. The youth reacts from it, becoming an academician. The man, normally, regains the mythic truth of his childhood in higher and purer form. But this third stage has been heavily hindered in the modern era. For academic reason, not content with its valuable but secondary rôle in the drama of human thought, has essayed the leading part: the "professor" has played the "hero." The academic mind has tried not just to criticize but to supersede mythology. As a result the philosophizing of our era has on the whole an air of juvenility. It is delightfully energetic, experimental, loquacious; but it is conceited and narrow, appallingly divorced from total human experience. It does not see what the child sees nor know what the man knows. It has been immensely preoccupied with the youthful query, "*How* does man know—how *can* he know Reality?" (The answer is, he cannot if you rule out mythology.) It is scornful of those who modernly accept the Christian revelation: they are "obscurantists." This is a term which proud "enlightened" youths love to apply to their small brothers and also to their elders. It is a word dear to academic juvenility.

The worst of obscurations, however, is the refusal to recognize the dramatic nature of Reality. This refusal was avoided by the two greatest of Occidental academics: by Plato, because of his vital sense for mythology; and by Saint Thomas, because of his adoration of Christ. But it is a refusal that must always be made by purely academic thought, since this is by nature averse from Life Dramatic. The academic mind—Aristotle's for instance—

always tends to find reality mainly in the contemplative intellect, in that which is aloof from the drama of persons and history. Hence, as remarked already, personal and historic revelations of God always appear to the strictly academic thinker either legendary or, if true, lawbreaking. For they are dramatic: they disturb the even tenor of the academic way.

Happily, however, there are plenty of signs that the Academic Era is beginning to draw to a close. The factors that brought it about have begun to reverse themselves. The chief factor was the disastrous schism in the Christian Church four centuries ago. If the Church had reformed itself without losing its unity—its unity of spirit—Christian thought could have continued to be catholic, expanding itself to comprise the results of modern science. Such expansion was forestalled by militant sectarianism with its retrospective theological hairsplittings. The mythological imagination, pagan as well as Christian, was discredited. Thus the ground was made ready for the monstrous mushroom notion that the method of natural science was the key to universal truth. However, that belief has now been undermined by natural science itself. And the science of theology is becoming vital again. It is redeveloping the capacity that it had in the thirteenth century for fusing old and new discoveries of the Divine Life. Sectarianism is abating. Some sort of confederation of the branches of the Church, a prospect that seemed Utopian a hundred years ago, is now well within the bounds of future possibility.

Philosophy today is not only freeing itself from naturalistic epistemology: it is becoming keenly aware of the inadequacy of concepts as interpreters of reality. Concepts may clarify life but they cannot render it; they are abstractions from it. They need to be plunged again, so the phrase now runs, "in the full stream of vital experience." But a stream, as has been said, is a very partial image of life; it is essentially nondramatic. And the present popularity of this image is the consequence of an essentially non-dramatic era. William James was certainly an animated person. But the full stream of experience into which he strove to plunge philosophic thought appears less and less dramatic as time goes on: it wears a late-Bostonian air. What is needed at present is the recognition that not just academic thought but academic thinking is an abstraction. It is a partial process detached from the mind's complete process; which, whatever else it is, is always dramatic and mythological. In other words, philosophy can become truly "pragmatic," not by plunging into current experience, but by striving to en-

visage the plot of the whole drama of life from the beginning until now. Which means that philosophy, if it is to find the fresh vitality for which it is now groping, must become again subordinate to theology and mythology. And indeed this condition is actually being fulfilled by certain outstanding philosophers of the present time, whose influence will after a while become current. They have humbled themselves before great human tradition. They have recognized two facts that academic philosophy in itself cannot apprehend: the general fact that the idea of perfect humanity and the idea of divine perfection cannot be disjoined; and the particular fact that, after long, natural, and historical preparation, the eternal God was possessed completely of the will, the intrinsic being, of one completely human person. In him God became the Son of Man.

Thus the deadly division instituted by the Academic Era between philosophy and religion is being healed. There may be in the future a Catholic Council of the Church attended and much aided by the leading philosophic thinkers of the time—otherwise, of course, the council would not be entirely catholic. We may expect a gradual reconstruction of the mythodramatic view of life—in a broader and more reasonable form, we may hope, than that which was prevalent in the fifteenth century A. D.; not to speak of the fifteenth century B. C. We may hope for the diffusion of a mental atmosphere in which the Holy Incarnation—the fact behind and above the dogmas of all Catholic Councils, past and future—will again appear divinely natural to the large majority of sane mundane persons. The man in the street will be relieved from his present conscientious nightmare of religious academicism. Whether he will be more moral, in the ordinary sense of this word, is beside the present question. The point is, he will be more human. . . . In the fish story with which I began, the younger of the two speakers is an objectionable mental prig. Moses, in spite of his crudities, is in the main normal and true to Nature.

The New Order in Church Music

ROBERT G. McCUTCHAN

There is in souls a sympathy with sounds;
Some chord in unison with that we hear
It touches within us, and the heart replies.

COWPER.

IN a letter to a friend, Doctor Channing one time said:

"I am conscious of a power in music which I want words to describe. It touches chords, reaches depths in the soul, which lie beyond all other influences. It extends my consciousness, and nothing in my experience is more mysterious. An instinct has always led me to transfer it to heaven; and I suspect the Christian under its power has often attained to a singular consciousness of his immortality."

Music has a strange power, far beyond that of any written or spoken word, to take up and carry on an emotion that has been excited, expanding and deepening it in a manner quite extraordinary.

This phenomenon may be explained in part, or accounted for in a way, by its extreme subjectiveness. It is like the "baby dear" who came "out of the everywhere into the here." It comes wholly from the mind of its maker, for unlike the other arts, we do not have any suggestions from nature—she only supplies the evidence that sounds exist; she does not sort them out or arrange them in any way.

Probably because of this extremely subjective nature of music we find it has grown hand in hand with religion. That is true of all times and all peoples. We have found that wherever there has been a religion there has been music, and where there has been no religion there has been no music.

Yet in our nonliturgical Protestant churches we have the curious anomaly of music, the subjective art, supplying about the only objective phases which are so necessary to worship. That this objective element is present is because of the power of music to emphasize, or dramatize, or illuminate the thought of the text. There are some things which must be sung. How dull "America" would be were it merely recited! Imagine the effect produced by a congregation simply repeating the words of many of our hymns. One may speak dramatically the words

"Is not His word like a fire?
And like a hammer that breaketh the rock?"

but they can never be spoken with such telling affect as is produced when a great voice sings them as Mendelssohn has set them to music in the *Elijah*.

If "worship" be the devotional acts of reverence, homage, and adoration paid to the Most High God; if "reverence" be a feeling of awe; if "homage" be an act of respect paid by external action; if "adoration" be the supreme worship due to God alone, then some means must be provided the worshiper to aid him in doing these things. That is why we may worship objectively when we sing

"All hail the power of Jesus' Name,"

and such lines as

"We at His feet may fall,"

"Go, spread your trophies at His feet,"

and

"Crown Him Lord of all."

Of course we cannot, literally, spread "trophies at His feet," but we can do so in spirit through and by means of our singing. We should not forget that the most effective way the members of a group may express their common thought in the same manner and at the same time is by singing it.

Perhaps, because of an increasing realization of this peculiar power of music, more serious consideration of the character of the songs of the Church has been given them during the last two decades than had been the case in the preceding century or more. Certain common trends are found in all of our recent denominational books of church song. Hymns, being a vital part of the religious culture of mankind, show, in their variation from time to time, the growth or decline of that culture. The revolutionary forces which religion is compelled to contend with in our day, the new patterns of thought, and form, and customs, result in the older forms not only being challenged, but in many instances discarded. The question is raised as to whether or not the Christian religion is at present going through one of its greatest transformations. Some adjustments have been made but there are many additional problems facing the Church which must be solved.

The questions: "What is the function of a hymn?" and its corollary, "Does it function as it should?" are of prime importance in the selection of hymns and the tunes to which they are to be sung.

A study of the official hymnals of several denominations shows the

same trends to be common to all of them. Benjamin Franklin Crawford has made an exhaustive study¹ of the new *Methodist Hymnal* and has made some interesting discoveries as to the changes in emphasis which have taken place in the last one hundred years. The results of his comparative study of five different Methodist hymnals—1836, 1849, 1878, 1905, and 1935—are illuminating.

His analysis shows that the number of hymns which have "the particular function of worship have almost doubled"; chants, which were introduced in the 1878 revision, have increased from about 4 per cent to nearly 18 per cent; doctrinal hymns have declined in number from 48 per cent to approximately 37 per cent; and those dealing with the Christian life have increased from less than 43 to 47 per cent.

The trend toward a more formal and stately worship is shown in the emphasis placed on ritual through the inclusion of chants, canticles, responses, sentences, amens, et cetera. As an indication of the change in attitude toward a more stately worship it may be noted that the first hymn in the book is Reginald Heber's

"Holy, holy, holy! Lord God Almighty!"

which Lord Tennyson thought the finest hymn ever written, taking into consideration its purity of language, its devotion, its spirituality, and the difficulty of treating such an abstract theme poetically.

"O for a thousand tongues to sing,"

which for so many generations occupied the No. 1 position in the Worship section of the *Hymnal*, has been placed as the first hymn in the section entitled The Everliving Christ, where unquestionably it more properly belongs.

Another tendency toward a more orderly service is the marked decrease in the number of those hymns designed to create and promote a specifically evangelistic atmosphere. A broadened interest is shown in a worship which emphasizes the majesty and power of God, His providence, and His love and mercy.

A new and expanding worship of Christ is seen in the increased number of carols and canticles made easily available.

¹ *Changing Conceptions and Motivations of Religion as Revealed in One Hundred Years of Methodist Hymnody, 1836-1935*. Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Pittsburgh, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1937.

A more careful selection of hymn texts for use during Lent and Passion Week has been made for our recent hymnals, and it should be noted that the nonliturgical churches have led the way in abandoning many of the hymns containing references to the more harrowing details of the Crucifixion. This may be accounted for, in a measure, by the fact that in the nonliturgical churches the hymn is of relatively greater importance than in those which have a liturgy.

The answer, in part, at least, to the query, "What is the function of a hymn?" may be found in those hymns which have recognized what might be termed a broader worship in that there is less emphasis upon redemption alone, and much more on all phases of religious life and experience.

Worship's corporate function seems now to be more fully realized than ever before—it is much more than an individual matter. Fewer hymns are found in which their sentiments are expressed by the use of the first personal pronoun. In those hymns dealing primarily with sin and salvation (of a personal nature), there has been the marked decrease of from about 17 per cent to about 4 per cent, while in those exalting the humanity of Jesus the increase has been eightfold.

A trend away from the interest in "the institutions of Christianity: namely, the church, the sacraments, the Sabbath, the Scriptures, the ministry, et cetera," and toward "the doctrines which set forth the services and functions of the Christian religion: namely, prayer and the kingdom of God," was also noted by Doctor Crawford. While "the Church, the Sabbath, the Sacraments, and the Scriptures have a definite place and value in the new hymnbook," he thinks the great change has come "in the conception of the duties and work of the ministry." While formerly the emphasis was on the work of the minister in rescuing men from sin—that is, from man's depravity—it is now conceived to be not only that, but "the building of the kingdom of God with men who will obey the will of God."

The trend is definitely toward a hymnody which promotes all phases of a broader Christian experience and a fuller life—a hymnody for twentieth century Christians.

I might dwell on other characteristics of the newer hymnals: the changed conception of life after death; the development and expansion of the social aspects of religion; the relation of Christianity to the new social order; the hymns of peace and brotherhood; the changed attitude toward missions;

the inclusion of hymns to be sung in the home by the family; and of hymns which little children may sing and understand.

The trend in "the motivation of hymns which promote Christian Living" from motives of "individual interest" to those of "collective interest" is great: in the first instance a decrease of from (roundly) 23 per cent to 7 per cent, and in the second instance an increase of from (roundly) 9 per cent to 27½ per cent.

In short, we find the modern hymnal reveals: (a) a change from an individual interest in religion to that which is more social; (b) a desire to participate actively in "the service of Christ to bring His kingdom into this world;" and (c) that hymns have "value in proportion to their ability to motivate life."

With this change in the textual content of our hymnals which has gradually grown during the last century, there has been a corresponding change in the music which gives the text fuller meaning. The old "fuguing tune," which was a highly individual expression (as, indeed, is all contrapuntal musical expression in its emphasis on different leading "voices"), has entirely disappeared; the song with chorus is rapidly passing, and the overly harmonized tune of the Dykes, Barnby, Henry Smart school of English organists has much less interest for us than it had a generation ago. This change should make our worship more meaningful.

In the making of *The Methodist Hymnal* the importance of the selection of musical settings having strongly melodic content was kept constantly before the group. In providing such settings encouragement is given to unison singing, which such authorities as Vaughan Williams and Martin Shaw say should always be the first consideration in congregational singing. We want the word, the message of the hymn, retained in the mind of the worshiper and this may be greatly facilitated by providing for the words a strong tune. Hegel said:

"Music builds no permanent fabric in space. It has no form which can be seen. It is a voice. Out of the unseen, in skilfully modulated tones, it speaks to the heart of the hearer. Like the voice itself, it no sooner utters its word than it is silent. Whenever we would recall its message, we must recite the informing word."

The combination of word and tune is almost ideal to fix thoughts in men's minds.

How greatly have hymns enriched the worship in all denominations!

Bishop Boyd Carpenter, in a supplementary chapter to Bishop Walsham How's biography (by his son), wrote:

"Some of his hymns will continue to be sung for long years to come; they will cheer and console the hearts of millions; many who hear will take up their burden and their hope again. We are told that when Melancthon and his comrades, shortly after Luther's death, fled to Weimar, they heard a child singing the stirring words of Luther's 'Ein Feste Burg.' 'Sing, dear daughter, sing,' said Melancthon, 'you know not what great people you are comforting.' Even so the voice of the hymn writer carries comfort to unknown hearts and to after ages.

"The writer dies; the hymn remains; the song goes on; tired men listen and find rest. Struggling men are encouraged to struggle on again; statesmen, philanthropists, the broken-hearted and the despairing are helped. Sing on: you know not what great people you are comforting. Such a reward is better than fame. It is as if, even after life is ended, the power to give a cup of cold water to a fainting soul in the name of Christ was not denied to the singer of the Church."

We seem to be growing up somewhat in our evaluation of good hymn tunes; we are not now so much concerned with novelties; we are demanding that our tunes have something to commend them other than that they are "new." So far as the music was concerned, the greatest difficulty which was encountered in the making of the new *Methodist Hymnal* was to eliminate certain weak tunes which had cherished associations. A few more years will take care of that situation.

Do not think I am referring only to the "gospel hymn" type of tune; there were others which were just as feeble, and cheap, and lacking in good taste. It would be just as bad taste and just as poor judgment to attempt to provide the majority of our churches with nothing but tunes of the German chorale style as it would be to attempt to provide the others with the most ordinary, tawdry tunes—the kind with which we were deluged about a generation ago. We have gone a long way in improving our taste in hymn music in recent years, and, I feel, have much more to be thankful for and much less to grieve over than we have had at any time in the last half century.

While recognizing the dignity of the German church music and their fine conception of the whole service, it would not be profitable for us to transplant wholesale their chorales into our situation, for the very good reason that they grew out of situations peculiar to the German people; they are founded upon sentiments which are their own and which grew out of their own natures and their own needs. We should take over, and have taken

over, those which are meaningful to us. And, with profit, we might well continue our study of their best as well as that of the best of other peoples. The Scandinavians, for instance, have a literature with which we in America might well be more familiar.

Significance should be attached to the quite obvious interest shown in the selection of the most appropriate musical settings for our hymns. In the earlier days of a century ago in America there was much congregational singing, the type of tune used being quite in accord with the cultural development of the time. Singing was a social pastime; there was the holdover from the earlier campmeeting days, and the singing schools were providing the material for the choirs of the churches. As we began to grow up, the churchgoers, along with others, began to show signs of becoming sophisticated, developing that self-consciousness which always accompanies near-sophistication. Self-consciousness became the bane of singing in our churches. There are abundant signs, however, that men are less subject to it now. Whether this may be accounted for by the hearty singing of men in their service clubs, as one of the results of the singing of the soldiers, or of the great interest that was manifested in "community singing" during the war, matters little. There is more general participation in hymn singing in our services of worship and no small contributing factor is the more attractive and wholesome music which has been provided. Dr. Dykes' comments on settings for hymns is pertinent:

"I never think of setting a hymn that is worthily set, where the tune can be got. That would be merely silly caprice, or vanity, or presumption. But if a hymn does not appear to me to be worthily set, then, I own, I am often induced, I may say sometimes almost compelled to try and do my best for it.

"I know so well the teaching power of hymns, *if they are happily wedded*, that I am very anxious to do my best . . . to add to the number of those useful and felicitous unions. . . . My one desire is this: that each hymn should be so set to music . . . that its power of influencing and teaching may be best brought out. All other considerations must be subordinate to that."

It is that principle which seems to be foremost in the thinking of the hymn-book makers of this day.

While it is true that, on the whole, there is this greater interest in congregational singing, it is also true that in those churches where a *cappella* singing by the choir is overdone and where the processional is so emphasized that it becomes ostentatious to the point of swagger, the singing by the members of the congregation is a poor, weak thing. Processionals with the

arms of the participants held at a rigid outward angle, with the step which is known technically to the folkdancer as the "slip," have no place in a dignified service of worship.

Another wholesome trend may be found in the general increase in the use of Introits, Responses, and Sentences (or Versicles), and it is encouraging to note the willingness of the body of worshipers in the pews to sing them with the choir when given the opportunity. It is not uncommon at all to find some of these things sung each Sunday in our smaller churches even where there are but meager musical resources, and in the more pretentious ones it is quite the order for members of the congregation to join with the choir in singing them.

It is but another evidence of the growing desire to have our services of worship conducted "decently and in order." Since Dean Sperry wrote *Reality in Worship* there has been aroused an astonishing interest in knowing more of what worship means—of what it is all about. This book has probably done more to stimulate the thinking of others about it all than any other that has appeared in recent years. In some respects it acted as a sort of stimulant that was perhaps far from the thought or intent of the author. One result was an outburst of experimentation which, in the large, has doubtless resulted in making much headway in reviving interest in our church services. There was need for a revival of such interest, for our churches were in a bad way so far as attendance at their services was concerned. Many people will do almost anything for their church except attend its services.

Those who were alive to the situation and eager to better it began seeking ways and means of making their own services more meaningful. The common practice of making the sermon, as such, the final and conclusive reason for holding a church service was vigorously attacked, and this not without reason. It is only fair to say that the attitude of the minister who greatly magnified the importance of his sermon and had little interest in what the organist, the choir, or the soloists did so long as it pleased his musical fancy (if he had any musical fancy), has changed greatly. Most ministers are now aware that the musical parts of the service may have a vital place, that they have great potential spiritual value.

Another result of the experimentation which has been going on is that a new emphasis and a new direction have been given our church music. It has become an integral part of the service and is no longer looked upon

merely as a "pretty" adjunct to it. The music must be appropriate and it should be beautiful. James Gibbon Huneker said, "God cannot be worshipped beautifully enough."

All this is for the better, and we find in addition that quite a different type of composition for church use is coming from our best composers in that field. We have become accustomed to the modern harmonic forms which for so long seemed to have an unfamiliar if not exotic sound. We have found that this modern harmonic treatment lends itself, I am almost willing to say ideally, to what we call sacred music, and we have only to listen to the compositions of such men as Martin Shaw, Gustav Holst, Ralph Vaughan Williams, Walter Galpin Alcock, Charles Wood, and other Englishmen, among them Alfred Whitehead, now at Montreal, and such Americans as Leo Sowerby and Van Denman Thompson, to feel that these men are establishing a new idiom for church music. Yet while congregations seem to delight in and profit from *listening* to music in the modern idiom, they still prefer to *sing* in that with which they have always been familiar.

Not only is there a different type of musical composition coming into our services, a music in an increasingly popular idiom, that is, the musical vernacular of the present day, which seems to have in it a challenge to bring out the best in our recognized composers, but that which is of far greater significance—it is a music with a purpose.

All this means that we of the nonliturgical churches have become liturgically minded, and have become so without having been aware of it. Even now it would be difficult for many churchmen to read the signs that are pointing the way. The words "liturgy," "ritual," and "rite," in the minds of many savor of things apart from themselves and not of them, nor for them; such words to them have vague implications when given any religious significance. In reality, however, they are quite common, even familiar terms, in other relationships. The American people have always loved ceremony: men speak of the beautiful rituals of their lodges; thousands of our young people have joined, and are joining Greek letter fraternities; youth are interested members of the Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, Knights of King Arthur and similar organizations, each with its rites and symbols. Funerals are frequently conducted with elaborate ceremonies. We are accustomed to the use of ritual.

Not long since college commencements were quite simple affairs. Then

members of the graduating class began wearing the Oxford cap; gowns soon became the accepted costume; members of the faculties conformed, adding their varicolored hoods. Now an academic procession at almost any educational institution is a sight to behold. High school commencements are highly colorful; the junior high-schoolers are becoming interested, and it will not be long before the kindergartners will be wearing appropriate costumes at the time of their graduation into the primary grades.²

We use symbols freely: we shake hands; we tip our hats; ladies kiss each other and sometimes a man; we send flowers when we lack words to express our condolences. The fact is, we have been rearing generations accustomed to ceremonial forms—call it ritual, if you like—and everywhere, aside from our religious observances, we love them.

Not only that: we are becoming regimented and have long been slaves of convention. A man may say almost anything he pleases from a public platform and doubtless "get away with it"; but let him appear on the street before the fifteenth of May or after the middle of September in a straw hat and he may start a small riot.

What has this to do with our music? For one thing it has brought about a desire in our directors of music to know more of the meaning of worship. As a rule the musician of the church using a liturgy has a much clearer understanding of the great principles underlying his form of service than has the musician of the nonliturgical church. We, of the latter group, have been more interested in our own parts of the service than in the service as a whole.

The minister should encourage his musicians to make a thorough study of the attitude of his particular church toward worship. He might suggest a course of reading, recommending such books as Dean Sperry's *Reality in Worship*, Dr. Vogt's *Art and Religion*, Professor Byington's *The Quest for Experience in Worship*, Canon Dearmer's *The Art of Public Worship*, and Professor Hoyt's *Public Worship for Non-Liturgical Churches*. I have found that most directors who have read some of these books have improved the quality of their music.

Such a study would be much more valuable than an attempt to utilize the suggestions about different phases of worship found in the books which have been appearing in such abundance in recent years.

² Edwin H. Byington has discussed this in an interesting way in *The Quest for Experience in Worship*. Doubleday, Doran & Company, New York, 1929.

The discussion now going on as to the desirability and advisability of adopting a calendar of the church year is interesting and quite widespread. Such articles as that by Clarence Seidenspinner in *The Christian Century* and by Howard Chandler Robbins in *Religion in Life*, show the trend. "It is in the air," as we say, and when we have found a widespread tendency it is seldom that organizations escape being influenced by it.

This discussion will no doubt bring about further experimentation with orders of service, and the results may, in some instances, prove embarrassing. I confidently expect that many nonliturgical Protestant churches will be experimenting with a calendar before we are aware of it, and the musicians who have responsibilities in such churches will find an entirely new situation confronting them. I do not mean to imply, however, that the "rank and file" churches will plunge into it at once. It will be a gradual development, for innovations come slowly into the Church. When we realize that many centuries must have passed before the Synagogue service found itself firmly established; that six or eight centuries passed before the Roman Church had fixed the form of its Mass as we know it today; that the Lutherans and the Anglicans followed, in large measure, the forms of the Catholic Church which had been long established, it is not to be wondered at that the "free" churches are still concerned about the problem. The presbyterial type of church organization is, roughly, only about three hundred years old, and the Methodist organization, episcopal in character, was founded so late as 1784. It takes a long time for drastic innovations to become common practices. It was Rowbotham who spoke of old customs being "preserved in the amber of religion."

This new development will surely do much to strengthen the morale of the volunteer chorus choir. One thing necessary will be to impress upon the director of music the importance of making a more careful study of the texts of his anthems than he has done heretofore. He will have to forego the tendency to sing Bach or Palestrina just because it is Bach or Palestrina, and because it is good music.

The depression through which we have just passed, or through which we are still passing, was not without its advantage. One of the real benefits it conferred was to help us get rid of the quartet choir—that institution which contributed so much to spiritual dullness. I would not belittle the ability of the quartet to furnish excellent music, but it is a sort of church chamber music, and no matter how finished a performance the quartet may

give, the spiritual significance of "its offering is so overshadowed that none but the most devout can keep sight of it."³ The average member of the congregation becomes so absorbed in an intellectual or sensual appreciation of it that he loses sight of that for which he came to church.

We want to do all that is possible to improve the musical taste of the people who comprise our congregations. The best way to do this is to have them become familiar with good music. Good music means, simply, that which is artistic in its construction, decorous in character, suited to the spirit of the text, and, in the case of hymns, singable by the people. This means that the music should not be difficult or involved in its construction. Much music that is quite simple will fit the category. So far as the "special" music is concerned, any attempt to compete with the concert platform in a church on a Sunday morning is hardly conducive to spirituality.

We must not allow ourselves to think that all of the poor music is heard in the country—the "sticks," if you will. It does not necessarily follow that because New York has its Metropolitan Opera and its excellent church music furnished by Clarence Dickinson, and Chicago its magnificent orchestra and its many fine churches with their competent musical directors, that the music in all of the churches in these cities is always the best. It is not. Because a city is a great art center it does not necessarily follow that all of its art is great art. While I have seen some of the greatest examples of painting in Paris, I have also seen there some of the worst; as a student in Berlin when it was the music capital of the world, I heard there more poor music than I have ever heard in any other place. Much of it was poor because incompetents were attempting something beyond them. If we could only find some way to impress on those who have charge of our music that the best results are obtained from doing those things which are within the musical grasp of their choirs, how much better off we should be. But that would be expecting all choir leaders to recognize their own limitations, which is perhaps asking too much. If one does not have real music in his soul his interpretations will suffer. Thoughtful study of anthem texts will aid in properly interpreting the music. The text influenced the composer—why should it not influence the director who acts as its musical interpreter?

Where churches experiment with a calendar the director finds that he needs some new music, yet it should make it easier for him to find suitable

³ *The Evolution of Church Music*, Frank Landon Humphreys, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1896.

selections of anthem material, as it should be easier for the minister to make wise selections of hymns. Ministers often forget that their congregations are composed of all sorts of people. There is the robust saint who wants to sing "Fight the good fight," on every occasion, as well as the timid one who much prefers "Lead, kindly Light." Ministers should not always allow their personal preferences to influence their selection of hymns.

The use of the newer type of church music should receive encouragement even though some of the oldsters may not like it at first. The younger people upon whom rests the responsibility for carrying on react enthusiastically to it. A famous English composer always encloses a note with each manuscript he submits to his publishers asking them not to reject his offering until it has been listened to at least ten times. Our best music cannot be fully appreciated after only one hearing. Rimski-Korsakov, on hearing repeatedly some works of a great modern composer whom he disliked, said to a pupil: "Stop playing this music or I will begin to like it."

The minister who is only a half-baked musician is a trial (I almost said a menace!). He usually likes the kind of music he likes, which is all right if he likes the right kind, but unfortunately that is seldom the case. He frequently bases his judgment on the few voice lessons he took while in college. Better for the minister to find a director in whose judgment he has confidence, consult with him, and then let him make the actual selection of music. We talk about directors being "consecrated." A measure of consecration is all right, but a mite less consecration and a lot more of the understanding of what corporate worship means would result in a more stately service of worship.

The "old services" which proposed making their appeal through the mind cared little whether there was any appeal made through the senses. A danger now is that there may be attempted too much of such an appeal.

Another danger: Most of the advice given as to the order and conduct of services is to the church which can command the greatest resources—like certain high-brow magazines which suggest how one may live reasonably comfortably on \$20,000 a year. Worship may be simple or adorned as circumstances allow. All that the best art can supply should be used. Doctor Sclater⁴ (Lyman Beecher Lectures, Yale, 1927), while recognizing that "the unlovely has had its day and tawdriness is following it into banishment";

⁴*The Public Worship of God*, J. R. P. Sclater. Richard R. Smith, Inc., New York, 1930.

while "squat ugliness is no longer regarded as a mark of spirituality," and while "more men care for loveliness now than was the case a quarter of a century ago," warns against the dangers of the desire to get away from ugliness and dullness, and against too much "beautifying" of our services. Most of the work of the ministry had been done by the rank and file, and, after all, Tom, Dick, and Harry are the final judges of beauty in art. We must not allow our worship to be merely "pretty."

I believe firmly in the benefits resulting from corporate worship. The worshiper in the congregation needs to feel that sense of individual responsibility which goes along with an actual audible and intelligent participation in common acts of devotion. Auditors are critics. If one has a part in a performance he is much more charitable toward its weaknesses than if he were merely an auditor and spectator. That congregations have failed, dismally, is true; that their prayers and praises have been performed by proxy is also true; but when popular sermon themes and special music are advertised, how are the people to know that they are expected to worship? They have not even been asked to do so.

We have gone a long way in the last few years in improving all phases of public worship. If I were a "committee on findings" on the present trends, especially in church music, I should find little to condemn and much to commend.

I should commend: (a) the increased interest in congregational singing, and (b) especially the interest shown in hymn tunes which have the happy combination of ease of singing and churchly dignity. I should commend (c) the increasing use of Introits, Responses, and Sentences; (d) the growth and interest in chorus choirs; (e) the more intelligent appreciation by the man in the pew of what music may mean in worship; and, to me the most significant of all (f), the growing desire of our music leaders to learn more of the fundamental principles underlying corporate worship.

Recent British and Continental Theological Literature

R. BIRCH HOYLE

THIS article is written in the interval between the Ecumenical Conference on Life and Work at Oxford, and the one on Faith and Order at Edinburgh. In the former, attention was directed outward to the present parlous condition of the world, with the breakdown of the moral virtues of truth, honesty and brotherly feeling between nations. The gaze turned inward to find out the resources and forces at the disposal of Christendom, with which the Church universal could supply moral energies to counteract the collapse of civilization. At Edinburgh these resources are traced to divine grace, and attention is turned to the channels, the ministry and the sacraments, through which the divine grace flows to humanity. Here come into view the long process of history, the story of the Christian Church, the *backward* view, which, in turn, looks inward to the fact of revelation, with the problems of man's ability to receive it, whether "natural" man can receive revelation (without the "prevenient" action of God) by means of reason, feeling, action issuing in fruitful results.

The recent literature, in the main, deals with these problems. It will be convenient to take up the backward view, the historical view, first. Principal John Dickie, from New Zealand, gives a personal retrospect of *Fifty Years of British Theology* in the Gunning Lectures (T. & T. Clark). This is useful as showing what contributions have been made to theology by J. H. Newman, James Martineau, B. F. Westcott, A. M. Fairbairn, von Hügel, and the influence on Scottish theology from the Ritschlian school in Germany. How to arrive at God, is the question put to these theologians, and the various answers lay bare the crucial problems of the hour.

The Dean of Winchester (Doctor Selwyn, editor of *Theology*) has collected a volume of essays by various writers on *The History of Christian Thought* (The Unicorn Press). This starts with the first four centuries of the Christian era, takes in Augustine, then Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen, and proceeds to the "Broken Limbs" of the Church at the Reformation, Luther, Calvin and the Counter-Reformation. Finally, in "The Modern

Age," it surveys Deism, Rationalism, making F. D. Maurice the typical theologian of the Anglican nineteenth century, facing subjectivism, Biblical criticism, the "Social Gospel." Within the limits of 180 pages, only outlines can be expected, but these are very clear. The latter part, from the Reformation onward, supplies the gap left by the death of A. G. MacGiffert, whose third volume on the same theme is sorely missed. Here mention may be made of the reissue, by the Lutterworth Press, of the late Dr. S. G. Green's *Handbook of Church History*, A. D. 30-1483. Dr. Elliott Binns has worked over that clearly-written book, cutting down a lot, inserting notes on new discoveries, thus bringing it up to date. With these three books, and MacGiffert's two volumes, one gains a sufficient knowledge of how Christian thought has developed.

Turning inward, the search is made for man's ability to reach God, and thus remedy "man's inhumanity to man." On the one hand is the Humanism of today seen in W. Lippmann, E. Haydon, J. W. Krutch, Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell, to whom, on the whole, religion is a "wish-project" without objective foundation. The result is that there is nothing and no one above man. And there is no purpose or goal to the historic process in such a view, leaving goodness, truth and beauty without a "ground" beyond man's own subjective emotions. This means *The Riddle of the World* (S. C. M.), the title of Dr. D. S. Cairns' Baird Lectures, who, on the other hand, after showing the futility of modern Humanism, resting on unsatisfactory scientific premises, proceeds to show how in the Old Testament Theodicy and the completion in the New, the Christian solution of these problems satisfies heart, mind and conscience alike. As a piece of apologetics, this volume is of great value; written for the "average man," it thoroughly exposes the limitations of the purely scientific, humanistic attempts to explain reality, while facing the problems of sin and suffering those attempts so often ignore.

Another work on Theism is Professor G. Dawes Hicks' Hibbert Lectures on *The Philosophical Bases of Theism* (Allen & Unwin). He too writes for the "general reader," having in view persons "who find themselves unable to accept the creeds of Christendom," or "miraculous revelation," "yet are persuaded that the spiritual life is a reality." Philosophy is more prominent than religion: the head, reason, rather than "the heart" pervades the book. The New Realism of the author examines Religious Experience in two lectures, warning against mysticism and pantheism, and

finding through nature, reason, great souls, the notes of revelation. He gives a good account of how the four great "Proofs"—the Cosmological, Teleological, Moral and Ontological—are of service in this age. He does not tackle the problem of sin, hence he can ask, "Why should the normal rational intelligence of man be judged to be incapable of discerning spiritual verities?" He might examine Saint Paul's answer in 1 Corinthians 2.

But here comes forward Principal T. Hywel Hughes with his book, *The Philosophical Basis of Mysticism* (T. & T. Clark). Doctor Hughes is convinced that "in mysticism there is a solid core of philosophical thought, as well as a profound religious experience." It has a theory of knowledge, to which he devotes a chapter: "never the result of argument, demonstration, or proof"; rather, "intuition, the conditioning factor in this insight being love." Thus "feeling"—almost Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence"—comes up again as primary, though widened to include thinking and action. There is much talk of the mystic's "immediate contact" and even "union with God," and yet Doctor Hughes ventures to dispute the mystic's claim to have been "lost in God," and explains it away! The book is exceedingly valuable for its extensive quotations, its attempts to explain mysticism in its epistemological, psychological and ethical aspects, and its fair standing up to the manifold criticisms directed against mysticism. In this way, looking within, Dawes Hicks sees reason supreme, challenging all mysticism; finding reason in the universe as objective ground of the Good, the Beautiful and the True, while Hughes, from the emotion of love finds man akin to God. Cairns bases his argument most on the moral consciousness of ought, with its source in God, and the prophetic filial consciousness of Jesus Christ.

Facing outward to the world of mankind, "moving about in worlds unrealized"—the worlds of goodness, aesthetics and duty—the problem of the Oxford Conference emerges, namely, how to "realize," that is, make actual "the lofty hopes that make us men." This is the concern of a truly great book by Professor A. D. Müller of Leipzig, in *Ethik* (Töpelmann, Berlin). Here are contrasted the "modern" views of the world and human nature, using the latest psychologies of Freud, Adler and Jung, and the Biblical view of the world and man as God's creations. The foundation or ground is God: all human duties are to be referred first to God and His purpose, as revealed in Scripture, in nature and in human consciousness. This order of sources of revelation is significant—the Biblical revelation is

primary. There is a thorough discussion of individual and social ethics. Against N. Hartmann's view, that there is no transcendental source of ethics, Müller carries on a vigorous polemic. In social ethics we are brought face to face with God's "ordinances" for man: the family, friendship, the nation, the State, with its use of force and war, its legal orders, and economics. The basic problem of "realization" is left to the Church: when she "realizes" the resources God places at her disposal, then, and only then, will "realization" take place and order return to this chaotic, disordered world. Love, "obedient unto death, the death of the Cross"—love, kindled by God, will be "the evangelical way of 'realizing' the Good."

Two other books take up aspects of man's relation to society: H. M. Relton's *Religion and the State* (Unicorn Press) and Roger Lloyd's *The Beloved Community* (Nisbet). Relton has in view the relation of Church and State, in separation, alliance and the present domination of the Church in Europe by the State. Lloyd deals with the tension between man's self-preservation and the rival claims of society and the State which suppress his personality. Like Müller, both turn to the Church for answers to this difficulty.

Their common viewpoint is that the Church is to "realize" the reign of God. On that "reign" we are taken back to the teaching of Jesus. On this theme—*The Mission and Message of Jesus*—a remarkable book has been constructed by H. D. Major, T. W. Manson, and C. J. Wright (Nicholson and Watson). This is an exposition of the four Gospels, "in the light of modern research." For the ordinary, non-professional reader, the results of form-criticism are presented: Doctor Major taking up the material and incidents common to the first three Gospels, Professor Manson, in masterly manner, examining the teaching of Jesus, while Professor Wright seeks to expound, by historical imagination and psychological methods, the experience Jesus had of His Father as given in the Fourth Gospel. There—in Jesus—is God most and best known. The wealth of material in this huge book should be utilized by every minister and Bible student.

The problem of mankind today is, How to return to God: reconciliation. In *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, by Lionel Thornton (Unicorn Press), we have a deeply searching study of what the Bible has to say on God's way of approach to man, alienated from Him. The Biblical teaching is seen as a unity, the Old Testament needing the New to "fulfill" its foretokens of redemption: fulfilled in Christ's "Way of the Cross." No new

theory is expounded: Auten's "Christus Victor" is used, where Christ triumphed over the world, sin, devil, law and wrath, and a good word is put in for both Anselm's and Abelard's views. But we are in the biblical material all through the book. By this man cannot save himself: he needs supernatural grace, which comes in the Holy Spirit through Christ. To Father Thornton, the Church is "organic" with Christ, risen and ascended, and this naturally leads to the next book on our list, *The Ministry and the Sacraments* (S. C. M.). The editors are Bishop Headlam and R. Dunkerley: the writers are truly ecumenical, over thirty in number, including two Roman Catholics, two Greek Orthodox writers, and representative scholars, Lutheran, Calvinist, Methodist, et cetera, who state how each church views the relation of ministers to the sacraments, what sacraments mean, and how grace is understood to enter into the Church of believers. Simply as a storehouse of material the book is of inestimable worth; underlying all varieties of views is the deep conviction that the grace of God streams, through Christ and the Spirit, into the Church "for the healing of the nations."

This brings us to our last book, W. Strählin's *The Mystery of God* (S. C. M.). The entire book expounds Saint Paul's phrase, "stewards of the mystery of God." We are taken behind and beyond this space-time world into the "secret places" where God, Christ dwell, from whom come the powers which make the Church a "mystery" to the ordinary man: powers which the officers and members of the believing Church are to draw upon and "dispense" for the salvation of mankind. It is an obscure and difficult book to read, yet repays every effort. For therein we "see as in a mirror, darkly," what God has done, is doing and will do, in whose working alone weary humanity may at last find rest and blessedness.

Book Reviews

The Nature of Religious Experience.

Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh. Edited by JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

SUCH a composite work as this has the advantage of reflecting different points of view; it has the disadvantage of being rather fragmentary and summary in character. The contributors are bound together by a common personal regard for their distinguished teacher, but otherwise each one to a large extent goes his own way.

The most valuable portions of the book are perhaps the historical sections, those which expound the relation of other men to the problem of religious experience; such men, for instance, as Reid, Campbell, Tennant, Taylor, LeRoy, Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann. Not a little interesting information with reference to these and other prominent thinkers is scattered throughout the book.

There is in the book no systematic and sustained argument for the validity of religious experience. Professor Bewkes, the author of the first essay, seems to find considerable significance in Professor Macintosh's doctrine of "critical monism," but some of the other contributors seem to regard this doctrine as neither "monistic" nor "critical." Professor Ferm, for instance, tells us that "a rational theology and not a theology of religious experience contains the more promising and reasonable hope"; and Professor Thomas states emphatically that religious empiricism "cannot by itself yield religious knowledge." Professor Bixler is apparently of the opinion that further exploration of value experiences

may ultimately yield something of decisive apologetic significance; while Professor Richard Niebuhr is convinced that the complete uniqueness of religious values must be recognized before they can become self-validating. A general argument in favor of the objectivity of values is presented by Professor Krusé.

Perhaps the most serious omission in the volume is a clear-cut definition of empiricism. Empiricism can have no distinctive meaning unless it implies the passivity of the human mind. But this is not clearly brought out. There is an excellent article on the reality of the self by Professor Calhoun, in some respects the most substantial chapter in the book, but the epistemological significance of the view advocated is not developed. Professor Bewkes apparently favors the idea that the organizing principles or categories of thought should "be grounded in the external order of nature and not in a genetically unaccountable subject." This would suggest a purely passivistic theory of thought, but was evidently not so intended by the author. In general the conception of empiricism is left at loose ends, and the necessity and importance of religious apriorism are not clearly apprehended.

The volume, nevertheless, has real value as a reflection of certain phases of current religious thought in America. It can hardly be said to make any significant contribution to the problem of religious experience, but it is instructive as an illustration of the different ways in which some representative American thinkers approach the problem.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON.

Boston University
School of Theology.

The Apostolic Preaching. By C. H. DODD. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$1.50.

MUCH of the critical research of the New Testament in the past has been to discover the divergent views of the writers. The author, Dr. C. H. Dodd, who is the Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, seeks to discover not the diversities but the underlying unity which runs through the New Testament. He raises the question as to what the primitive Christian Gospel was. What was the basic pattern interwoven in the New Testament tapestry? There follows a careful evaluation of the Gospels, Paul, and John. This study reveals that each has common, cardinal tenets which are set in a somewhat similar eschatological framework. They are the death, resurrection, exaltation and second coming of Jesus. "With all the diversity of the New Testament writings, they form a unity in their proclamation of the one Gospel."

However, as the coming of the Lord was deferred, the early Christians were forced to readjust their views. "When the unexpected delay in the consummation broke up the continuity of the eschatological process, some readjustment of outlook was called for." The eschatological disappointment of Paul led him to explore the mystical implications of Christ when incarnate in human experience. This emphasis became "The foundation for a strong, positive, and constructive social ethic." In the Fourth Gospel, even more than in Paul, "Eschatology is sublimated into a distinctive kind of mysticism."

The latter part of the book conveys a definite challenge to the modern minister. It is his task to recapture for *his* preaching the essential gospel which the New Testament writers stressed; it is also his responsibility to relate that gospel to contemporary evils in a constructive fashion.

Doctor Dodd holds that the advent of Jesus represented a divine-human crisis. "The pattern of history is revealed less in evolution than in crisis. Once in the course of the ages the spirit of man was confronted, within history, with the eternal God in His kingdom, power, and glory, and that in a final and absolute sense. . . . By that supreme crisis the meaning of all history is controlled." The minister is thus challenged to relate all contemporary crises to that one great, historical "crisis."

LLOYD E. FOSTER.

Calvary Methodist Episcopal Church,
East Orange, N. J.

Church Music in History and Practice. By WINFRED DOUGLAS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00.

ANY book by Canon Douglas deserves a careful reading by the thoughtful church musician. This one, an amplification of the Hale Lectures, delivered early this year at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary of Evanston, has been eagerly awaited by the many who were unable to be present when the lectures were delivered. These lectures were prepared primarily for the clergy and the seminarians as well as the organists of the Protestant Episcopal Church, yet Canon Douglas's profound scholarship, his fine historical background, and his facile style have fitted him to produce a book which has in it much of value for the average musician and not a little for the cultured general reader.

The book has been painstakingly indexed, it has an adequate bibliography in the special field treated, and has, probably, the most complete lists of phonograph records of liturgical music which have been compiled. The importance of these lists to the ordinary church organist and

choir director should not be underestimated. If such leaders would secure some of these records and carefully listen to the playing of them, what a change might be brought about in the interpretation of much of our present-day church music!

Canon Douglas has not concerned himself with any "music outside the appointed services" of his church. This is but natural in the light of his training, his experience, and his research in that particular field. He is obviously prejudiced in favor of Gregorian music and makes quite extravagant statements concerning it. The book is a plea, certainly implied if not specifically expressed, for his church to use Gregorian liturgical music exclusively. This doubtless would be all right for the "high" churchman, but would not be at all feasible for the masses—the "mine run" of church attendants. If worship be the thing Canon Douglas says it should be, namely, a pouring out of one's whole self toward God, that worship must be in the vernacular. Luther was wise enough to realize there was such a thing as a musical vernacular, and made the most of it. The Wesleyan revival did not get fully under way until the early converts began to sing in a familiar idiom.

Gregorian music is beautiful music when it is sung by those who are competent to sing it; those who are familiar with its background and the situations out of which it grew. It did not grow out of twentieth-century situations, it is not a familiar idiom of musical expression, and it is doubtful if it may ever become an intelligent medium of such expression for twentieth-century churchgoers.

It is an interesting book, nevertheless, and has in it much grist for the mill of the modern musicologist.

ROBERT G. MCCUTCHAN.
DePauw University.

Rebel Religion. By B. C. PLOWRIGHT.
New York: Round Table Press.
\$2.00.

THIS book is a searching examination of the Christian idea of "community" in relation to Fascism and Communism. In a world shaken to its foundations by the breakdown of old ideas and the emergence of powerful movements with radically different postulates, what is the function of Christianity?

For light the author, an English Congregational minister, turns to Jesus' conception of the kingdom of God and inquires how, from the human side, it was to be inaugurated. Jesus, he finds, "ceased to trust to a political community based on race, blood, and self-interest"; neither did he rely completely on the permeation of society by Christian individuals; he looked rather to the Christian fellowship, "a community based on faith in Himself and loyalty to Himself, organized on the basis of good will, . . . love, and regard for personality." This fellowship, demonstrating the Christian spirit, "actually embodied in a full and true community," was to be the human agent in the redemption of society.

Tragically, the Church has failed to fulfill the hope of its Founder. Since Constantine, far from creating the conditions which God could "answer" with His kingdom, it has largely accommodated its social ideals to those of the secular community: force and self-regard. The most resolute present-day attempt to realize the Christian goal, the author holds, is to be found not in Christianity, but in atheistic Communism! But Communism is prevented by its methods and materialistic presuppositions from attaining the goal. Fascism is irreconcilably opposed to Christianity at practically every point. Our hope therefore lies in a return to the rebel faith of Jesus. Revolting

against injustice, the Church cannot be content to tell the world to change; it must "set itself resolutely" to become, as Christ intended, a real brotherhood. For example, each Christian community should become an economic unit embodying Christian principles. Such a concrete demonstration of true community would challenge and redeem the world.

The book is characterized by vigorous thinking, and abounds in creative insights. If critical of Christianity, it is nevertheless appreciative of its real accomplishments. The accounts of Fascism and Communism are objective and fair, the critiques penetrating and convincing.

The author tends to regard the attainment of economic justice in this world as the chief if not the only task of the Church. This may be partly the inevitable reaction of a sensitive Christian to the otherworldliness of much Christianity. Nevertheless, to preserve balance we need to remember that for Jesus the kingdom of God is beyond history as well as in it, and that religion has to do not only with economic concerns, but with the relation of man's total personality to the eternal God.

Few will completely agree with this militant book. Some will be aroused by it, as Kant was by Hume, from their "dogmatic slumber." All who seek a Christian civilization and a Christian answer to Communism and Fascism will find it a valuable stimulus to thought and action.

S. PAUL SCHILLING.

Methodist Episcopal Church,
Prince Frederick, Md.

Thoughts on Death and Life. By
WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New
York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

A WORTH-WHILE book is to be expected from the author and such this is.

The announcement of the book is justified—Professor Hocking is a leading American philosopher, whose works are internationally well-known.

He announces that he has doubted that life goes on. His statement that the majority today vote negative on immortality is debatable. He recognizes that there are no concerns which more affect human happiness and sanity than the issues of life and death. He holds that survival is neither probable nor improbable in advance of a determination of one's world view or metaphysics. He seeks not to prove or disprove, but to remove some of the obstacles to an understanding and judgment of life and death, that his readers may be enabled to live with courage and equanimity. He believes that survival of death is a possibility but not a necessity of destiny. We have immortality—not immortality. We can "put on" immortality but also mortality.

Seed thoughts abound throughout the volume. Instead of interest in another world subtracting from interest in this, without the continuance of personality, human life cannot hold its worth and meaning. Duration is a dimension of value and we know that survival ought to be. There is a deep-lying innocence of the mind whereby it carries on its living as though there were to be no temporal end of its being. There is a duality within the self wherein the reflective self contemplates the decease of the dated excursive self but not of the reflective self. To conceive of life as a sort of apprenticeship in the capacity to create raises the question—Do we exist in order to act or do we act in order to exist? We care for being more than for achievement, because being is an enduring potentiality, and this can only signify potentiality for further life. The dated self that is produced vanishes; the reflective

self, having attained a measure of reality in that creative deed, is ready for another essay in creation.

His comment upon Professor Dewey's religious position is penetrating—Can human allegiance be compelled by an object which it has done so much to make? Can the needed surrender to a God of one's own conscious construction be genuinely executed?

Parts of the book have a distinctive loveliness. The wish for survival is not primarily for one's self. "It takes the form of a demand that someone else, whose death has been witnessed, shall not have perished from the universe. Attachments have been broken off, the emotional habits of life have been thwarted, but the protest is not leveled against this personal pain. It is leveled against the destruction of something admirable. It has little or nothing in common with the demand found by Kant in human conscience, calling for endless time in which this moral self may become perfect! On the contrary, it is a cry that life *has produced* the perfect being, beloved by me, and has thrown it away. I care enough for that appearance to carve it into imperishable stone, yet nature lets the living original perish! It is a protest which moves far beyond personal suffering and expresses outrage at an objective unfitness." . . . "This can only be answered by bringing dawn back into the sunset, and the endless otherness of life into the crux of death."

There seems to be a baffling unrelatedness in the development of the discussion. Perhaps it emanates from the composition of two different lectureships given at Harvard and Chicago. Perhaps it issues from a mind so comprehensive that it includes considerations which would not seem to the more limited to be pertinent. Is it impertinent to suggest that it may

come from the impatience of a great and busy man to integrate his writing for the benefit of his readers. The regret of this reviewer is that many valuable reflections are likely to be unremembered because they are not linked in a logical sequence easily recollected.

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Book Editor of the Methodist
Episcopal Church.

The Economic Ethics of John Wesley. By KATHLEEN WALKER MACARTHUR. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

IN accordance with the dominant interests of our time, a number of recent writers have discussed the political and economic views and influence of John Wesley and the Methodist Movement. When individualism was the fashion it was very generally accepted that Wesley had wrought beneficently and, in Lecky's phrase, had saved England from a French Revolution; but lately students of British social history have not been so kind. History began to be interpreted in the light of the class struggle, and Wesley has been soundly rated for having pursued individual salvation instead of social reform. The Methodists, so it was said, fixed their minds on the New Jerusalem and not on the social redemption of England's fair and pleasant land.

True, the critics have ignored a few simple facts. They have apparently forgotten that points of view which may seem obvious to writers looking backward from the twentieth century may not have been so obvious to men living and working a century and a half ago. Indeed, some of the critics have not obeyed Cromwell's famous exhortation to the Scots, to consider that they themselves might be mistaken. It is arguable that social reformation without individual

reformation may in the end prove futile; and it is certainly possible to argue that for the eighteenth century in England individual reformation was the crying need. Moreover, critics of Wesley's ethics have often made the mistake, common enough in all kinds of history, of supposing that the attitudes and beliefs of followers a half century later were necessarily the attitudes and beliefs of the founder. It might be added that some of the critics of Wesley's social views have also made the mistake of not reading Wesley.

It is the merit of Miss MacArthur's treatise that she has stayed close to her sources and that she has interpreted Wesley in the light of eighteenth-century England and not in the light of what twentieth-century writers think that their ancestors should have been. The outstanding quality of this short book is its realism. Wesley's own writings and the ascertainable facts about Wesley's work and teachings are the sources from which the author derives her materials. And in her treatment of these materials she considers Wesley's relations to the problems which obtruded themselves during his lifetime.

Certain changes were coming about in England of the later eighteenth century; and, whether these changes were desirable or not, they had to be met. Individuals had to be orientated to the new world; they had to be tided over financially; they had to develop outlook and habits that would see them through. Especially did the masses need "social rights and status as persons; the organization of life into order and meaning and right relations in a time of confusion and uncertainty; guidance in the use of liberties already gained, and aid in overcoming the perils of uncharted personal and political freedom." Because Methodism met these needs, contends Miss MacArthur, the

Revival was "so prominent and so popular among the common people."

Wesley was interested in individual regeneration; he did believe that individual regeneration would solve man's economic and social ills. The author shows, however, that Wesley was not unaware of the social implications of the remedies which he suggests nor unappreciative of the social approach in certain instances. But his greatest contribution was the tying in of religion with the practical problems of the ordinary man. There is no attempt made in this book to suggest that Wesley's principles are final; but there is shrewd criticism of those who assume that moral foundations in individual life, which include honesty, simplicity and brotherly love, can be ignored while the New Jerusalem is built on earth by economists.

Criticisms of certain details could be made; but on the whole this is a fair and competent study of Wesley's economic ethics. Moreover, in these times it could be read with profit by all those who believe that the world will not be saved by bread alone.

UMPHREY LEE.

Highland Park Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Dallas, Texas.

The Gospel of Mark. By B. HARVIE BRANSCOMB. The Moffatt New Testament Commentary. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$3.50.

Das Evangelium des Markus. By ERNST LOHMEYER. Meyer Kommentar über das Neue Testament. Göttingen.

BRANSCOMB has given to English readers an indispensable summary of modern historical study of the Gospels. Interrelations with other Gospels are treated at sufficient length to deal with all essential questions of a "life of Jesus." Of course

he recognizes that a life of Jesus is impossible, for Mark had no reliable knowledge of the sequence of events. Still, Branscomb argues effectually for the possibility of authorship by John Mark. He dates the Gospel about 75, contending with Bacon for a date later than 70. Though many of the positions of form-criticism are adopted, more emphasis is laid upon delimiting the written sources. At least eight are accepted. Instead of admitting successive revisions of the Gospel, he explains about a dozen verses as glosses. The textual questions are discussed in so far as it is possible in a commentary on an English translation. References to current literature are sparse, and there is little debating with competing interpretations.

It is to be hoped that preachers of the "liberal Jesus" will study the volume with care. They will discover that modern New Testament scholarship dismisses all psychologizing of such incidents as the baptism of Jesus. We are dealing in such places with Christian theology, not the self-consciousness of Jesus. They will learn that the kingdom of God was an essentially eschatological conception. To find any idea of an evolutionary kingdom is misunderstanding and misinterpretation. On the whole, the best of contemporary historical scholarship is brought together without that straining after originality which mars the work of some. However, there are some novel positions taken. The answer to the Syrophenician woman is viewed as the posing of his own life problem on the part of Jesus rather than as a rebuke to the woman. A suggestion of Burkitt is developed which would relegate the triumphal entry to the Feast of Dedication. Evidence from Jewish lore is used to support the contention that the cleansing of the Temple must have been at least two weeks before

the Passover. The Last Supper was not a Passover, but a farewell meal with his disciples in Jerusalem, which was secretly arranged after Jesus became aware of his betrayal.

Only in his treatment of the messianic question is the influence of the "liberal Jesus" marked. The Son of Man title is dismissed as early Christian theology. Instead of following the Wrede path of denying that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, Branscomb curiously reverts to the old apologetic idea that Jesus sought to lead His disciples to a different conception of messiahship. The answer to Pilate, "Thou hast said," was not intended as an affirmation, for such an affirmation would have led to misunderstanding of Jesus' objective.

It is interesting that in the very same year there should appear a commentary on Mark in the famous Meyer series in Germany (their equivalent of the *International Critical*), the first in thirty-six years. Space does not permit any adequate discussion of Lohmeyer's work. It is unlikely that his new theory, that Christianity had a double origin in Galilee and Jerusalem, will find general acceptance. The commentary is based on just as rigid historical criticism, but has the additional stress upon what the Germans are calling "theological exegesis." This raises an important question and directs attention to the most serious criticism which may be leveled against the Branscomb commentary. Though there will be differences of opinion upon many points of detail, he has given us an unexcelled prolegomena to an historical study of Jesus. But is that what a commentary on the Gospel of Mark should be? When we fully realize the extent to which it portrays the theology of the Christian Church rather than a simple historical report of a human life, is the purpose of the commentator

achieved in separating the "historical" elements from the secondary? Lohmeyer sees as his task that of expounding the *gospel*, and as he sees it, the Son of Man appeared in history, not simply in the theology of the Early Church. Does not the present stage of New Testament study call for a commentary on the *gospel* rather than a prolegomena to the historical study of Jesus?

CLARENCE TUCKER CRAIG.

Oberlin College.

Towards the Christian Revolution.

Edited by R. B. Y. SCOTT and GREGORY VLASTOS. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.00.

IN this concise and well-written symposium nine Canadian scholars, many of them mature beyond their years, affirm that with the passing of the frontier and the rise of complex industrial organization the old individualistic social order is doomed. Will that individualistic order be replaced by the totalitarian State, or by Communism, or by a socialized commonwealth based upon the dynamic of actual Christianity?

The writers, following a general theme without slavishly close collaboration, approach their task from various angles—philosophical, theological, ethical, Biblical, economic, and political. They reflect such diverse influences as Karl Barth, A. N. Whitehead, and John Macmurray. As a rule they are primarily suggestive and interpretative, although two chapters on economics rely heavily upon statistics and quotation. Assuming that present conditions the world around call for serious readjustment and that crises might produce immediate changes, the authors ask for intelligent planning to direct the impending social transformation.

Toward that end they hold the com-

mon objective of a classless, co-operative society, although they differ in regard to its scope and its means of attainment. Gregory Vlastos seeks a community dominated by love. R. B. Y. Scott and Eric Havelock, with tolerant eloquence, outline the gradual evolution of an ideal brotherhood. Like J. King Gordon, who thinks that Sweden supplies an alternative to Fascism, they hold that so long as democracy offers hope for effective change none need assume the defeatist position of believing that violent revolution is inevitable. Others appear to regard struggle and mortal conflict as unavoidable. Two contributors who consider that efforts like those of Kagawa and the Scandinavian co-operatives are not sufficiently fundamental, prefer rather to exalt Marxism and attempt to reconcile it with the teachings of Jesus, Eugene Forsey affirming that the only sign which shall be given this generation will be that of the prophet Marx. It is to be regretted that the other outspoken champion of this view, "Propheticus," whose presentation is probably the most controversial in the entire volume, has chosen to remain anonymous.

Since the writers do not completely agree one with another, no one else will be expected to accept all their attitudes and contentions. Every reader, however, will be grateful for their frank and sincere convictions, and for their definite call to social action. There should be general approval of the closing pages, which assert that the comfortable middle class group who have the money and the leisure to read these essays possess the power to make the inescapable revolution bloodless and Christian rather than violent and irreligious.

EARL CRANSTON.

University of Redlands,
Redlands, California.

The Social Manifesto of Jesus. By
EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT, JR.
New York: Harper and Brothers.
\$2.00.

ONE does not read very far in this book, written by the minister of the Pul-len Memorial Baptist Church, Raleigh, N. C., before he realizes that this author has with rare exegetical skill given an unusual interpretation of the familiar Lord's Prayer.

With this realization we warily put up our defenses against the danger of most clever expositors—reading into an ancient document some interpretation that seems plausible but was never intended or even thought of by its originator. Throughout the first part of the book, however much we may agree with Doctor Poteat's ideas per se, we question whether they were in the mind of Jesus when He first uttered the prayer. Doubts develop as we read the best chapters, those on "Property" and "Debt." These are so startling that we wonder whether the Master could have meant His petitions relating to bread and trespasses as they are here interpreted. Second reading and sober thought convince us that the author's exegetical skill is backed by sound historical and economic knowledge, and that he has made out a more than plausible case for his conclusions.

Doctor Poteat's thesis is that the Lord's Prayer is Christ's social manifesto, an expression of corporate rather than of individual life, that no one of its petitions is understood properly until set within a social pattern. That social pattern is the kingdom of God (the State) within which the will (the Law) of the Father (the Government) is done, and which provides the environment necessary for a universally abundant life. Social reorganization must come before the divine will can be accomplished; hence the order

in which the petitions are given. It is the function of the State to provide economic security, and in the Lord's Prayer we are taught to pray for a social order in which God's will can be done. Then the petitions about bread and debts have a significance they lack for most people at the present time.

The author sees bread as the symbol of property, and regards any petition for it as subject to definite conditions—it must be mutually possessed for use, for use in supplying needs and not in securing personal profit. An excellent discussion of what the words "daily" (bread) and "our" (Father) do to the two sacred cows of our economic life—the acquisitive instinct and the indispensability of profit—is found in this chapter on "Property." In his discussion of what he calls Jesus' "philosophy of property," the author points out that we admit gladly that God must be shared but raises the question—how about bread?

To translate *οφειλήματα* as trespasses in the theological sense is, according to Doctor Poteat, unjustified by sound exegesis. It means debts, and that with an economic, not a theological reference. Reviewing the part played by such debts in Jewish social history, the author reveals how natural it was for Christ to include in His social manifesto a petition for freedom from all debts that do not promote general well-being. Debts that hamper individual and institutional life have no place in an ideal society.

It is the author's belief that the ethical difficulties involved in the words "lead us not into temptation" will disappear, when we read the petition in conjunction with the previous one, "Thy kingdom come." He views them as positive and negative expressions of the same idea. The present structure of society creates idleness, ignorance, fear and desperation, making

almost inevitable some sins that in a better social order would be uncalled for. When that order comes the desires of men can be concentrated more and more on the life of the spirit. Only as men have the opportunity thus provided can they really rise to the spiritual level of life, and only then can the activity of evil be nullified.

Of all the recent books on any aspect of the life and teachings of Jesus that this reviewer has read, this is by far the best.

EUGENE WILFORD SHRIGLEY.

Methodist Episcopal Church,
Baldwin, New York.

The Local Church. By ALBERT W. BEAVEN. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

The Business Administration of a Church. By ROBERT CASHMAN. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$1.50.

IN the field of church methodology *The Local Church* has no superior. Only Doctor Beaven could produce such a wise and richly suggestive volume. For twenty years he was pastor of Lake Avenue Baptist Church, Rochester, N. Y., which, under his leadership, came to be known as one of the most efficiently organized churches in America. His wide experience as pastor, then as president of the Federal Council of Churches, and now as head of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, has broadened his horizon and deepened his convictions. The average pastor will appreciate this book because the author, with such experience, firmly believes in the Church and speaks a clear word concerning it out of the thought and life of the world today. He also exalts the local church—not any of its departments—to a lofty plane, and shows how it may be an important part of the Christian world community. Today much attention is

focused on world affairs, on social problems and on theology, and there is no small danger that the significance of the local church may be neglected. After all, whatever advance is made will come through improving the local and world ministry of each church: hence the importance of this study for the minister.

The great value of the book, however, lies in the thoroughly progressive framework in which it is set. It accepts the philosophy of Christian education at its best and applies it to all the work of the Church. It weaves into every consideration, not only methods, sane and practical, but a spirit which reflects the depths of Christian understanding. The sole purpose of the Church is to advance Christlikeness. Its aim is succinctly stated as follows: "The purpose of the Church is to secure within individuals and society an ever-increasing practice of the attitudes toward God and man that were revealed in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ." The true measure of the Church is not to be found in its ritualistic form nor in its theological doctrines, but rather in the Christlikeness of character which is developed in its members. No mere atavistic Church, but one always tested by Christlikeness! All organizations are regarded as successful only insofar as they promote this central purpose and modify the attitudes of men and women, boys and girls toward Christlikeness. The author envisages a Church which is more than a series of organizations, rather an organism with spiritual life pulsating throughout each of its diverse members. It does not contend for a Church *and* a School, so much as a Church *with* a School, and the major loyalty ever centered in the CHURCH itself.

The author is conspicuously successful in spiritualizing organization, and his book is a veritable thesaurus of tested pro-

cedures which will enrich and expand any church program.

This book is really designed as a leadership text on the purpose and program of the Church. As such it is admirably adapted for use with official boards and lay groups. The reviewer can think of no more profitable experience for pastor and officials than a careful and thoughtful study together of the stimulating contentions of this able writer. It merits a place in every minister's library and should be read widely by laymen. If used it will help the cause of Christian education and advance the work of the Church, which are not two undertakings but one.

In *The Business Administration of a Church* we have an interesting study of a field of church responsibility not frequently surveyed. The author has done a good job, but the reader must keep in mind the sharp limitations of the theme. The book deals only with the business end of the church. It is a most readable compendium of suggestions, many of which have distinct value, and is written out of a long experience in dealing with the business aspects of church management, financial procedures, conventions, et cetera. No one church could make wise use of all the plans or ideas listed, but there is not a church which would not find something that could be appropriated with profit. This is not a closely reasoned document; it is a direct statement of a situation with a specific conclusion given immediately. You may agree or disagree, but you will not fail to appreciate the brisk, direct, and to-the-point chapters.

There are fifteen chapters, covering such practical themes as the Minister's Office, files, correspondence, publicity, finance, sexton, care of property and use of time, with a revealing chapter on "The Swindling of Ministers." Some

portions of the book may seem quite elementary, but this is because the author feels that many preachers face discouragement through lack of insight and skill in the business management of personal and church affairs.

The book has stimulating value. As you read it you will find yourself frequently exclaiming, "I never thought of that."

It is to be regretted that the author felt constrained by his subject to such narrow limits. If he had only pushed farther afield he would have found several additional areas in which an exploration would prove exceedingly valuable. What about the business methods so often practiced by ministers themselves! All too frequently there are those who seem entirely willing to sanction financial procedures which the better business judgment of the day would instantly repudiate. Is there any relationship between the business of the Church and the world of business outside? What about the ethical involvements of many financial practices now in operation in numerous churches? Here are additional areas which should be tactfully explored. Nevertheless, within the narrow limits set for himself, Doctor Cashman has produced a book which will have a helpful influence in many quarters. It is a wholesome sign when thoughtful laymen push their pens in constructive fashion in behalf of the Church.

KARL QUIMBY.

Ridgewood, New Jersey.

On the Rim of the Abyss. By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.00.

PROFESSOR SHOTWELL of Columbia has been intimately associated with the League of Nations from its earliest days. He is also president of the American

League of Nations Association. No one in this country, therefore, is better fitted to interpret the League's aims and achievements no one has a greater right to help plan its future. Through good days and bad his faith in the League has never faltered. As Voltaire said of God, so Professor Shotwell would say, in effect, of the League: if it did not exist another would have to be invented. But hand in hand with this faith has gone a critical realism which recognizes that an instrument of policy designed to supplant the oldest and most brutal of them all cannot successfully be forged in a little more than fifteen years.

He is not an alarmist attempting to frighten us into the League. The title of the book suggests something catastrophic until one is told that it is taken from Dante's image of the Inferno, with its succession of concentric circles ever widening in rim as they rise up from the central abyss. The emphasis in this study is on the rim, where the United States finds itself, in comparative safety from the central abyss, which is Europe. What interest should a nation on a relatively remote rim take in the League whose chief business so far has been the mitigating of strife in the abyss? How can the United States effectively and without danger co-operate with "the only international organ of co-operative pacification?" These are the central problems of this book.

The larger part of the book is a scholarly survey of the history of the League, with its hopes and disillusionments, its successes and failures. One important fact emerges: the League is not a static institution incapable of change, but has steadily undergone revision. At no time, of course, has the demand for reform been more insistent than now, when friends of the League are only just be-

ginning to recover from having been stunned by Italy's insolent annexation through war, explicitly outlawed, of a member state whose territorial integrity she had solemnly pledged to help protect. Some members wish to put more teeth into the League, and others wish to draw them all. Professor Shotwell belongs neither to those who wish to strengthen the League into a superstate with a police force all its own—he does advocate a special flag for the League—nor to those who would "reform" it out of existence. What is imperative, he feels, is the explicit recognition in principle of what has always been true in fact, namely, that responsibilities for preventing war are not equal, but graded. He realistically acknowledges that European States, including Great Britain and France, have always been slow to move where their own national interests were not involved. He concludes therefrom that the United States, out on the rim, should not be expected to renounce its enviable geographic advantage.

Nevertheless, not isolation but graded co-operation might well be expected of us in view of our having signed the Kellogg Pact. Regional disturbances should be taken care of positively, through regional pacts of mutual assistance under the auspices of the League, like the Locarno Pact. But peace-loving nations even on the outer rim should at least give negative support by not sabotaging the more positive measures adopted by nations more closely concerned, that is, the United States should neither aid the aggressor nor declare an equal embargo on aggressor and victim and other League members alike.

Such negative support, however, is not only pregnant with consequences but also with important presuppositions. Professor Shotwell does not overlook them, but

proposes either that an associate membership be provided for states like the United States, or, failing that, that by making the Pact of Paris the preamble to the Covenant the states having signed the former be invited to participate—not only to observe—in emergency League conferences and in certain permanent and regularly recurring conferences as well. Professor Shotwell is clearly attempting to bring the League and the United States into closer co-operation. In no other way, he feels, can the peace of the world be made secure. This runs counter, of course, to the prevailing American faith in the greater security of an impartial neutrality program. But whatever one's peace party and strategy, this book is an indispensable textbook for all persons intelligently interested in peace.

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ.

Wesleyan University,
Middletown, Connecticut.

The Christian Faith. By ALFRED E. GARVIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.25.

What Is the Faith? By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

The Christian Faith. Edited by W. R. MATTHEWS. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$3.00.

THESE three volumes, all from British writers, are welcome additions to the rich stream of present-day theological discussion. Together they give an interesting picture of currents in contemporary thought. Doctor Garvie's work is ripe fruit from long years of study and teaching, aware of current movements but not too easily swayed by them. It is a compact and inclusive outline of theology, perhaps seeking to comprehend too much,

as when the classical arguments for the being of God are condensed in one page. His liberalism loses none of the great Christian convictions, but he makes effective protest against Barth's doctrine of man and against revived teachings about an impassible God. Excellent are the brief sections that refer to Christ and the Spirit.

Principal Micklem is a Congregationalist like Doctor Garvie, brought up in the liberalist tradition, and well aware that he cannot give up its critical-historical method and its open-minded search. But he has more fear of that relativism and humanism which threaten to dissolve the central Christian conviction and not least its basic conviction concerning the living God. The way out for him is not through philosophical considerations. He reveals rather the common agnosticism which seeks escape by a new authoritarianism. His first task is to show that Christianity means belief in revelation. Convincingly he points out the heart of the New Testament, faith in "the Word," not as a sum of Scriptures already at hand or yet to be written, but as the message of the living God who has spoken to men in Jesus Christ. Rightly he sees that this Word is really a deed, the deed of the Eternal in time as He comes to men. Next he pleads for "a catholicism of the Word," but "the Word" soon appears as dogma, a term rather ambiguously and unfortunately used by the author as designating the truths necessarily involved in the Word. Finally, he moves on to identify the Christian faith with a particular type of theology. Nominally he distinguishes Word, dogma, and theology. He confesses, however, that he cannot draw the line between them, and the Christianity that he offers holds the Trinity as "the only all-comprehensive Christian *dogma*," that is, as

necessary belief. This dogma, as Doctor Micklem presents it, includes the traditional two-nature doctrine of Christ with its Greek abstractions and its "anhypostatic" humanity (what some of us would consider a denial of a real incarnation), with hypostasis instead of person, and speculative distinctions incomprehensible to the common man. (Does the theologian himself understand them?) The plain man can understand how in Christ God has come to man in forgiveness and life, and how God gives Himself to man as indwelling Spirit. But here these concrete realities of history and experience once more retreat before speculations about the Thinker, his Thought, and the mutual Love between Thinker and Thought which must have a subsistence of its own as a third "hypostasis" in the Trinity. Doctor Micklem holds that this is necessarily implied in thinking of God as personal, and that "without it we may be pantheists or atheists or philosophical absolutists or monists, but we cannot believe in a personal God." The influence of Barth for both good and ill is apparent in this neo-orthodoxy. It is written in admirable spirit, is penetrating in thought, and has much to offer to those concerned with the crucial questions as to the nature and certainty of our faith. But if this be "the Christian faith," then its adherents must either be philosophical adepts or passively submissive to ecclesiastical tradition.

We can only approve the purpose of the volume edited by Dean Matthews, to present to intelligent men and women a present-day interpretation of Christianity. There is no watering down of results of research nor writing down that dodges vital matters. The names vouch for the standing of the book though results are not of equal value. Sidney Cave discusses "Why Christianity?" as compared

with other religions. A consideration of the alternatives offered in western movements of thought would have been more pertinent to the purpose of the volume. J. K. Mozley writes on the Bible. The editor writes about the what and the why of belief in God. G. S. Duncan gives the status of present-day discussion of the historical value of the Gospels, though the problems raised by the form-criticism receive more attention in Rawlinson's chapter on Christ. Nathaniel Micklem presents "The Primitive Church." Sin and redemption are well treated by J. S. Whale and Wheeler Robinson. Edwyn Bevan sees the Church as "the Body made one by one Divine Life and one Holy Ghost." Francis Underhill on "Christian Worship," F. R. Barry on "The Christian Way of Life," and Percy Dearmer on "Christianity and Civilization" complete the volume.

The writers are men who speak with authority in their fields, and a good share of nonconformists are included. There was clearly no effort to secure uniformity in viewpoint, which makes the work the more valuable.

HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL.

Garrett Biblical Institute.

Hebrew Origins. By THEOPHILE JAMES MEEK. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.00.

In the historical study of Hebrew religion there is no more fascinating problem than that of origins. The Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Toronto has here contributed an interesting, fresh, and quite independent study. In six compact chapters he deals with the Origin of the Hebrew People, of Hebrew Law, of the Hebrew God, of the Hebrew Priesthood, and of Hebrew Monotheism. The author has a remarkably wide grasp of the English, German, and French

literature in the field and his work is carefully documented. It makes appeal both to the specialist and to the earnest, non-technical student of the Hebrew Scriptures. It is written in a clear, readable English style, and it brings a reasonably wide grasp of archaeological investigation to the illumination of the subject.

In Chapter I the author deals with the difficult subject of the *Habiru*, studying their appearance in sources dating from c. 2000 B. C., and with the *'Apiru*, noting their appearance in Egyptian sources dating from c. 1300 B. C. The Biblical term Hebrew (*'ibri*) is identical with these and when we first meet it (Genesis 14) it has become a gentile term and designates an ethnic group. Before this, the term, namely, *Habiru* or *'Apiru*, is not ethnic but "a degrading, derogatory appellation, a mark of inferiority, denoting an alien, a barbarian, a Beduin . . . a mock name that ridiculed its bearers." It designates "one who passes," a transient, a nomad. In the earliest sources, the Hebrews are aliens, adventurers, mercenaries, selling their services now to the Babylonians, now to the Hurrians (Horites), now to the Hittites or Amorites. He views Abraham's migration as being a part of the Hurrian and to be dated not earlier than the nineteenth century B. C. The Hyksos, who include Semites, Hittites, Luvians, and Hurrians, are mirrored in the Egyptian contacts of the patriarchal traditions. The earliest movement of the Hebrew Conquest, under the leadership of Joshua, which captured Jericho, Shechem, Gibeon, Mizpeh, and Shiloh, is reflected in the movements of the *Habiru* in the Tell el-Amarna period. The confederacy established at Shechem under Joshua represents the beginnings of the Israelites (*bēnê Yisrael*). The second phase of the Hebrew Conquest started from Kadesh

and was under the leadership of Judah, which tribe included the Levites, who alone of the tribes had been in Egypt and consequently had been under the influence of Moses.

Doctor Meek does not take adequate account of the very early entrance of Judah as an Aramaean tribe from the east (Genesis 29), centuries before the southern invasion from Kadesh. The cultural superiority of Israel over Judah (page 43) was not due to the longer residence of the former in the land, but to the nature of the territory occupied with its nomadic affiliations. In the ancient Judean poem (Genesis 49) Judah comes fourth and in the ancient Israelite poem (Deuteronomy 33) it comes second among the tribes. In the certainly old traditions giving the tribal scheme it comes fourth (Genesis 29. 35). Moreover, Doctor Meek ignores the strong tradition of the Joseph tribes (Ephraim and Manasseh) in Egypt, where it is reasonable to believe they may have come under the influence of Moses. It is the Joseph tribes that represent normative Israel.

Doctor Meek makes a first-hand comparison of Hebrew law with the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (twentieth century), the Assyrian Code (fifteenth century) and the Hittite Code (fourteenth century). He finds little influence from the Hittite, more from the Assyrian, especially with regard to marriage, but most from the Babylonian. While the Babylonian code came from the political rulers whose interest was primarily in economic prosperity, the Hebrew law came largely from the priests and prophets, whose chief concern was a better social and religious life, and thrills with a prophetic humanitarianism.

He traces the development of the Hebrew God through various stages, naturalism, animism, polydaemonism and poly-

theism, to the emergence of a single deity for the clan. He shows how the priesthood had its rise in the necessity for specialists of long experience in the magical practices and ritual observances. The Levites were originally a secular tribe and worshiped the serpent god Nahash or Nehushtan. By championing the cause of Yahweh, God of Judah, they were saved from complete extinction or absorption and became a priestly guild.

Dealing with the origin of Hebrew prophecy, he views the prophet as the nonprofessional and nonhereditary leader, gifted with mystical insight and subject to profound ecstatic seizure, which was "a real, ineffable experience of the mind." He traces the development of prophecy, beginning with Moses and Deborah, continuing through the seer, and reaching with the *nābi'* or preacher type, a new phase. The prophetic bands were flaming firebrands of war, preaching a politico-religious crusade. The contest between Yahweh and the Bull cult produced such men as Elijah, Elisha, and Micaiah. The protest against the professionalizing of the office of interpreter of Yahweh found its first full expression in Amos and the great ethical prophets. They were religious geniuses concerned about the present, but also challenged a new world order. Doctor Meek ignores the positive influences of the Canaanite prophets in the development of the ecstatic in Israel and in their contribution of mystical awareness of the divine, union with deity, passion and intensity.

Doctor Meek is convinced that monotheism did not antedate polytheism. The Sumerians were not, as Langdon has recently maintained, originally monotheists. Moses was not a monotheist but a henotheist. In Palestine Yahweh became the state deity, but the fertility deities of the land continued to be worshiped as

well, until the prophets arose. They were intolerant of any and every alien deity and opposed the high-place worship with its resulting syncretism of the local Baal cults with Yahwism. Hosea, however, had the genius to see how futile it was to preach an austere desert god to an agricultural people. He "disengaged the life of agriculture from the perils which threatened religion and succeeded in making an alliance between civilization and the religion of Israel, and he succeeded in commending Yahweh to his people, divorced from all licentious practices, idolatry, and magic rites." The conception of Yahweh as the god of two distinct peoples, Judah and Israel, along with the prophetic idea that he could use Assyria to punish them, led the Hebrews to view Yahweh as a universal God. Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah brought this to its distinctly Israelite expression.

No one can read this book without having his knowledge of Old-Testament life and religion broadened and deepened. And where the author is not convincing, he is always suggestive. *Hebrew Origins* merits the careful, grappling reading of a wide circle of Biblical scholars, teachers, and students.

ELMER A. LESLIE.

Boston University School
of Theology.

The Civilized Mind. Forest Essays, Second Series. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

A FELLOW-THINKING makes us wondrous kind. Doctor Hough, in these thirteen essays, shows his sincere admiration by modeling his writings after the notable Shelburne Essays of the late Paul Elmer More, by dedicating this volume to his memory, and by reflecting the teaching of that humanistic school of which the

Princeton professor, together with Irving Babbitt, was a leader. The penetrating indictment of naturalism; the dualism, the Platonic tradition, and the high Christology of Professor More find expression and specific reference in about six of the chapters. It is this heritage, we believe, that enables the author to guide his bark between the Scylla of a splendidly null scholarship and the Charybdis of "social idolatry."

The Dean of Drew University moves, like a citizen of world literature, with easy grace on the thought-highways. In a day of violent reactions and half-truths, he exemplifies the ability for "mental mobilization," of which he writes. Of Marlowe it was said that he had found more than an education—he had found his mind, and it is for this that Doctor Hough contends and also illustrates unconsciously in his world-view.

Our day, it is true, has fewer "light half-believers of casual creeds," but there is a grave blurring of vital distinctions, and the weary liberals of the Christian fold require preaching that will save us from "a worm-eyed view of the universe." Truly, the hungry sheep look up, and if they are fed it is frequently either

by those who mouth musty stale-news as an echo; or by others who serve up sublimated sociology and call it gospel.

Dean Hough would have Theology again assume her throne as Queen of the Sciences. She has, indeed, fallen from her high estate to become a charwoman for university professors, and a bond-maiden for both the sovereign and the Totalitarian State. In his chivalrous rescue, however, one wonders whether more would not be gained by making her autonomous in her own realm, rather than by redefining science to include other than causal sequences and measurable phenomena.

At times, in this volume, one has the feeling of over-simplification. For instance, there is a refrainlike reference to a threefold classification in subhuman, human, and superhuman. Yet one puts down *The Civilized Mind* with a sense of appreciation that such an ability to ransack the ages for material is compatible with the great evangelical tradition, and that still, with Browning, we see the Christ stand.

W. P. LEMON.

First Presbyterian Church,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Bookish Brevities

The Saturday Review of Literature pictures Lloyd C. Douglas, Gaius Glenn Atkins, Harry Emerson Fosdick, and E. Stanley Jones as leading religious writers.

The most competent and dependable discussions of foreign literature, and especially of South American literature, to be found in America is in *Books Abroad*, a quarterly published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

One of the new books, described in two religious papers as a "must" book, has been returned by two distinguished Christian scholars, to whom it had been successively referred, with the comment that it is unworthy of review in RELIGION IN LIFE.

Charles W. Ferguson reports that there are 125 stores in America which major in the sale of religious books.

Dumas Malone, editor of *The Dictionary of American Biography* and of *The Harvard University Press*, ranks America's foremost men of letters in this order: Emerson, Hawthorne, Mark Twain, Whitman, Poe, Thoreau, Henry James, and Cooper.

E. Stanley Jones, who has been conducting his Ashram, and who had planned to give six months to evangelistic work in China, especially among students and with an emphasis upon the creation of Christian homes, was obliged immediately upon landing to leave Shanghai for Manila where he is completing his next book, *The Choice Before Us*.

The endeavor of RELIGION IN LIFE to bring its readers various aspects of thought is illustrated by two articles in this number.

Dr. Roy Wood Sellars of Michigan University is acknowledged to be among the first philosophers in the United States. His article is written with eminent scholarship and earnest purpose, but it acclaims a Humanism against which Christian thinking is increasingly moving as insufficient.

Professor Louis J. A. Mercier of Harvard University, who writes on "Naturalism, Humanism and Religion," is a distinguished member of the Roman Catholic Church, as have been other members of his family. He writes with penetrating discrimination and the illumination of ripened culture.

The two articles are complementary and should be read together.

Basil Mathews, Professor of Christian World Relations in Boston University School of Theology, and author of *Shaping the Future* and several other books, was helpful in the organization of the Oxford Conference. Mr. Mathews began his literary career as private secretary to A. M. Fairbairn of Mansfield College, Oxford. *The Christian World*, upon whose staff he was for six years, speaks of him as "thinking in continents" and as being master of a vividly picturesque style. His next book is to be *The World in Which Jesus Lived*.

Books are serviceable objects, says the *London Spectator*. You can press flowers in them, you can stand on them to put vases on brackets. And they often look

quite nice lying about. An eminent firm of London booksellers, in their 1937 catalogue, observes of one of their new books—"No more magnificent ornament could be imagined for the hall of a large mansion than this beautiful volume lying on an old oak table."

Of this same sort is a letter which came to the business office of RELIGION IN LIFE. "We will soon have here our annual Inter-Church field meet where all the denominations play together. We have no admission fee and hundreds of people come each year. We have 150 events with prizes for each winner. I wondered if you would care to send three or four copies of RELIGION IN LIFE as prizes for some of the ministers' races."

Bernard De Voto, who from 1922 to 1927 taught English at Northwestern University, left the Harvard Faculty to assume the editorship of *The Saturday Review of Literature*. In his manifesto, he declared his belief that the values of literature are genuine values. "I believe that clear thinking is one of the most difficult and desirable things in the world, and that all absolutes are dangerous. I believe that the free meeting of diverse intelligences is as necessary to literature as to society. I believe that America is a nation sufficiently great to abide all the confusion, folly and despair of these times, and to triumph over them in its own terms and in harmony with its own traditions and institutions."

Without any semblance of imitation, how close are these standards to those of the late Henry van Dyke: "I believe that the best we can do for Literature is to cultivate an appreciation for that which is finest and most humane in the writings of the past and to teach young men and

women to know the difference between a book that is well written and a book that is badly written, to give them a standard by which they may judge and measure their own efforts at self-expression, and to inspire in the few who have an irresistible impulse to write, a sincere desire to find a clear, vivid and memorable form for the utterance of the best that is in them."

.

When a critic attacked Doctor van Dyke with the cocksure savagery with which young critics of today are wont to assail writers of yesterday, he replied in these lines that were found unpublished in his desk after his death:

TO THERSITES

You seem to hate me. Well, what does it matter?

I do not have to read your peppery patter, Nor you my books! Let's take our ways apart,

And follow each the guidance of his heart.

You say God's dead, and life's a bawdy tale;

I think God lives, and goodness will prevail.

You mock mankind with lewd ungainly mirth:

I find a lot of folks to love on earth.

On prejudice you feed and nurse your spleen:

I'd rather have more wholesome food, and clean.

You write a language hitherto unknown; To Shakespeare's tongue and faith, I fealty own.

So ride your road, Smart Aleck, gaily ride;

I keep my path; the future will decide.

INDEX—VOLUME VI

A

- Adventure of Christianity, The: *Sayre*, 125.
Aesthetic Experience and the Good Life: *Newhall*, 84.
Apocrypha, The: *Hawley*, 561.
Appreciating Creation: *Whitney*, 502.
Atkins: Dwight Lyman Moody, 323.

B

- Bennett*: Church and State: A. Wealth of Recent Books, 133.
The Contribution of Reinhold Niebuhr, 268.
Berg: The Crock of Gold, 432.
Bodein: Walter Rauschenbusch, 420.
Brown: The Need and the Possibility of an Ecumenical Theology, 3.
Business of Preaching, The: *Paterson*, 62.

C

- Can We Believe in Progress? *Thomas*, 70.
Chanter: The Foolishness of Preaching, 406.
Character, Science and Religion: *Ligon*, 218.
Christian Faith and the Common Life: *Temple*, 29.
Church and Communism, The: *Tillich*, 347.
Church and Democracy, The: *Harkness*, 368.
Church and Fascism, The: *Krusé*, 358.
Church and the Modern World, The: *Urban*, 93.
Church and State—A Relationship in Equity: *Harmon*, 208.
Church and State: A Wealth of Recent Books: *Bennett*, 133.
Church Union in Canada and in the United States: *Gilroy*, 392.
Contribution of Paul Tillich, The: *Niebuhr*, 574.
Contribution of Reinhold Niebuhr, The: *Bennett*, 268.
Crock of Gold, The: *Berg*, 432.

D

- Demonic Influence of National Sovereignty, The: *The Marquess of Lothian*, 16.
Dickie: Religious Experience: Its Validity, 493.
Dulles: The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World, 191.
Dwight Lyman Moody: *Atkins*, 323.

E

- Elliott*: Life Dramatic, 588.

F

- Far Eastern Situation, The: *Welch*, 290.
Foolishness of Preaching, The: *Chanter*, 406.
Forgotten Source of Ethics, A: *Menzel*, 62.
Frantz: The Interpreter's House, 582.

G

- Gilroy*: Church Union in Canada and in the United States, 392.
God: Process or Personal Power? *Ramsdell*, 107.
Grant: Presenting Religion to Youth, 381.

H

- Harkness*: The Church and Democracy, 368.
Harmon: Church and State—A Relationship in Equity, 208.
Hawley: The Apocrypha, 561.
Holy Spirit in the Poets, The: *Hoyle*, 244.
Hough: Making Theology Available for Religion, 552.

- Hoyle*: The Holy Spirit in the Poets, 244.
Recent British and Continental Theological Literature, 615.
Recent Theological Books: British and Continental, 448.

I

- Intercessory Prayer: *McEwen*, 334.
Interpreter's House, The: *Frantz*, 582.

J

- James—Practical Mystic: *Wishart*, 257.
John: *Moffatt*, 41.

K

- Krusé*: The Church and Fascism, 358.

L

- Life Dramatic: *Elliott*, 588.
Ligon: Character, Science and Religion, 218.

M

- McCutchan*: The New Order in Church Music, 601.
McEwen: Intercessory Prayer, 334.
Mack: Religious Books Which Endure, 443.
Mackay: The Restoration of Theology, 163.
Making Theology Available for Religion: *Hough*, 552.
Marquess of Lothian, The: The Demonic Influence of National Sovereignty, 16.
Menzel: A Forgotten Source of Ethics, 52.
Mercier: Naturalism, Humanism, and Religion, 538.
Moffatt: John, 41.

N

- Naturalism, Humanism, and Religion: *Mercier*, 538.
Need and the Possibility of an Ecumenical Theology, The: *Brown*, 3.
New Order in Church Music, The: *McCutchan*, 601.
Newhall: Aesthetic Experience and the Good Life, 84.
Niebuhr: The Contribution of Paul Tillich, 574.
Notes on the Problem of Evil: *Potest*, 284.

P

- Park*: What Is a Church For? 291.
Paterson: The Business of Preaching, 62.
Potest: Notes on the Problem of Evil, 284.
Preaching and the Christian Year: *Robbins*, 235.
Presenting Religion to Youth: *Grant*, 381.
Premises of Theology and the Task of Preaching, The: *Van Dusen*, 180.
Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World, The: *Dulles*, 191.

R

- Ramsdell*: God: Process or Personal Power? 107.
Recent British and Continental Theological Literature, *Hoyle*, 615.
Recent Theological Books: British and Continental: *Hoyle*, 448.
Religion Faces Naturalism: *Sellers*, 526.
Religious Books Which Endure: *Mack*, 443.
Religious Conflict in Germany, The: *Vernon*, 112.
Religious Experience: Its Validity: *Dickie*, 493.

Restoration of Theology, The: *Mackay*, 163.
Robbins: Preaching and the Christian Year, 235.

S

Sayre: The Adventure of Christianity, 125.
 The Winning of Peace, 483.
Sellars: Religion Faces Naturalism, 526.
Stewart: What Is Man? 510.

T

Temple: Christian Faith and the Common Life,
 29.
Thomas: Can We Believe in Progress? 70.
Tillich: The Church and Communism, 347.

U

Urban: The Church and the Modern World, 93.

V

Van Dusen: The Premises of Theology and the
 Task of Preaching, 180.
Vernon: The Religious Conflict in Germany, 112.

W

Walter Rauschenbusch: *Bodein*, 420.
Welch: The Far Eastern Situation, 299.
 What Is a Church For? *Park*, 291.
 What Is Man? *Stewart*, 510.
Whitney: Appreciating Creation, 502.
 Winning of Peace, The: *Sayre*, 483.
Wishart: James—Practical Mystic, 257.

Book Reviews, 140, 306, 455, 620.
 Bookish Brevities, 159, 319, 479, 637.

